# DIOGENES

# The Idea of Trans-national Public Philosophy as a Comprehensive Trans-Discipline for the 21st Century

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## 1. Introduction

The term "public philosophy" appears to have come into usage in the 20th century, especially in the English-speaking world.[1] However, if we define the concept of public philosophy as "the philosophy, in which the various public issues such as political legitimacy, social justice, war and peace, environmental problems, public memory, etc. are discussed philosophically," concepts equivalent to this could be found in the classics of western as well as East-Asian countries. Indeed, a long tradition goes back more than 2,000 years. For example, Aristotelian practical philosophy, which was put forward in Ancient Greece and consists of ethics, politics, and rhetoric, could be regarded as the origin of public philosophy in western countries. This philosophy was influential in the Arabian medieval period as well as the European world and is now considered to be the origin of republican public philosophy. On the other hand, it is Confucian philosophy, represented by Confucius and Mencius, that might be regarded as the origin of East-Asian public philosophy. This East-Asian tradition was developed into neo-Confucian philosophy in medieval China by Zhu-zi as well as Wang Yang-min and it exerted much influence on Japanese as well as Korean public philosophy in the pre-modern era.

These traditions were transformed in modern Europe. Social-contract political theory represented by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant; economic theory represented by Smith, Malthus, and Marx; sociological theory represented by Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, and others appeared one after another. These theories were imported almost literally into East-Asian countries, especially into modern Japan from the end of 19th century, and began to compete with one another.

Moreover, it should be pointed out that modern socio-political as well as academic situations since the 19th century are characterized by the following two aspects:

(1) The development of public philosophies from cosmopolitan to nationalistic on the socio-political level.
(2) A change in the relationship between philosophy and social theories on the academic level.

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By clarifying these situations, this paper aims to propose trans-national public philosophy as a comprehensive trans-discipline for the 21st century.

First I will review the characteristics of public philosophies in the socio-political area since the 19th century, in Europe as well as Japan. Then I will review the transformation of academic situations in general from the 19th century until the present day. Finally I will attempt to propose trans-national public philosophy as a comprehensive trans-discipline for the 21st century – a discipline consisting of a new public ethics and glocal public philosophy, together with new understandings of self, others, and the public world.

## 2. The characteristics of public philosophies in the socio-political area since the 19th century in Europe and Japan

As is well known, Kant's writing on public philosophy, such as "What is Enlightenment" and *Toward Perpetual Peace*, penned in the late 18th century, was not composed for a particular nation but for citizens of the world. Indeed, his idea of "the public use of reason" was conceived as an indispensable right of the world citizen and his notion of "public orders" took in not only the national and international level but also the level of the world citizen (Kant 1996; 2006). In this sense he can be called a cosmopolitan public philosopher.

However, the development of public philosophies in western countries began to take on increasingly nationalistic features from the 19th century. Indeed Fichte, who saw himself as the genuine successor to Kant's transcendental philosophy, advocated a closed trade-state and the unification of German people into one nation in order to resist Napoleon's imperialism. Approaching this from the public-philosophical concept of the self, the Kantian cosmopolitan self was replaced in Fichte's work by a "national" self, which has to be generated through national education and culture (Fichte 2008). In this sense he can be called a nationalistic public philosopher.

In the case of Hegel, the matter is a little more complicated, because he thought that not only the national self but also the European self played the most important role in the public space. Hegel tried to describe the new modern Europe, changed by the French revolution as well as the industrial revolution, in a comprehensive way in his *Philosophy of Right* in 1821. He rejected Kantian cosmopolitanism as illusory and regarded the constitutional sovereign state, which was supposed to be legitimized by the mutual recognition of the people's freedom and excellent government officials, as the most important public institution (Hegel 2008). Unlike Fichte, however, Hegel attached great importance to world history, which was recognized as the progress of the consciousness of freedom among the people. By "the people" he meant merely the European people, because it was only they who knew the value of freedom. As for the Asian people, he despised them for their ignorance of freedom (Hegel 1970). This view of world history and world culture in Hegel contrasted sharply with that of Leibniz, who, as a cosmopolitan philosopher in the late 17th century and early 18th century, emphasized various individuals (monad) in the world and appreciated highly the Chinese intellectual culture of his day.[2] Thus Hegel became a representative of Eurocentric public philosophy, which had not really been seen before the 19th century.

After Hegel died, the constitutional nation-state system in Europe developed gradually but in a conflicting way, as was seen in the relationship between France and Germany. This conflict culminated in the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, which also revealed leftist internationalism to be an illusion. The Marxian belief that the proletariat has no national border was betrayed in that historical catastrophe by the fact that so many workers preferred their national identity to their international identity.

In that situation what is noteworthy in terms of public philosophy is that an American journalist, Walter Lippmann, published an epoch-making book and criticized the manipulation and stereotyping of public opinion on the basis of his experience during the First World War. According to him the people were manipulated in the pseudo-environment created by the media and became the mass, like the prisoners in the cave that Plato had criticized. In this regard, the public as an important actor of democracy is nothing but phantom (Lippmann 1922, 1993). Against this diagnosis, it is well known that John Dewey presented a counter-argument with the intention of rehabilitating the public (Dewey 1991). I shall discuss the contemporary relevance of this issue at the end of the paper. Next I will move on to the features of public philosophies in modern Japan. As is well known, Japan's modernization began with the Meiji Renovation in 1868, when the New Emperor replaced the Tokugawa Shogunate, feudal status was abolished, and construction of an integrated national polity started. It should be stressed that this renovation was not a coup d'état but a quasi revolution by the corporation of upper and lower samurais, who wished to change the Japanese system as a whole and deal with the great powers of the west from the 1850s. In this process I would like to focus my attention on a neo-Confucian public philosopher who exercised an intellectual influence on this movement, Yokoi Shonan (1809–69).

After Commodore Matthew Perry from the United States suddenly arrived in Japan in 1852, there was a hot debate between samurai as to whether to open up the country and trade with foreign nations or to do battle with foreigners and maintain national isolation. Shonan converted from the second position to the first based on a neo-Confucian thought, "Universal Public Principle (Logos) of Heaven and Earth (天地公共の実理)." According to him, this principle has a universal or transversal validity to distinguish between decent and indecent countries. On the international level Shonan approved of opening Japan up to foreign countries, because America and other western countries could be regarded as more decent than Japan. On the domestic level he considered that the ultimate legitimacy of politics lies in public discussion by Japanese people (公論、公議) and that Japan should become a more virtuous country through it. However, his quasi-cosmopolitan thought changed and increasingly stressed the importance of national defense after he had become conscious of the danger of the state egoism of western countries.[3]

In fact public philosophies in the Meiji era (since 1868) were closely connected with nationalism. For Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901), for example, who could be regarded as one of the representative modern public philosophers in Japan, it was most important to build the Japanese nation from each private person. He declared that there is only a government and no nation in Japan, and thought that the foundation of the Japanese nation should be realized by the power of individuals, who absorbed learning (Fukuzawa 1963). In this regard, his national and liberal public philosophy has been considered a good example to be realized by Japanese people up to the present day.

From an international perspective, however, his public philosophy, characterized in the slogan he advocated in 1885, after the breakdown of the revolutionary project led by Kim Ok-kiun in Korea: "Let's leave Asia (for Europe) (脱亜論)" was very ironic, because the Europe of that period recognized no substantial public space beyond the limits of each nation-state. In fact Fukuzawa (1973: ch.10) intended to establish a state sovereignty in Japan that would be just as strong as that seen in European powers. He showed little interest in other Asian countries, at least after 1885, and much more interest in the promotion of Japanese power. Consequently his thoughts on enlightenment did not offer the Japanese people any critical viewpoint against the colonialist behavior of the Japanese state in China from 1895 and in Korea from 1910.[4]

Thanks to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–22), Japan in the Taisho era (1912–26) was able to share in the First World War victory with other great powers. It should not be forgotten, however,

that Taisho democracy developed in the context of imperial Japan, for Japan in those days had colonial control of Taiwan from 1895 and Korea from 1910. Japan was really an empire in East Asia then. Domestically the important political outcomes of Taisho democracy were the party cabinet from 1918 and the establishment of universal male suffrage in 1925.

The most famous public philosopher of this era was Yoshino Sakuzo (1878–1933) at the University of Tokyo, who was a Christian and quasi-Hegelian thinker. In 1916 he advocated the idea of constitutional politics and political systems "rooted in the people（民本主義, *Minponshugi*)" instead of the term *democracy* (民主主義, *Minshushugi*), which could be associated with Rousseau's theory of general will. According to him, the first is compatible both with monarchism and the republic, though the second is compatible only with the republic. As with Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" mentioned above, Yoshino attached great importance to the role of professional policy-makers such as governmental officials and political parties entrusted by the Japanese people.

On the international level too Yoshino, who universalized a Hegelian view of history, considered Japan's victory over Russia, as well as China's revolution of 1911, as a victory for freedom over despotism. He studied intensively the modern history of China, focusing especially on revolutions, and even tried to justify the Chinese students' protest movement against feudalism and Japanese imperialism, which broke out on May 4, 1919, because it aimed for freedom and *Minponshugi* (民本主義).[5]

As regards Japanese colonial policy in Korea from 1910, Yoshino was not so radical as to want to aim at abolishing it, and indeed that was obviously one of his limits, but he was very critical of the assimilation policy in those days, which ignored the cultural identity of the Korean nation.

As for thinking about the relationship to Asia during that period, there were a few Japanese thinkers such as Miyazaki Toten (1871–1922), who advocated solidarity with revolutionary China against western colonialism and was admired by Yoshino (Miyazaki 1982), and Tachibana Shiraki (1881–1945), who called for inter-social solidarity among communities in China and Japan. Still they had only minimal influence on the Japanese nation. Instead the ultra-nationalistic tendency grew steadily to the extent that the Japanese government established the puppet-state of Manchukuo and allied with Nazi Germany. In this situation nothing was so deceptive as the ideology of "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (大東亜共栄圏)" put forward by the Japanese government in 1940, because the reality in East Asia was by no means co-prosperous in nature. Rather, it was merely imperialistic, as evidenced by the policy by which Japan forced East-Asian people to speak Japanese in their countries' schools. In addition, the ideology of "Overcoming Modernity," that is to say, defeating western individualism, liberalism, and capitalism, advocated in 1942 by some Japanese intellectuals, was based on totally ignoring Japan's imperialistic behavior in Asian countries.[6]

In this context I feel obliged to mention one first-class Japanese scholar of Islam: Okawa Shumei (1886–1957). Indeed, it is only through Okawa that Islamic philosophies were introduced into modern Japan. He translated the Koran into Japanese and published an introductory book about Islam. Unfortunately, however, he was so captured by nationalism that his sympathy with Asian thought and antipathy to western colonialism did not lead him to solidarity with other Asian people but to a Japan-centric expansionism. As a result he was charged with war crimes after the Second World War. It is a great pity that he was not able to develop his knowledge of Islam in a more cosmopolitan way.[7]

If we consider the situation of western Europe after the Second World War, it was greatly changed. The nightmare and trauma of two world wars forced European statesmen and people, particularly in Germany and France, to construct a public space that would go beyond the level of nation-state. Though the future of the EU still remains to be seen, the transformation from national into trans-national public space is continuing in today's Europe.

In contrast, a similar transformation is not evident in East-Asian countries. On the political level a serious problem is to be found within the postwar Japanese government, which made it a rule to follow uncritically the USA's international policies. And during the Second World War Japanese intellectuals were not without their faults as they focused on the modernization of the individual within the nation and did not attach much importance to the problems of overcoming the history of modern Japan in Asia. This is just the moment to develop a trans-national public philosophy in Japan, especially because the new cabinet, formed in September 2009, is advocating construction of the East-Asian community modeled on the EU.

I shall discuss this theme later.

## 3. Transformation of academic situations from the 19th century to the present

To begin with, I would like to introduce an overview of developments in social theory and philosophy since the beginning of the 19th century, dividing them into the following three periods:[8]

(1) The period of pre-specialization in the social sciences, when philosophy sought to unite and contain all sciences within itself, as exemplified by German idealism from Kant to Hegel. Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, written for his lectures at Berlin's Humboldt University in the 1820s, can be regarded as a typical example of the integrative philosophy of this period.

(2) The period of specialization, when the separation of the social sciences from philosophy took place, while specialization within the sciences continued. Max Weber's lecture *Science as a Vocation* (1919), in which he declared specialization to be the destiny of his time, is regarded as the classic view of science during this period.

(3) The period of post-specialization, when the relationship between the social sciences and philosophy, including ethics, is getting closer again, and may well characterize the scientific situation for the 21st century. This is the background against which I would like to develop trans-disciplinary as well as trans-national public philosophy.

I shall explain this scheme in detail.

To understand the great transformation of the academic situation in the 19th century, it would be advisable to begin with the comprehensive concept of philosophy in so-called German idealism as a classical paradigm of philosophy, which characterizes the period of pre-specialization in the social sciences. For in spite of metaphysical differences, the representative philosophers in this movement held the common idea that all sciences could obtain their validities through the basis of philosophy. Therefore they regarded philosophy not as a discipline but as trans-discipline that laid the foundations of all sciences.

Whether Kant belongs to German idealism or not, it is certain that Kant's new idea of a faculty of philosophy pursued by free-minded scholars, in distinction from that of theology, law, and medicine, provided an impetus to think about the location of philosophy in the university (Kant 1992). Indeed Schelling's famous book on the method of academic studies, published in 1803, stressed that philosophy could not be institutionalized as a specific discipline but should be learned as a fundamental science in a free association of all faculty members (Schelling 1974). This idea had a great influence on Wilhelm von Humboldt, who founded the Berlin University. Yet Schelling did not develop his theory of sciences any more after he had shifted his philosophical interest from

sciences to human evil and religion. Accordingly, we can hardly find any public philosophical social theory in his writing.

Unlike Schelling, Hegel kept up his interest in the systematic theory of sciences until his death. He regarded philosophy as the total system of philosophically founded knowledge, which consisted of logic, natural philosophy, and humanities (Hegel 1990). As is well shown by his declaration "philosophy is its time grasped in thought," it was especially important for Hegel (2008) to develop a philosophical system with regard to the new social and academic situation in the Europe of his day. As a matter of fact, his system of humanities contained anthropology, phenomenology, psychology, philosophy of rights, philosophy of arts, philosophy of religion, etc. It must be especially emphasized here that the Hegelian system is related closely to his theory of the development of human subjects, who acquire their knowledge through the process both of alienation and of realization. His public philosophy mainly presented in his *Philosophy of Right* also presupposed a theory such as *Phenomenology of Mind.*

However, this philosophical system was characterized by his Eurocentric thought, as was pointed out in the previous section. Moreover, it assumed the concept of absolute knowledge, which meant the ultimate place and the viewpoint of totality for the human subject to reach. Because such a concept was anticipated in his philosophy, it left an impression of a closed system and collapsed after his death.

The academic situation after Hegel's death can be called "the period of specialization of the sciences," while the Hegelian system was representative of "the period of pre-specialization." In fact philosophy lost its intellectual power to integrate sciences and many sciences became more and more independent of philosophy from the middle of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century. The faculty or department of natural sciences separated off from that of philosophy and new faculties or departments such as political science, economics, and sociology as special disciplines arose. In parallel, philosophy fell into a crisis of identity and was downgraded to a special discipline. In addition social theories which had a long tradition from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel, and not only described social realities but also pursued ideal visions of society, were de-philosophized and split into several special disciplines such as sociology, economics, political science, cultural anthropology, etc. As the most representative theorist of social sciences in this period, I would like now to address M Weber's view of science.

As regards the theory of science, Weber owed a lot to neo-Kantians such as H Rickert or W Windelband in that he regarded social science as cultural science, which relates to the understanding of values. However Weber emphasized the distinction between social scientific knowledge and value-judgments. He declared that an empirical social science cannot tell people what they *should* do, but rather what they *can* do. Value-judgments belong to the area of personal individual decision based on each person's worldview, while social scientific knowledge belongs to the sphere of academic research based on what Weber calls "ideal-types" (Weber 1968a). At the end of his essay "Objectivity" in 1904, Weber (1968a: 213) attached much importance to the value-consciousness of each scholar in the age of the specialization of sciences and suggested that the understanding of sciences could change in the future. He also criticized the specialist without spirit in the last part of his *Protestant Ethic* in 1905 (Weber 1963: 204).

Nevertheless this viewpoint seems to have faded away in his very popular book *Science as a Vocation* in 1919. There Weber regarded the contemporary academic situation as the stage of specialization, which had never been seen before but would continue in the future. In his view, philosophical ideals such as the "way to the true being, way to true art, way to true nature, and way to the true God, etc." cannot be justified any more, because a new time of polytheism of values has begun. What is important in such a situation is that intellectuals understand and endure

it so as to serve their special discipline as their vocation. The question of the ultimate meaning of science does not belong to science but to the decision of every person who leads their life in their own way. The social sciences can teach how to understand political, economical, and social phenomena by means of ideal-types, but they can never give an answer to the question of whether such phenomena are worthy of being or not.[12] With this dualism of scientific validity on the one hand and of the meaning of life on the other hand, Weber limited the ability of philosophy to take a stance in each individual's everyday life (Weber 1968b).

I appreciate this theory of social sciences put forward by Weber in the period of specialization as well as just after the First World War, insofar as it warned us against an obsolete presumption that philosophy could integrate the social sciences in a speculative way, as German idealism had once tried to do. Yet I have to say that his view of social science, which was influential on social sciences and existential philosophy in the 20th century, is obsolete today.[9]

The main reason why I believe this to be so is that normative political and social theory, which Weber, apart from his theory of power politics, excluded from social sciences and hardly conceived, began to be strongly rehabilitated from the 1970s. By that I mean the normative political theory developed by John Rawls (1971), Michael Walzer (1983), Charles Taylor (1994), Martha Nussbaum (2006), the normative economic theory developed by Amartya Sen (2000), the normative social theory developed by Jürgen Habermas (1981), and others. These currencies can be called a *nouvelle vague* of public philosophies, because they have been discussing normative public issues such as justice, well-being, human development, multicultural public space, democracy, etc. in both theoretical and practical ways. In fact, these public issues could not be discussed without value-judgments, which Weber had denied. And as a matter of fact, this *nouvelle vague* has been so influential in the academic world that the relationship between the social sciences and philosophy, including ethics, is getting closer again. Moreover, the radical change in international situations since the 1990s is requiring more and more interdisciplinary cooperation among different disciplines. I would like to call this new academic situation "the period of post-specialization."

In this period of post-specialization, philosophy can no longer remain a separate academic discipline, focused solely on the study of earlier philosophies, but should rather be considered a trans-discipline. As a matter of course, arrogant notions, such as Hegel's absolute knowledge in the period of pre-specialization, must be rejected and instead philosophy should rather play an intermediary role, facilitating communication among the various social sciences, including political science, economics, sociology, ecology, history, and should do this from the perspective of the new public ethics and ontology under the name of glocal public philosophy,[10] which I will advance in the following sections.

## 4. A new trans-national public ethics for the 21st century

First of all, the new trans-national public ethics should, both contrary to Samuel Huntington's notorious concept of the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996) and contrary to a cultural relativism that has no interest in normative ethics, develop the relationship between the diversity of cultures and trans-cultural public values. What is very important here is our efforts to make mutual understanding of the diversity of cultures in the world compatible with trans-cultural public values such as peace, well-being, human rights, etc. There are very different kinds of cultures and religions in the world. However it is wrong to abandon trying to understand them, let alone stir up the clash of civilizations. In fact it is not civilizations but ignorance of them that clash with one another. The new ethics excludes any cultural imperialism that assumes one culture surpasses other cultures, as was seen in Hegel, mentioned above.

At the same time, the new trans-national public ethics attaches much importance to trans-cultural public values such as peace, well-being, and human rights, because they give the preconditions for human beings in any culture to lead good lives. In this regard it criticizes any ethnocentrism that denies such trans-cultural public values. To sum up, the new public ethics holds the view that understanding human beings cannot be separated from the different context of culture in which each individual lives and for that very reason both cross-cultural dialogue and trans-cultural public values should be promoted.

This ethical thinking about cultures necessarily relates to the new public ethics about history. It was a great mistake to assume that history ended with the end of the Cold War, as Francis Fukuyama (2006) once thought with reference to Hegel. On the contrary, we entered a new historical stage in which various conflicts caused by historical events in the past were revealed and must be solved. This is the chief reason why we need a new ethics of history, which requires dialogue between past, present, and future, as EH Carr (1961: 123–124) advocated. Yet the new public ethics for the 21st century cannot take over the quasi-Hegelian progressive viewpoint clearly found in Carr, who seems to have believed in the progress of world history. Ideology such as the "Cunning of Reason" *(List der Vernunft)* in Hegel or "Historical Necessity" in Marxism cannot any longer be adopted to explain the past. Instead non-Eurocentric plural viewpoints have to be taken into consideration.

The new trans-national public ethics as regards history is characterized by how it considers modern history, not only from positive viewpoints such as the emancipation of peoples from oppression, the building of a constitutional state, etc., but also from negative viewpoints such as the arrogance of cultural imperialism, the barbarous acts of modern sovereign states, suppression of one people by others, religious intolerance, etc. This ethics makes efforts to eliminate such negative elements in history as far as possible. I will now develop this ethical thinking based on concrete examples.

As shown in the second section above, the history of public space since the 19th century has been closely connected with nation-state building and colonialism. Therefore, each type of nation-state building was different from others, even in Asian countries. For instance, Chinese nation-state building was combined with resistance to imperialistic invasion by western countries as well as by Japan. Indian people, Arabian people, African people have another great history in their nation-state building. In contrast, the Japanese nation-state was related to an imperialistic behavior, which caused great damage to Korea as well as China. It should be a serious task and intergenerational responsibility for the Japanese to overcome modern history's negative legacies such as colonialism. Each different consciousness of modern history will adopt a different stance on intergenerational responsibility for the positive as well as negative legacies of the past. Only then shall we be able to take common intergenerational responsibility for the future.

In this regard, we need what the South African public theologian John De Gruchy (2002) calls "restorative justice." This idea contrasts with the retaliatory justice, as in "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." So restorative justice aims not at revenge but instead at apology and forgiveness.

Incidentally I might remark that restorative justice has a different feature from the distributive justice that has been discussed recently by Rawls (1971), Walzer (1983), and others, because the former takes on a historical-temporal character. It requires us to admit undeniable historical facts and errors in the past, to co-memorize them in the present, and to have a strong will to overcome the past and construct common values in the future. Without such historical and temporal elements, there can be no restorative justice. The public world involves not only the spatial-present dimension but also the temporal-historical dimension. So it will be a great challenge for trans-national public ethics based on restorative justice to deal with the past, present, and future of the public world in which human beings live.

However the process of reconciliation is not a masochistic one, as some people mistakenly assume. In my view, reconciliation is not the ultimate end but a necessary condition for realizing co-happiness among the various peoples who live in differing cultures. That is why we need intergenerational responsiveness for our public common future.

In this regard I need to introduce cosmopolitan ethics, in the sense that we have a responsibility to take on a "positive" legacy of cultural resources in the world. Indeed, using or studying cultural resources as very important public goods must not be confined to particular people or nations, but spread all over the world. But because there are different languages and cultures in the world, it would be natural for each ethical subject that has both universality and cultural particularity to take this responsiveness according to each situation, tradition, and ability. Fortunately there are a few common cultural resources in East-Asian countries, such as Chinese characters or script, Confucianism, Buddhism, and it would be a great task for East-Asian people to reconstruct (or deconstruct) their positive legacy for future generations.

Intergenerational responsiveness, as well as responsibility for the future, would be more clearly recognized when we consider our future from a more comprehensive and inter-related perspective, when we tackle global issues such as ecology and the environment, economic development, education, world peace, human rights and so on. We would not be able to deal with these without regard to future generations in the world. To reinforce this point, I will propose here a new ethics of public (common) good/bad.

The notion of public (or common) good is predominantly treated from a perspective of institutions, and is regarded as a concept encompassing material objects and systems. Thus public good includes not only moral good, but also social goods. As founders of the ethics of public good, which should be differentiated from virtue ethics, Thomas Aquinas and Friedrich Schleiermacher should be mentioned. Aquinas regarded "society" (*societas*) as human activity with the aim of realizing "the good life, including material welfare."[11] In his doctrine of goods, Schleiermacher investigated "a totality of goods which results from the organization and institutionalization of reason," and as concrete examples of this cited scientific communities, states, voluntary social organizations, churches.[12]

According to a remarkable report by the United Nations Development Programme, global public goods must fulfill the minimum criteria that they offer "benefits to more than two states," and that they provide "benefits that are strongly universal in terms of countries, people, and generations." These global public goods are then classified in accordance with three more specific concepts, namely "natural global commons," such as the ozone layer, atmosphere, and climate; "human-made global commons," such as norms and principles accepted worldwide (e.g. universal human rights) and scientific knowledge, the internet, etc.; and "global policy outcomes," including peace, health, and stable financial markets (Kaul, Grünberg, and Stern 1999: 454–455). Trans-national public ethics must now take on the role of providing the ethical basis for the concept of global public goods.

This ethics must also study the antithetical concept in this regard, namely public bads, which can then serve as the basis for global public bads. The United Nations Development Programme focuses on the following "global public bads": depletion of the ozone layer and increased levels of radiation, the risk of global warming, violation of human rights, injustice, lack of equal rights, exclusion and inequality of access in regard to information, wars and conflict, epidemics and financial crises, among others. Ways should be found to rectify these on a trans-national basis (ibid.). A typical example of these "global public bads" is the financial crisis which began in the autumn of 2000. This must be considered from the new perspective of trans-national public ethics.

## 5. A brief comment on peace as a trans-national public value

In connection with the previous section, I, as a Japanese scholar, will now make a short comment on peace as a very important transversal public value. The preamble to the Japanese Constitution, promulgated in 1947, declares the following:

> … We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want …

I think this is a very important declaration, which includes trans-national public values such as world peace and justice.

Roughly speaking, there are two concepts of peace: negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace means the absence of overt violent conflict. We can see this concept in Hobbes's theory of Leviathan. To escape from the state of nature characterized as "*bellum omnium contra omnes*," Hobbes advocated that we should make by our mutual contract "Leviathan," which secures our peace and safety (Hobbes 1958). In my view, this Hobbesian idea has not yet lost its actuality. Far from it! When we look at places such as Iraq and Palestine, it is evident to many that Hobbesian theory is applicable. In this sense there is no denying the value of negative peace.

Yet it must be pointed out that the people under the control of a Leviathan can have only the right to live safely, the right to reject embarking on a life-threatening war, and the right to keep silent under arrest. Any other human rights, such as freedom of speech, expression, academic thought, cannot always be guaranteed under Leviathan. Furthermore, a Leviathan is based on the fear of state authority as well as a distrust of human nature.

On the other hand, positive peace means a state where peoples have collaborative and supportive relationships. Looking back to European social philosophy, this concept of peace was clearly defined by Spinoza, who said: "peace is not the mere absence of war, but a virtue based on strength of mind." According to him, the Hobbesian thought "*bellum omnium contra omnes*" would be realized, insofar as the human being is subordinated to passive mind (passion). But the human being is able to access active mind by intuition, intellect, and intellectual love of God (= Nature) (Spinoza 1958). It is just this active mind that creates positive peace.

Spinoza conceived the best state (commonwealth) as one in which people live in harmony. Such a state is established by a free people, led more by hope than by fear, whereas a conquered people is led more by fear than by hope. Hope seeks to improve life; fear seeks only to avoid death (Spinoza 1958: 311). It is clear that Spinoza's conception of positive peace had a wider view of human rights than Hobbes's Leviathan.

In the contemporary perspective, the notion of positive peace has been strongly advocated by Johan Galtung (1996). He defines positive peace as the state in which there is no structural violence. Structural violence denotes a form of the violence corresponding to the systematic ways in which a given social structure or institution kills people slowly by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. Institutionalized racism, sexism, elitism, ethnocentrism are examples of this. Positive peace cannot be realized without eliminating such structural violence, in other words, without realizing human rights in the sense of both economic, social, cultural rights and civil, political rights, as international covenants on human rights declare.

While negative peace does not always relate to social justice as a public value, positive peace always relates to the idea of social justice. By global justice I mean various sorts of justice such as distributive justice, ethno-cultural justice, and environmental justice, which must be discussed together with positive peace and human (economic, social, cultural, civil, political) rights all over the world.

However I think we should go beyond the theory of human rights and social justice in order to realize positive peace. As the famous Preamble to the UNESCO Constitution declares, "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that defenses of peace must be constructed," so we have to deal with the problem of the human mind. In this regard we might see Spinoza as a pioneer of the philosophical foundation of peace, even if we could not agree with his metaphysical pantheism.

In this connection I would like to think again about the Japanese term *Heiwa* (平和), which means peace. Literally, the character 平 (Hei) means mild, impartial, horizontal, etc. and the character 和 (Wa) means harmony, softening, mitigating, appeasing, calming, etc. The Japanese people (me included) should not forget either the errors made in Korea and China and caused by Japan in the past or the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the USA.[13]

## 6. The concept of a glocal public philosophy with a new understanding of self, others, and the world as its basis

Now I would like to deal with what could be called a new ontology for public philosophy in the 21st century.

As discussed above, trans-national public ethics which tackles problems like world peace, economic or environmental crisis, human security and so on requires trans-national cooperation and a new philosophical understanding of the self, others, and the public world. Yet I hesitate to call this kind of trans-national public philosophy a global one for two reasons. First because the term "global public philosophy" is easily associated with monoculturalism. The adjective "global" seems to me unable to do justice to the diversity of the world. Even if the humanization of globalization is advocated, it still sounds like a prescription for the homogenization of the world. The second reason is a more philosophical one, namely the problem of the understanding of the self who talks about global issues. In my view human beings are always existing in the world (in German *in-der-Welt-Sein*), as the great philosophers in the 20th century, like Martin Heidegger (1977), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945), Paul Ricœur (1969), Charles Taylor (1989), and Kitaro Nishida (1987), emphasized. That is, the self should be always understood as a located or situated self and it is very important to recognize in which situation people face or treat global issues such as peace, justice, human rights and securities, environmental crisis and so on.

This is why I think the term "global philosophy" is rather misleading and I would like to adopt instead the word "glocal" public philosophy as my coinage in order to overcome the limits of national public philosophy. The adjective "local" means "existing in or belonging to the area where you live, or to the area you are talking about" (see *Cobuild Advanced Learner's English Dictionary*, New Digital Edition). Therefore, the glocal public philosophy can be defined as a trans-national public philosophy, which deals with global issues not from nowhere but from somewhere to be locally characterized. What is important is the correlation between the globality of issues and the historically as well as culturally characterized localities in which each human being lives. The global and local viewpoints are seen as interdependent, and public values and the particularity of thinking are then viewed as hardly separable. To reinforce this program, however, a new theory of self, others, and the public world is needed. Indeed, it is right that Michael Sandel (1982) once

criticized John Rawls because his theory of justice lacks consideration of the problem of the encumbered self. Still, it is important for a glocal public philosophy to develop an ontological foundation in a much more comprehensive way in order not to fall into any ethnocentrism or irresponsible rootless universalism.

   To lay the foundation of glocal public philosophy in an ontological way, I will first introduce the concept of the "Cosmopolitan Self" as a new dimension of multiple understanding of the self. This concept has a long tradition with roots extending to the Stoics, Christianity, and Kant in western countries, as we mentioned in the first section, and it is also combined with the consciousness of 天 (Ten) in neo-Confucianism as well as God in the Muslim world. The Cosmopolitan Self understands himself or herself as a member of the Earth, that is, a cosmos in which all of humankind lives. The Cosmopolitan Self also understands being in the universalistic way. But it must be emphasized that this notion of the Cosmopolitan Self must be combined with other public dimensions of understanding of the self that are characterized by cultural-historical differences or particularities. In concrete terms the self and the world in which he or she lives possesses a unique history, depending on who the person in question is, for example, contemporary Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Indian, Arabian, American, African, French, German and so on. This individual holds the mental responsibility for his or her past and must make efforts to understand others who live in different cultures and histories. In this respect the universalistic viewpoint of the Cosmopolitan Self and multicultural viewpoint of the Particular Self should not oppose but complement each other. It should be pointed out that local governments, workplaces, churches or temples or mosques, schools, universities, and other associations or communities also belong to the public world, which is constituted not only by the nation but also by people who do not belong to the nation, and the multiple understanding of the self and others would play a very important role for people to communicate with one another in such various public worlds.

   I would like finally to take up the issue of the trans-national public. In order to think about this issue, it would be best to recall the controversy between Lippmann and Dewey, which I mentioned above in the second section, not only because both can be regarded as representative public philosophers in the 20th century, but because the issue between them about the public, in the sense of "a set of people in a community who share common interests," seems increasingly important in the 21st century. In my view the main point at issue between them was the rebirth of the public in the Great Society, which can be called the global society in terms of today. Lippmann's public philosophy, advocated after the Second World War, expected not the public in general but public intellectuals to criticize mass society, including mass media and unlimited pursuit of profits, and to perform civil duties as the main actors in the public world (Lippmann 1989). Dewey's public philosophy, on the other hand, assumes a well-educated public in general, who can perform democracy in the sense of "the mode of associated living" as the main actor in the public world (Dewey 1991).

   In my view, these classical views of Lippmann and Dewey seem to have been demonstrated in the recent Iraq War. At the beginning the majority of US media offered people false information about the presence of weapons of mass destruction and helped the Bush administration start an illegal war. I think this is a typical case of what Lippmann once warned against. Yet it should not be forgotten either that at the same time there were very strong anti-war networks and movements formed by internet users all over the world. I regard this phenomenon as what Dewey called Formation of Great Community. Based upon this monumental case, I want to insist that we should and could make Lippmann's realistic viewpoint and Dewey's idealistic viewpoint compatible. A glocal public philosophy based upon a new understanding of self, others, and the public world takes over Dewey's ideal without forgetting realistic criticism of manipulation by the mass

media and tries to undertake philosophical and democratic education for all which opposes all fundamentalisms and imperialisms.

## Notes

1. See Lippmann (1989), Bellah et al (1985: 297–307), Sandel (2005). In Japanese academia, independent of the English-speaking world, there has been an inter-disciplinary dialogue and exploration on public philosophy in the 2000s, which could be called an academic movement and in which a number of innovative research projects have been completed. Academia in China too has gradually become familiar with the new academic concept of Public Philosophy. In June 2009, thanks to the efforts of Prof. Meimao Lin at Renmin University of China, the People's Publishing House published a translation series of 10 volumes of "Public Philosophy," introducing the latest research results from Japan.
2. On this topic, see Perkins (2007).
3. It was not until recently that Yokoi Shonan began to be reinterpreted as a very important public philosopher in early modern Japan. See Minamoto (2005). An old view that sees Yokoi as a cultural imperialist, represented by Sansom (1950: 269), must be rejected now.
4. Regarding recent studies on this theme see Schad-Seifert (2003).
5. Unfortunately Yoshino's works are not yet translated into English. However, two excellent studies about him in English, Najita (1974) and Stegewerns (2003), deserve to be mentioned here.
6. On this theme see Calichmann (2008). Still this author seems to me to overestimate the influence of this war-time event on current Japanese politics and culture.
7. On Okawa see Szpilman (1998).
8. I first introduced this historical perspective of Wissenschaft in terms of the categories of pre-specialization, specialization, and post-specialization in Yamawaki (1999) and since then I have been emphasizing it in a number of my books and papers in order to highlight the historical particularity of our contemporary environment for the social sciences. See also Yamawaki (2009).
9. I have been stating this critical opinion on Weber's thinking about sciences, which is still influential on social scientists, both in Japanese and English. See Yamawaki (2007).
10. The part after section 4 of this article is an abridged version of the theses in my recent book *Glocal Public Philosophy: A Vision of Good Societies for the 21st Century* (in Japanese); see Yamawaki (2008).
11. On the contemporary relevance of Aquinas's common good theory see Keys (2006).
12. In my view the legacy of Schleiermacher's ethics should be more appreciated by contemporary scholars. See Schleiermacher (2002).
13. On this theme see Yamawaki (2006).

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