

obscured by luxuriant and irrelevant speculation besides being clarified and chastened.

That part of the tradition in particular has suffered which governs the expounding of the Scriptures, being first overgrown by a riot of allegory, and then being cut back to the barest of literal stumps by the severity of the reaction. Fr Daniélou has been most successful in disentangling the traditional Christian typology which was the core of Origen's exegesis from the alien modes of allegory with which he festooned it. Not that we would altogether allow the distinction between typology and allegory to be quite as clear, or indeed as sound as the author avers; nor are all Origen's original contributions to spiritual interpretation to be rejected as invalid, and only those types accepted which can already be found explicitly in the general tradition. That would be to prevent any further development of typological exegesis altogether. But Fr Daniélou's is perhaps a necessary way of proceeding *ad hominem*, considering the black suspicion which anything that smacks of allegory still arouses.

An appendix informs us that Fr Daniélou has changed his mind, since the first French edition, about private confession in Origen's day, a practice which he used to think could be inferred from certain passages in his writings. These passages still appear in the chapter on 'Penance', but now they have the opposite inference tacked onto them. The author would have done better to rewrite the chapter altogether, because the effect is extremely bizarre. Though not previously acquainted with Fr Daniélou's opinion one way or the other, I thought at first that the translator must have been taking astonishing liberties with his text, outdoing Rufinus himself, by inserting a strategic negative or two where it would hurt most; a suspicion for which I apologize.

Mr Mitchell's translation is excellent, real English, not mere anglicization. Professor O'Meara's translation also of Origen's two treatises is much better than most that have appeared so far in this series—and more accurate than some of Fr Daniélou's quotations from the same works. Read together with the latter's apologia they make convincing evidence in favour of his case, illustrating, as the translator says, the irresistible charm of Origen's use of Holy Writ. Professor O'Meara also quotes Erasmus as saying that one page of Origen taught him more Christian philosophy than ten of Augustine. But Origenolatry can go too far. Erasmus was a man of greater learning than judgment.

EDMUND HILL, O.P.

PHILOSOPHY AND ANALYSIS. Edited by Margaret Macdonald. (Basil Blackwell; 30s.)

Blackwell's have done well in adding this further collection of

philosophical articles to the two volumes of *Logic and Language* already published. The present book contains a selection of articles published in *Analysis* since its inception in 1933. They are grouped in chapters under a series of headings and illustrate, better than anything else could, the process of development through which this kind of philosophizing has passed during this period. Sometimes, as in the case of the chapter on psycho-analysis and morals, the individual papers form a connected discussion with a remarkable degree of unity. The volume also contains a number of papers which, notwithstanding their brevity, must rank among the most important contributions to modern philosophical literature. The papers are all short. In this they illustrate not only the policy of *Analysis*, but what is most characteristic of 'analytical' philosophy. Their aim is to give piece-meal 'solutions' to philosophical problems, i.e. of the puzzles which arise from our ordinary talk about the world we experience.

In her attempt to describe the features which characterize 'philosophical analysis' (in her introduction to the volume) Miss Macdonald remarks that the phrase was originally introduced as a technical term for the work of Russell and Moore, was later extended to that of Wittgenstein, and is 'now applied to the work of any philosopher which resembles, or shows the influence of, one of these models'. This is a revealing statement. Over the change of tone between the earlier and the later papers in the collection the influence of Wittgenstein is indeed writ large. 'Logical positivism' before the war, at any rate, was a coherent and fairly easily characterized school of thought. Its strict empiricism differed from the nineteenth-century empiricism of Mill in being able to give an account of the necessary truths of logic and mathematics without reducing these to factual generalizations of a very high order. Here the earlier positivists could draw on the mathematical and logical work done since Mill's day from Frege to Russell. As a result they were able to treat the necessary propositions of logic and mathematics as tautologies, true in virtue of the conventions which define their terms and govern their usage. From these tautologies they distinguished significant propositions which could be verified, at least indirectly, by experience (and on what could be regarded as 'experience' there was, of course, a good deal of difference of opinion); all other statements were 'nonsense' or 'poetry'.

These lines are now no longer so easy to draw in the right places. The reason for this blurring of outlines lies in the increasing attention philosophers have paid to real language as used in diverse regions of human interest. On the one hand the purely formal calculi of logic and mathematics are now usually seen as more loosely related to the logical structure of colloquial language; on the other hand, philosophers now often

remember the curious likeness which empirical statements can sometimes bear to 'poetry'. Here again, it is the genius of Wittgenstein that stands behind the development which has taken place. Wittgenstein's stature refuses to allow us to classify him in any philosophical school; but if the earlier positivists could draw their inspiration from some remarks in the *Tractatus*, the newer philosophical analyst speaks in the accents of the *Philosophical Investigations*. ('Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.'—p. 8.) If to be influenced by Wittgenstein's thought is enough to make a philosopher a 'philosophical analyst', then it is difficult to see how philosophy can now ever be anything but 'analytic': for after the impact of a great philosopher, philosophy can never return to where it had been before.

R. A. MARKUS

SENSE WITHOUT MATTER OR DIRECT PERCEPTION. By A. A. Luce (Nelson; 12s. 6d.)

Professor Luce's aim is to state in modern language Berkeley's argument that 'matter is a meaningless concept; he does so with a vigour and clarity that make his book a pleasure to read. He has no difficulty in showing that this is not the paradoxical position it is often taken to be; Berkeley never attacked the common use of the term 'matter', which is equivalent to 'the sensible', but only the technical use which it had acquired in philosophy, of an unperceived 'support' to sense-data. By contrast Berkeley simply affirmed the view of ordinary men, that there is no need to postulate anything beyond the colours and sounds and tastes which are there for our senses to grasp.

Professor Luce has no difficulty in disposing of the argument that this makes the world unreal, a sort of dream; dreams and illusions are clearly distinguishable from ordinary perceptions, and are generally due to reliance on a single sense without confirmation from the others. When we have sensed the redness, roundness, and sweetness of the apple, what more could we require to assure ourselves of its reality? To double the sensible apple with a 'material' apple which cannot be sensed in any way does nothing to make it more real, and is indeed, as Professor Luce says, a philosophical monstrosity.

A second argument for 'matter' is that without it the world would be composed of colours, shapes and so on, but not of sensible things. Once again it is not difficult to show that 'matter' does not help; there is simply no room for it in the perceptual situation. The colours and shapes are there: 'what holds them together? Why *are* they together?