

should be noted the definition of beauty as congruity "between the being in and of the mind and the being in and of the thing" (p. 36); what is the difference, then, between beauty and truth? The application of principles in such a swift-moving world as ours presents very special difficulties: a more detailed treatment of the problem of war might have been expected; on the other hand the institution of private property is given its proper perspective and it is made clear that the rigid attitude which some Catholics are inclined to adopt in its defence is not justified in thomistic philosophy. One very useful feature of the book is its frequent reference to continental thinkers of whom the average Anglo-Saxon student knows little or nothing.

EDWARD QUINN.

THE WHOLE MAN—PSYCHOLOGY. By Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M. Cap. (Bruce Publishing Co.; n.p.).

It appears from the Author's Preface that this is the latest addition to a series of textbooks in which Fr. Bittle has already covered almost the whole field of Scholastic Philosophy from logic to ontology. The reviewer is not acquainted with the previous members of the series, but to judge from the present work we have something new in the way of textbooks, at least in English. Lucidity of exposition and an abundant use of examples, together with the more material advantages of doctrinal summaries at the end of each chapter, a useful glossary of terms and an extensive bibliography all combine to make the book eminently suited to its purpose, which is to provide "an elementary course of philosophical psychology".

As the title of the book indicates, psychology is conceived as being restricted to the investigation of the nature of man rather than as the philosophy of organic life in general. This approach entails some modification of the traditional order of treatment, but it has much to recommend it, since man remains the main interest of any psychological study, and also because it emphasises from the outset the essential unity of man as an organism exercising the diverse functions of vegetative, sensitive and intellectual life.

On other points of method there is more room for criticism. For instance, the undue preponderance of purely 'scientific' material in some sections of the book. Thus much space is given to a long account of the neurological and physiological basis of sensation, but though sensation itself is defined in terms of cognition, there is no adequate treatment of the nature of knowledge as such. Even the description of the origin of intellectual ideas gives little information as to the unique character of the union between knower and known, while such questions as the precise role of the phantasm in this process, and the distinction between impressed and expressed intelligible species are shelved as "abstruse problems, which need not detain us". The theory of faculties and their dis-

inction from the soul seems to merit no mention at all. This may be due to an exaggerated deference to modern prejudice against anything savouring of 'faculty psychology'; even Spearman's 'Factors' receive only a passing reference, while his experiments in factorial analysis which have done much to rehabilitate the despised faculty theory in the eyes of the moderns are not detailed. The omission of such a fundamental doctrine together with the sketchiness of the treatment of the nature of knowledge would seem to constitute a serious weakness in a book which purports to provide a course in scholastic psychology and which in other respects is excellent of its kind.

EGBERT COLE, O.P.

IS THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE CONTROLLED BY THE WANTS OF MAN?

By Dr. F. Sherwood Taylor (Society for Freedom in Science, Occasional Pamphlet No. 1; 1s. 6d.).

Popular interpreters of the history of science have for some years been fascinated by the notion that a scientist is not independent of the mental climate of the society he lives; they seek to find relations between scientific advance and the contemporary state of society as a whole. Unfortunately this useful line of investigation has too often been coupled with the presupposition that science has not been, and should not be, pursued for the sake of understanding nature, but for the sake of the material benefits which applied science can confer. Moreover, attention has thus been diverted from the study of the internal development of science according to its own proper dialectic. The works of Bernal, Hogben, and J. G. Crowther, for instance, are marred, if not vitiated, by these mistakes.

Dr. Sherwood Taylor has written a lively commentary on a typical pamphlet of this school, entitled *The Development of Science* and published by the Association of Scientific Workers. The contentions of the spokesman of the Association are found to rest on facile history, bad reasoning and neglect of the internal logic of science. His main conclusion, that "the broad lines of scientific development are governed by the practical needs of men, but especially by the needs of those men who control the wealth and power of the community", is found to be entirely without historical support. Many scientists have been aware that the economic interpretation of the history of science is being carried to absurd lengths, but it needed Dr. Sherwood Taylor's scholarship to show exactly where the fallacies lay. There is room for a larger work on the interpretation of the development of science, and the respective contributions to it of disinterested curiosity, the desire for fame or gain, and philanthropy, among human motives; and, among external influences, technology, medicine, philosophy, and religion. The over-emphasis of economic factors would be best corrected by a balanced account including the other factors.

E. F. CALDIN.