

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

AN APPEAL

DEAR SIR,

A disastrous fire, during the night before Christmas Eve, destroyed a large portion of the Library of the University of the Witwatersrand, including many Philosophical and Psychological works.

The contents of the Library were only partially covered by Insurance, and the prevailing depression makes it difficult to find the money for promptly replacing the losses.

May I, in these circumstances, appeal through the pages of *Philosophy* to all fellow Philosophers and Psychologists, and especially to my friends and colleagues at British Universities, to help me in building up again, as soon as possible, an adequate collection of books for my students.

Every gift of author's copies or of duplicates—addressed to The Librarian, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa—will be gratefully acknowledged, and the donor's name, together with the occasion of the gift, will be recorded in the books themselves.

Yours faithfully,

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

Head of the Department of Philosophy.

University of the Witwatersrand,
Milner Park, Johannesburg,
February 22, 1932.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

Mr. Rex Knight, in the current number of *Philosophy* (April 1932), questions what I say in my review of Professor Stout's *Mind and Matter*.

Professor Stout writes that "from the time of Descartes the traditional and orthodox view has been that the secondary qualities do not qualify matter at all" (p. 127). I pointed out in my review that Locke, and probably Descartes, did not use the phrase "secondary qualities" in this sense. Mr. Rex Knight admits as much.

He defends its use, however, on the ground that it is the *traditional view*, and suggests that Professor Stout in referring to the traditional view is well aware of Locke's different usage. Whether the above passage supports that interpretation must be a matter of opinion. In any case, it might be asked whether the *traditional view* is anything else than a misunderstanding of Locke's view.

Mr. Rex Knight then asks where did Descartes assert that secondary qualities qualify matter. Nothing that I said requires me to answer.

I am,

Your obedient servant,

B. M. LAING.

The University, Sheffield,
April 30, 1932.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

As a keen student of Philosophy, a staunch supporter of the Institute and its *Journal* since their inception, you may possibly allow me to express some surprise that such a very thin, inadequate review of a work so stimulating and important as *Zermatt Dialogues* should have appeared in the April issue of *Philosophy*, where one had expected to read at least a competent and thorough discussion of the basic theses and ideas put forward in that book.

Fully three-fourths of the space is given to quasi-humorous attacks on the author, apparently because of his unheard-of audacity in venturing to criticize, even respectfully, such exalted deities (worshipped by Mr. Turner of course) as Bradley and Bosanquet—the English echoes possibly improvers upon the Zeus of that Olympus—Hegel.

That even severe criticism of Hegel himself, to say nothing of his Oxford followers, is by no means “improper” seems pretty obvious from what Mr. Loevenberg says about Hegel in his review of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind* in the April issue of *Mind*. Hegel is here convicted of employing “many equivocal terms and phrases”; of “descending to outrageous puns to take the place of serious argument”; and, incidentally, he receives many hard knocks and stinging epithets.

Surely if Zeus himself may be thus criticized, the lesser Oxford Olympians have no good reason to complain either of the substance or the form of Mr. Fawcett’s critical remarks.

But really all this is not the main point to which I wish to call attention. That point is simply and briefly a complaint that nowhere in Mr. Turner’s review is any attempt made to discuss the fundamental, vitally important and significant issues raised in Mr. Fawcett’s constructive work. All these are ignored, passed over in favour of verbal fault-finding. Nor is even the basic difference between Mr. Fawcett and Hegel brought out, viz., that while for Hegel Categories, Concepts, Conceptual types of Thought are the very essence and life of “God” or “The Idea,” or The Absolute, for Mr. Fawcett Reality lies rather in the anti-conceptualist direction adopted by Schelling, Schopenhauer and others. Thus Mr. Fawcett sees no call for a “logic” giving their dialectical articulation. For according to his view “Concepts” are essentially “substitute facts,” human products, with no internal moving force or life. But this fundamental position is neither discussed nor even taken seriously by the reviewer.

Above all, I regret the omission, alike in Professor Mackenzie’s review in *Mind*, in Mr. Turner’s in *Philosophy*, and in all the notices of *Zermatt Dialogues* which I have seen, to consider and discuss with any thoroughness the main theses and contentions of his work. In those I have seen, often laudatory and appreciative, the consideration of side issues, at best of minor importance, has crowded out and concealed the essential, fundamental issues raised. For example, I have seen no attempt anywhere seriously to discuss the case for and against belief in Divine Imagining as the Root of All. Nor have I come across any real discussion of Mr. Fawcett’s contention that Time, Space and Causation are all alike creations of Divine Imagining, nor his view that when thus regarded and treated, solutions are found, and satisfying ones, for those same three perennial riddles of Philosophy.

That Mr. Fawcett’s theories as to world-genesis and the like should be ignored is not surprising. After all, they are secondary products, barely within the scope of Philosophy proper, in the narrower sense. But surely anything as fresh, as penetrating, as suggestive and stimulating as his root ideas in Philosophy and his brilliant argumentative support of them, not only in these *Zermatt Dialogues*, but more technically and elaborately in his earlier works, *The World as Imagination* and *Divine Imagining*, ought to receive some less inadequate treatment and discussion in the pages of such a publication as *Philosophy*, which avowedly aims at putting before the British public the most living and penetrating philosophical thinking of the day.

BERTRAM KEIGHTLEY.

BENARES, INDIA,

May 14, 1932.