

Catholic theologian finally resolves the former in favour rather of the relative autonomy of temporal communitarian ends, than of the medieval sacral interlude (and this is M. Maritain's contention), can surely be of no less interest to the humanist.

Enough has perhaps been said to indicate the importance of the problems dealt with in his book. It must be confessed, however, that the many valuable things M. Maritain has to say on these would have gained in force had greater care been taken in the presentation of his book. The impression of unity given by a book is always imperilled when it is made up of items written at various times and for various occasions; items, too, which vary in their value and interest. One feels the need for a greater degree of self-editing than has here been undertaken, and, above all, the lack of an introduction serving to make the connections of these *disjecta membra* more evident.

RONALD TORBET, O.P.

EXISTENTIALISM AND THE MODERN PREDICAMENT. By F. H. Heinemann. (Adam and Charles Black; 18s.)

CHRISTIANITY AND EXISTENTIALISM. By J. M. Spier. (The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company; \$3.00.)

METAPHYSIQUE DU SENTIMENT. By Th. Haecker.

GABRIEL MARCEL ET LA METHODOLOGIE DE L'INVERIFIABLE. By Pietro Prini.

CRISE DE LA METAPHYSIQUE. By Max Müller. (Desclée de Brouwer.)

Anyone who discusses what is loosely called *Existentialist* philosophy is peculiarly liable to the temptation to develop, in a succession of portentous clichés, some sort of history of western culture culminating in a critical Now in which the exponents of this philosophy play an urgently dramatic role. It is not being suggested here that such a view is necessarily false because it is platitudinous, nor that the philosophers themselves are free from preoccupations with the 'fate of western culture', nor even that they or their commentators ought to be free from such preoccupations; but it is surely true that the real importance of a philosopher is obscured when he is interpreted as a portent in the interpreter's pet eschatology and not *metaphysically*, as contributing to our intelligence of Being.

Dr Heinemann, I am afraid, has a quite remarkable flair for the acceptable cliché: *Respondeo ergo sum* is his 'key-symbol'. He is at some pains to assure us of his credentials for his task: he is apparently on familiar terms with many of the leading philosophers he discusses, and claims to have coined, in 1929, the term *Existenzphilosophie*—not, it might have been supposed, something of which he would have wished to remind us. Yet his brief digests of Kierkegaard, Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel and Berdyaev are undistinguished, except for the chapters on Husserl and Heidegger, which simply miss the point—the point being, in

Heidegger's words, *die Frage nach dem Sinn von SEIN*. This missing of the point becomes systematic in Mr Spier's book. His analysis derives from the work of Hermann Dooyeweerd, whose *Critique of Theoretical Thought* is now in course of translation into English. According to the Introduction by the translator of *Christianity and Existentialism*, Assistant Professor David Hugh Freeman, their central thesis is that 'no philosophy can claim theoretical autonomy, because religion and science are intrinsically and necessarily connected', where 'the term "religion" is not used in its narrow sense, but simply designates the most basic commitment that a person makes with whatever he considers to be his "God"' (p. vii, and footnote). It is not surprising that with such principles Mr Spier is content to characterise 'Heidegger's Existentialism' as 'a consistent nihilism which accepts a disqualified pragmatism' (p. 37). What is especially painful about these two books is that well-intentioned and highly educated people like Dr Heinemann and Mr Spier should be unable to recognise that a lack of philosophical integrity, of a reverence for Truth, contributes more to the depreciation of Christianity and humane values than any of the apocalyptic phantasms by which they are so disquieted.

It is a relief to turn to the three essays in a new French series, most of them translations of German or Italian originals. Their general appearance is smart, but in detail their production is unnecessarily casual. At least half the quotation marks appear singly and not in pairs; for *Crise de la Métaphysique* there is no list of contents and its five Appendices are only to be found with difficulty in the middle of the book.

Haecker's essay is charming and sensitive but philosophically rather slight. He is anxious that the hardbitten scholastics of his acquaintance should introduce into their division of the human spirit into mind and will, a third member, *le sentiment, das Gefühl*. I can hardly suppose that Haecker really thought that St Thomas's philosophy was so casually put together as to be open to this sort of prefabricated extension; but he certainly does seem to have been unaware of what might be called the *analogy of the passions* in St Thomas. But this criticism doesn't bear on the major theme of the essay, an exploration of the place of 'feeling' in our lives. Here, in the sounding of 'la mer immense du sentiment', Haecker's fineness of moral perception and his European sense allow him most delicately to shade his chart.

The other two essays really call for a more detailed examination than can be given them here. M. Prini has performed a considerable service in presenting a coherent account of a 'philosophie de la pensée pensante'; and Marcel himself, in a characteristic small-boy-as-Grand-Old-Philosopher prefatory letter, commends M. Prini's study as 'une des plus pénétrantes qui aient été consacrées à ma pensée'. He finds the phrase, 'la méthodologie de l'invérifiable', particularly happy; but neither he nor

M. Prini appears to recognise that while it is, in fact, extremely apt, it is also quite damning. Surely the very frequent embarrassment felt before Marcel's work is justified by a sort of deliberately esoteric snugness of the exquisite which colours it throughout. To identify scientific and objective thinking with the spirit of *avoir*, with a *concupiscence originaire*; to insist on a choice between primary and secondary reflection (pp. 65-71)—is frankly childish; perhaps it is a mark of Marcel's real stature as a philosopher that in spite of this preliminary self-amputation, he may yet be associated with Heidegger, Whitehead and, paradoxically, Wittgenstein, in the current renewal of metaphysics. M. Prini shows excellently how 'objective', 'problematic' thinking is used as a springboard for Marcel's plunge into 'le mystère'; and he follows with enthusiasm and suppleness, in the chapters 'La dialectique de la réflexion récupératrice' and 'L'ontologie de l'invocation', movements of Marcel's thought in which every scholastic would find it invigorating to exercise himself.

M. Müller is himself a pupil of Heidegger and dedicates his essay to his master, so that his interpretation, particularly of Heidegger's recent and less-known developments, may fairly be taken as authoritative. A special interest of the book is the claim made by the author to have studied and penetrated the metaphysics of St Thomas. This claim, so far as any first-hand acquaintance with St Thomas's writings is intended, appears to be quite without foundation; but fortunately this hardly diminishes the interest of what he has to say, particularly in a deeply thought-out appendix on 'Essence et être' (pp. 71-80). The chief merit of M. Müller's essay is that it treats Heidegger's philosophy as an approach to the 'question as to the sense of Being', a question which, as may be seen from the Introduction to the Fifth Edition of *Was ist Metaphysik?*, is not a purely speculative one (in the post-Cartesian sense), in view of the concrete relatedness (*Bezug*) of Being to the nature of man. As M. Müller puts it, 'L'être est l'histoire de la réalité cosmique vers sa présence, vers son actualité' (p. 63); and he shows, by an interesting comparison of the Epilogues to the Fourth and Fifth Editions of *Was ist Metaphysik?*, that Heidegger has now decisively opted for an *interdependence* of Being and being (the existent; *Sein, Seiende*; pp. 41-42). Unlike Dr Heinemann and Mr Spier, M. Müller recognises that Heidegger is concerned with the possibility in Being of history, and not with the merely contingent facts of history. This insight is not as foreign to St Thomas's as might at first appear; the first sixty-four chapters of the Third Book of the *Contra Gentiles*, once grasped as a study of Being as assimilation, the most perfect achievement of which is found in the *openness* of the Beatific Vision, allow at least of a sympathetic penetration. It is extremely important that a familiarity with Heidegger's work should become more general and not remain the mark of a fashionable esoterism; and it is gratifying to see that Catholic philo-

sophers, including notably Père Geiger, O.P., are among the most sensitive to his contribution to our intelligence of Being.

CORNELIUS ERNST, O.P.

ECLIPSE OF GOD. By Martin Buber. (Victor Gollancz; 15s.)

TRAGEDY IS NOT ENOUGH. By Karl Jaspers. (Victor Gollancz; 21s.)

There can be no doubt about the continued vitality of existentialism as a mode of philosophic thought. The range of its influence extends from the atheism of Sartre to the Catholicism of Gabriel Marcel. Martin Buber and Karl Jaspers stand in the middle between these two extremes. Buber as a Jewish philosopher, whose most characteristic mode of thought was revealed in his *I and Thou*, stands out as a vigorous champion of theism. His thesis in the present work is that in the crisis of the human spirit today the idea of God has undergone an eclipse; in the words of Nietzsche, 'God is dead'. This does not mean, of course, that any change has taken place in God; it means that something has come between the human mind and the reality of God, which hides that reality from men's eyes. It is Buber's contention that the cause of this eclipse is that the abstract conceptual mode of thought, which he calls the mode of 'I-It', has taken the place of the mode of living personal relationship, the 'I-Thou', and God has thus been reduced to a mere idea, a concept which can be handled by men and either approved or dismissed. 'It is the situation of the man who no longer experiences the divine as standing over against him. . . . Since he has removed himself from it existentially, he no longer knows it as standing over against him.' The battle for religion, as he conceives it, both now and at all times, is a 'struggle for the protection of the living concreteness as the meeting-place between the human and the divine'. In a chapter on Religion and Philosophy he defines the relation between these two modes of thought, the abstract and the concrete, with great insight as being determined by the 'two basic modes of our existence', the I-Thou and the I-It, each of which has its own function and its own validity. In a later chapter on Religion and Modern Thinking there are penetrating criticisms of Sartre and Heidegger, and, what is of particular interest, of Jung. Jung has, of course, always maintained that he regards religion from a purely psychological point of view and makes no metaphysical statement regarding it. But Buber maintains that Jung, in fact, constantly oversteps the bounds of the psychological and reveals himself as a Gnostic, for whom the whole of religion has been reduced to an immanent process. It is a criticism of which all followers of Jung must feel the force.

Tragedy Is Not Enough is a translation of a section of a long work of Jaspers on Truth. It has an introduction by Karl Deutsch, which gives some idea of Jaspers' position both as a philosopher and as a German who had to face tragedy in a very real way in his own country during the war. But in this work he is concerned primarily with tragedy as literary