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## International Organization

**Alexander E. Wendt**

**The Agent-Structure Problem**

**Joseph S. Nye, Jr.**

**Nuclear Learning**

**Lars Mjøset**

**Nordic Economic Policies**

**William H. Kaempfer**

**James A. Lehman**

**Anton D. Lowenberg**

**Anti-Apartheid Policy Instruments**

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**Nuclear Power Safety**

**Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons**

**Theories of International Regimes**

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# Abstracts

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## **The agent-structure problem in international relations theory**

by Alexander E. Wendt

While neorealism and world-system theory both claim to be “structural” theories of international relations, they embody very different understandings of system structure and structural explanation. Neorealists conceptualize system structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state agents, whereas world-system theorists conceptualize system structures in structuralist terms as generating state agents themselves. These differences stem from what are, in some respects, fundamentally opposed solutions to the “agent-structure” or “micro-macro” problem. This opposition, however, itself reflects a deeper failure of each theory to recognize the mutually constitutive nature of human agents and system structures—a failure which leads to deep-seated inadequacies in their respective explanations of state action. An alternative solution to the agent-structure problem, adapted from “structuration theory” in sociology, can overcome these inadequacies by avoiding both the reduction of system structures to state actors in neorealism and their reification in world-system theory. Structuration theory requires a philosophical basis in scientific realism, arguably the “new orthodoxy” in the philosophy of natural science, but as yet largely unrecognized by political scientists. The scientific realist/structuration approach generates an agenda for “structural-historical” research into the properties and dispositions of both state actors and the system structures in which they are embedded.

## **Nuclear learning and U.S.–Soviet security regimes**

by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

The concepts of regimes and learning have been developed in the Liberal theory of international relations, but their application has been mostly in the area of international political economy. U.S.–Soviet relations are generally explained solely in terms of Realist theory. The dichotomy is unfortunate because both strands of theory have something to contribute. Although the injunctions of an overall regime do not govern the U.S.–Soviet security relationship, it is possible to identify the injunctions and constraining effects of regimes in subissues of the security relationship. In five areas of the nuclear relationship (destructive power, control problems, proliferation, arms race stability, and deterrent force structure), it is possible to identify different

degrees of learning and to see how such learning affects and is affected by the development of regimes. Looking at the U.S.–Soviet security relationship in terms of learning and regimes raises new questions and opens a research agenda which helps us to think more broadly about the processes of political change in this area.

### **Nordic economic policies in the 1970s and 1980s**

by Lars Mjøset

Although the Nordic countries are small, open economies, they were able to benefit considerably from the expansion of the world economy during the “Golden Age” of the 1950s and 1960s. They achieved industrial diversification and consolidated welfare-state reforms. Throughout this period, several economic policy routines were institutionalized. These routines may be analyzed as parts of a specific economic policy model, determined by the economic structure and the pattern of political mobilization. It seems more fruitful to distinguish five such models rather than to use the generalizing notion of a “Scandinavian model.” In the 1970s, the world economic crisis posed new challenges for the Nordic countries. In the first phase of the crisis, economic policies continued to operate in accordance with the established routines. But structural problems, new patterns of political mobilization, and new forms of external pressure forced governments to shift towards austerity policies in the late 1970s. The extent and the specificities of these shifts are compared and the degree to which the economic policy models have changed assessed. Such an analysis is a first step to answer some crucial questions now facing the Nordic countries: Was their flexible adjustment merely the result of favorable conditions during the 1960s—or is it a permanent trait? Are they now trapped between large industrial nations and dynamic newly industrializing countries? If so, what will be the fate of their advanced welfare sectors?

### **Divestment, investment sanctions, and disinvestment: an evaluation of anti-apartheid policy instruments**

by William H. Kaempfer, James A. Lehman, and Anton D. Lowenberg

Pressure for divestment and mandatory disinvestment sanctions directed against South Africa are an instance of domestic interest groups in one country seeking policy change in another. The link from shareholder divestment to disinvestment by firms is tenuous, however (since South Africa-active firms do not seem to suffer as a consequence of divestment pressure), and legislated sanctions are likely to have unpredictable and sometimes perverse effects on the extent of apartheid practices.

### **Nuclear power safety and the role of international organization**

by Jack Barkenbus

Sovereign states determine the health and safety regulation of nuclear power facilities almost exclusively. Yet the Soviet nuclear power accident at Chernobyl (April 1986) demonstrated that nuclear power can have significant health and political effects transcending state boundaries. Several meetings have been held at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the Chernobyl accident, with delegates seeking to find the proper balance between auto-

mous state decision-making and international or transboundary interests. This article examines the nuclear safety role of IAEA in the past, and comes to conclusions regarding its likely role in the future. I claim that IAEA is unlikely to become a powerful regulatory “watchdog,” but that incremental changes in the agency could, over time, create a significant international presence.

### **Theories of international regimes**

by Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons

Over the last decade, international regimes have become a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations. This article provides a critical review of this literature. We survey contending definitions of regimes and suggest dimensions along which regimes vary over time or across cases; these dimensions might be used to operationalize “regime change.” We then examine four approaches to regime analysis: structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive. We conclude that the major shortcoming of the regimes literature is its failure to incorporate domestic politics adequately. We suggest a research program that begins with the central insights of the interdependence literature which have been ignored in the effort to construct “systemic” theory.