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ABSTRACTS

DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By JOHN GERRING, PHILIP BOND, WILLIAM T. BARNDT, and CAROLA MORENO

Recent studies appear to show that democracy has no robust association with economic growth. Yet all such work assumes that the causal effect of democracy can be measured by a country's regime status in a particular year (T), which is correlated with its growth performance in a subsequent period (T+1). The authors argue that democracy must be understood as a *stock*, rather than a *level*, measure. That is, a country's growth performance is affected by the number of years it has been democratic, in addition to the degree of democracy experienced during that period. In this fashion, democracy is reconceptualized as a historical, rather than a contemporary, variable—with the assumption that long-run historical patterns may help scholars to understand present trends. The authors speculate that these secular-historical influences operate through four causal pathways, each of which may be understood as a type of capital: physical capital, human capital, social capital, and political capital. This argument is tested in a cross-country analysis and is shown to be robust in a wide variety of specifications and formats.

ELECTORAL CONTROL IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

THE PERVERSE INCENTIVES OF FLUID PARTY SYSTEMS

By JAKUB ZIELINSKI, KAZIMIERZ M. SLOMCZYNSKI, and GOLDIE SHABAD

How do fluid party systems that exist in many new democracies affect democratic accountability? To address this question, the authors analyze a new database of all legislative incumbents and all competitive elections that took place in Poland since 1991. They find that when district-level economic outcomes are bad, voters in that country punish legislators from a governing party and reward legislators from an opposition party. As a result, electoral control in Poland works through political parties just as it does in mature democracies. However, the authors also find that, in contrast to mature democracies, legislators from a governing party tend to switch to an opposition party when the economy in their district deteriorates. When they do so, their chances of reelection are better than those of politicians who remained loyal to governing parties and are no worse than those of incumbents who ran as opposition party loyalists. These empirical results suggest that while elections in new democracies function as a mechanism of political control, fluid party systems undermine the extent to which elections promote democratic accountability.

PRESIDENTIAL CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTING IN LATIN AMERICA

By GEORGE TSEBELIS and EDUARDO ALEMÁN

Ten Latin American presidents have a power that has not received the study that it deserves: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. These "amendatory observations" return to Congress for a final round of voting. Sometimes the presidential version of the bill becomes the default alternative automatically and may require qualified majorities to be overturned. The authors analyze veto procedures in eighteen Latin American countries and argue that amendatory veto power significantly increases presidential weight in legislative decision making.

LIFE OF THE PARTY

THE ORIGINS OF REGIME BREAKDOWN AND PERSISTENCE UNDER SINGLE-PARTY RULE

By BENJAMIN SMITH

This article develops a theory of single-party regime consolidation to explain the dramatic variation in longevity among these regimes. The strength of the opposition and rent scarcity during party consolidation, it argues, structure the choices available to elites as they decide how to build a support base. A weak opposition and ready access to rents makes a low-cost consolidation

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possible, but these conditions provide little incentive to build a robust coalition or strong party organization; this trajectory generates weak single-party rule that is likely to collapse in a crisis. Conversely, elites who face a powerful opposition and scarce rents have no choice but to offer potential allies access to policy-making and have powerful incentives to build a strong and broad-based party organization. Ruling parties that emerge from initial conditions like these prove more resilient during later crises. The author conducts an initial test of the argument against paired comparisons of Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania and of Indonesia and the Philippines.

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