

Resurrecting the Jew is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the emergence of “Poland’s Jewish turn” in the post-communist era (8); the second chapter examines the commemoration of Jewish absence in the urban landscape; the third chapter offers an overview of nostalgic, romantic longings for Jews; the fourth chapter discusses the Polin Museum of the History of Polish Jews; the fifth chapter identifies different kinds of engagement with the Polish Jewish past, including such registers as “crude cultural appropriation,” “casual engagement,” “romantic engagement,” “critical-introspective engagement,” and “political engagement” (157); the sixth chapter looks at the revitalization of Jewish life in Poland since 1989; and the seventh chapter summarizes the book’s main conclusions, suggesting that Poland’s Jewish turn has “lessons and implications well beyond Poland” (197). As to the latter, Zubrzycki poses a question of considerable breadth at the end of her book: “How do we represent that which remains lost? How do we reincorporate that which is no longer?” (200).

This is a large and important question, one which I would like to reflect on briefly by considering one of the most ambitious examples that Zubrzycki discusses, the Polin Museum. Polin aims to narrate 1,000 years of Jewish life in Polish-speaking Europe. As a commemorative museum, it strives to remember the dead by presenting aspects of Jewish cultural, economic, religious, and intellectual life. Though this commemorative imperative to remember the dead reflects a seemingly axiomatic response to death in contemporary Europe, if not in western history more broadly, it is ultimately, as Zubrzycki’s concluding questions intimate, a fragile response, or, in more ancient Greek terms, a tragic response; tragic in the sense that remembrance cannot heal the painful wounds of loss and death, no matter how beautiful or poignant a particular act of remembrance might be.

A beautiful building houses the Polin Museum, and its exhibition reflects beautiful work by many dedicated scholars. Yet, when reflecting on the museum after reading Zubrzycki’s brilliant chapter about it, I could not help but think about the fragility of memory, about the fragility of history; I could not help but ask: can memory, can history, respond adequately to loss? For what is an adequate response to death in the first place?

These are large and important questions indeed but perhaps ones that can easily be avoided amid all the battles about history in Poland and elsewhere, including here in the United States. I might even hazard to say that such debates attract and hold our attention partly because they turn us away from recognizing and confronting the fragility of memory as a response to death: perhaps we prefer to argue about what should be remembered and how it should be remembered rather than think about the limits of memory since, after all, memory can achieve its goal of overcoming death, of resurrecting the dead, to borrow from Zubrzycki’s title, only in a metaphorical sense. By prompting such thoughts and questions, Zubrzycki has written an excellent and thoughtful book that deserves to read by a wide range of scholars and students in sociology, history, and European studies.

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First Nationalism Then Identity: On Bosnian Muslims and Their Bosniak Identity.

By Mirsad Kriještorac. *Ethnic Conflict: Studies in Nationality, Race, and Culture.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022. xviii, 330 pp. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. \$85.00 hard bound; \$44.95, paper.

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It took at least a decade after the end of the Bosnian War for scholars and researchers to begin to look at the situation of diaspora Bosnians in the United States. While such

communities in St. Louis, Chicago, and New York City, among others, had already existed before the war, the great influx of refugees escaping the fighting and the post-war disorder greatly increased the populations there and, therefore, the push to study the challenges and tribulations of Bosnians living in the US. Several books about this topic have appeared within the last five years, mostly focusing on the Bosnian Muslims living in the US. One of the most recent books is the title reviewed here.

Mirsad Kriještorac explores the hypothesis that a group of people that has experienced a significant alteration in its societal conditions may emerge from that experience with a strikingly new self-identification. However, that identity, he asserts, will emerge only after the group, primarily through the group's elites, succeeds in articulating a nationalist perspective, not the other way around. In setting up this chicken or egg problem, the author's position is expressed by his book's title, *First Nationalism Then Identity*.

In order to clarify the relationship between nationalism and identity, the author focuses on the attitudes of members of the Bosnian Muslim diaspora in three large American cities and several smaller enclaves, each of which houses a significant, or at least noticeable, number of Bosnian Muslim expatriates: New York City; St. Louis; Chicago; Atlanta; Detroit; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Erie, Pennsylvania; Elmwood, New Jersey; Lincoln, Nebraska; and Waterloo, Iowa. These sites were chosen because the Bosnian Muslim populations there maintained their own visible and active religious, cultural, and social centers in various manifestations, although almost three-fourths of the data for the study came from the first-mentioned three most populous cities.

The polling questions used for the study were meant to tease out whether nationalism could be considered the driving instrument for the acquisition of a new self-identity, what the author refers to throughout the study as a "new salient identity." Furthermore, did the trauma of the Bosnian War and the large-scale movement of Bosnian Muslims from their homeland animate, or perhaps simply accelerate, a process of national feeling among the Bosnian Muslim elites. And, did the elites influence their co-nationals, which then could (or did) produce a new self-identification among this population? The study also addressed other questions, such as the components of this national identification and whether such variables as age, gender, education, economic interaction with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and other factors might affect the type or strength of nationalist feeling and thus create a new self-identification.

Kriještorac seeks to illuminate the content of nationalism as developed outside of the nation-state that is the referent for the diaspora group. His choice of the Bosnian Muslims as his case study is quite interesting in that, while BiH had a brief medieval independent existence, until the late twentieth century it had been forced to be part of a variety of larger entities. While Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats could, conceivably, have had loyalties to Serbia and Croatia, respectively, in their various historical forms, the Bosnian Muslims had no other ethnoreligious/state modality to entice their loyalty, except secular, communist Yugoslavia. Therefore, the author was dealing with a group of people whose identification with BiH was not permitted to blossom fully until the collapse of Yugoslavia and the final guns of the Bosnian War were silenced. Most Bosnian Muslims remaining within BiH probably have a very strong attachment to the state that they fought for or returned to after the war, a question outside the purview of this inquiry. But what about those who have created a life outside of that country? For example, does the name Bosniak, adopted by many Bosnian Muslims to identify their national status, resonate with the diaspora? This study has sought to answer the question of the strength and salience of the diaspora population's attachment to BiH and whether a new identity based on a national feeling is emerging. This investigation is worth examining for those

who question the future of a stable BiH, based on a loyal citizenry and supportive diaspora. Of course, next, it would be worthwhile (even imperative) to ferret out the strength of attachment to BiH of its other constituent peoples (and “Others”?), both at home and in the diaspora, even though their identification with BiH might be of a different type or strength than that of the Bosnian Muslims due to historical and socio-religious factors.

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The Moneywasting Machine: Five Months Inside Serbia’s Ministry of Economy.

By Dušan Pavlović. Trans. Goran Gocić. Budapest: CEU Press, 2022. vii, 156 pp.

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Dušan Pavlović’s book is a rare insider look at the economic policy-making process in Serbia, where most academic eyes over the last decades have been focused on politics alone, as if wars, nationalism, and persistent authoritarian tendencies could be abstracted from both domestic and international economic concerns. Pavlović’s book was first published in Serbian, where it quickly became a bestseller by local standards. It is now available to English-speaking audiences in the excellent translation by Goran Gocić.

Between September 2013 and January 2014, Pavlović served as an advisor to Saša Radulović, Minister of Economy in the cabinet of Ivica Dačić, leader of Serbian Socialist Party and once Minister of Information under Slobodan Milošević. The government was, however, dominated by the rising star of Aleksandar Vučić, at that time a Deputy Prime Minister, and the head of Serbian Progressive Party, the largest party in the parliament. Pavlović entered the government incited by the prospect of substantial economic reforms, following upon the many broken promises by the Serbian democratic opposition to do so. Pavlović resigned, along with Radulović, just five months later, when it became obvious that political interests—and politicians’ and parties’ self-interests—would continue to override what Pavlović saw as much-needed economic and market rationality in Serbia.

Pavlović’s analysis focuses on the work of “extractivist institutions,” which “lie at the core of the money-wasting machine” (29) of the Serbian state. Citing Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, (*Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, New York, 2012; 76), he calls them extractive “because such institutions are designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset” (37). They are characterized by rent-seeking, soft budget constraint, and party patronage (15). In Serbia, according to Pavlović, the primary culprit in such transfer of wealth and resources are socially-owned enterprises entwined with party clientelism, but also state subsidies to foreign investors doled out without any accountability or conditionality. Delayed restructuring of large socially-owned enterprises resulted in perpetual economic losses covered by the state—but also in the perpetual delivery of votes to any and all parties in government. Botched privatization and sale of companies to foreign investors often entailed guarantees of tax breaks or other subsidies without any demands for delivery in return. Within the Ministry of Economy itself, several agencies—Development Fund, the Serbian Export and Promotion Agency (SIEPA), The Serbian Export Credit and Insurance Agency, the Bankruptcy Supervision Agency, and the Privatization Agency, acted as midwives to the recurring extractivism. In Pavlović’s view, the durability of these institutions and