

## BOOK REVIEWS

HARTMAN, MARY S. *The Household and the Making of History. A Subversive View of the Western Past.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [etc.] 2004. xi, 297 pp. £45.00. (Paper: £16.99.); DOI: 10.1017/S0020859005012228

In 1965, John Hajnal first identified a distinctive late-marriage pattern in western Europe in the early modern era, wherein the mean age of women at first marriage was twenty-three years or more, spouses were very close in age, and more than 10 per cent of the population never married. Subsequent research amply confirmed the pattern in peasant villages, while noting that elites married earlier throughout the era. Remarkably, these conjugal norms have been found in no other region of the world prior to the twentieth century.

As historians reckoned with the significance of Hajnal's discovery, many wondered whether this unique conjugal regime might explain, in part, why capitalism first took root in northwestern Europe. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, an intense discussion of the late-marriage system had two salutary effects: (a) it shifted the focus of family studies from the rather static conception of household composition that had preoccupied Peter Laslett and the Cambridge Group to the dynamics of familial reproduction; and (b) it thrust family studies and demography into the centre of economic and political history, where they could not reasonably be ignored. But then, through the 1990s, the interest of economic historians waned, gender studies took a discursive turn, and family historians retreated to the study of the domestic domain. The larger societal effects of family systems, and our history-making claims for the late-marriage norm in particular, were largely forgotten. Mary Hartman sees this as a real intellectual regression. In a driving and superbly realized synthesis, she devotes her formidable analytical powers to reopening the discussion and making this distinctive marriage system – its origins, persistent dynamics, and wide-ranging effects – unignorable once more.

The prevalence of the late-marriage norm is well established in most regions of northwestern Europe for the sixteenth century; before that, the evidence is scarce and the system's origins remain a matter of speculation. Hartman takes us way back (further back than anyone else, to my knowledge) to the early medieval synthesis, where the collapsing Roman Empire and the intruding Germanic tribes (which, Tacitus had noted, married late) created, in their intercalation, an opportunity for aggressive arable expansion throughout the reformed manorial zones of northwestern Europe. In the midst of widespread colonization, ethnic commingling, a relatively weak landlord class offering incentives for settlement, and an emergent, hybrid, legal framework open to the incremental extension of customary rights, dependant peasants were able to secure the heritability of family lands, while non-heirs, marrying out, could be compensated with readily available (if rough) secondary parcels in newer settlements.

For reasons we do not yet understand, these cultivators adopted a distinctive neolocal household norm, whereby parents delayed the marriage of their offspring in order to remain in charge of the family holding, and then, when they could postpone no longer, retired *in situ*, handing over the reigns of power to the designated heir who married in and established, with his wife as partner, a separate household. Hartman finds shards of

evidence for the development of this household form in Herlihy's analysis of Saint Germain-des-Prés in the ninth century. Wisely, she envisions a centuries-long process of consolidation, placing the appearance of two of the system's well-established early modern adjuncts – written retirement contracts and a phase of domestic service prior to marriage – after the Black Death. We might add that the widespread commutation of dues in the West eventually created a market in severable land. This added an element of flexibility that permitted core family holdings to be kept intact while non-heirs marrying out could be duly compensated. The postponement of marriage enabled both generations to work towards this end, thus preserving a modicum of family peace.

Hartman's discussion of origins is highly suggestive, marred only by her surprising dismissal of Goody's thesis that the Catholic Church played a crucial role in the development of the late-marriage norm (pp. 85–86). While it is true that we cannot plausibly regard the Church's regulatory powers as a sufficient condition of the system as a whole, there is no reason, within a multicausal framework, to disregard it as a contributing factor. The Church's insistence on the public consent of the principals in marriage, for brides as well as grooms, made it harder for parents to dictate mate-selection and the timing of nuptials, thus strengthening the hand of young adults who had reasons to refuse a partner, break off a betrothal, or delay nuptials. The Church's recognition fortified a neolocal logic, namely: "If it's our choice to marry, then let's work hard and plan ahead to establish our own household."

Secondly, the monastic orders provided a venerated alternative to marriage, sequestered from the opposite sex in celibacy. This goes some way towards explaining the remarkably high proportions never marrying, not simply in the numbers recruited, but more importantly, in the presentation of lifelong celibacy as an honourable choice. If, as a general rule, a woman's bargaining power within marriage is partly a function of the availability and attractiveness of alternatives to it, then "taking the veil" provided a secure and esteemed alternative to "tying the knot".

In two illuminating chapters, Hartman dissects the fierce backlash of a threatened patriarchal order as it organized to eradicate heresy in the village community of Montaignou (early marriage) and witchcraft in Salem (late marriage). Hartman highlights the importance of women's informal networks in a late marriage society, and shows how they suffered the brunt of the Church's attack in the Salem witch trials. Late marriage required strong women's networks of self-help and vigilance to keep the vast majority of young single women safe from sexual dishonour and childbirth out of wedlock for ten to twelve years from menarche to betrothal. Here too, the relationship between late marriage and the relatively high proportion never marrying seems significant. For the presence of older spinsters in women's community networks was probably a key factor in their strength and resilience.

Many scholars (including the author) have dwelt on the distinct aspects of this conjugal order: its spousal relations, mode of fertility regulation, family cycle, labour-power utilization and land transmission, as part of a larger argument. Contrasts have been drawn with arrangements in adjacent regions of early marriage. But until Hartman's sustained deliberation, no-one had taken them all on, assembled an encompassing range of interdisciplinary evidence, and tracked down the system's ramified effects through so many periods and domains. From early medieval origins, through the Reformation and into the industrial era, Hartman addresses the influence of late marriage and rough age parity, on living standards, domestic decision-making, sexuality, labour productivity,

intergenerational relations, legal norms, and political ideology. In case after case, she convincingly shows how this form of familial reproduction enabled women to take action within the strictures of a patriarchal order, asserting and extending their legal rights, while influencing the course of societal change from below.

If her book is anywhere near as widely read as she is, she will certainly have succeeded in enriching historical scholarship by bringing marriage norms and modes of familial reproduction back to centre-stage in our understanding of the making of the modern world.

*Wally Seccombe*

ANDRESS, DAVID. *The French Revolution and the People*. Hambledon and London, London [etc.] 2004. xviii, 301 pp. Ill. £19.99; DOI: 10.1017/S0020859005022224

David Andress has written a truly excellent book. This social history of the French Revolution synthesizes a vast amount of secondary literature to offer insights to specialists and a rich and clear account to general readers. The first three chapters of the book are a discussion of the basic issues affecting the lives of peasants, artisans, and people on the margins of rural and urban communities, and the subsequent nine chapters contain description and analysis of the involvement of these social classes and strata in the upheaval of 1789 and the mobilizations of the following decade.

The line of reasoning running through the book is that everything the people achieved in the Revolution was a result of their own efforts. Educated and propertied elites regarded themselves as the public and took for granted their exclusive right to represent the nation. Independent politics of merchants, artisans, peasants, and laborers looked like imprudent expressions of ignorance, criminality, and outside influences. Lawmakers believed that popular mobilizations posed a threat to public order and imperilled their efforts to endow the nation with sensible legislation. Such attitudes left their mark on the festival of the federation marking the first anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. The National Assembly put on a Catholic mass, disciplined military marches, and oaths of loyalty of the king and the deputies in order to build consensus around a conservative revolution led by the upper classes.

The attitudes of the revolutionary elite also left their mark on legislation regarding the people's right to assemble. After 1789, journeymen and master craftsmen formed associations to encourage participation in politics and provide services for members. All the legislators, whether monarchist or Jacobin, agreed that these associations divided the citizenry into exclusive groups devoted to the private interests of their members. The associations represented antisocial behavior inimical to the new regime and liable to cause disorder. Landed professionals shared a firm commitment to economic individualism. The National Assembly passed laws abolishing the guilds in March 1791, all associations of urban workers, artisans, and manufacturers in June, and all associations of rural laborers and domestic servants a month later.

The upper classes' scorn for popular politics also found expression in official policy toward religion. Legislators of each regime of the 1790s associated the Church with aristocracy and counter-revolution. They believed that popular piety undermined their efforts to unite the people around the Revolution and incited resistance to the war against

the European monarchies. Drawing on the research of Olwen Hufton and Susan Desan, Andress shows that devout women met with the most derision. Revolutionaries believed that women had a natural penchant for religion and maintained its influence among the people. Ironically, these prejudices may have given women leeway to defend the Church. Revolutionaries could not punish women for the innate weakness of their sex. Women occupied churches and scoured them clean of their profanatory function during the Terror when militants had turned them into temples of reason. Women encouraged communities to attend to their religious services and sacraments in spite of the deportation of their priests.

Andress also does well to capture the general psychological aura of the social and class relations of the old regime. Though the societies of early modern Europe had lower rates of criminality than do our own, they also had a different threshold of tolerable violence. In eighteenth-century France, it was acceptable behavior for a master to beat an apprentice, a servant, a woman, a child, or any other sort of inferior. The tacit threat of violent personal disciplining infused the hierarchies of the period. Lords, for instance, had the support of the various instances of the judiciary to uphold their seigneurial rights, including the exclusive right to bear arms. Their unwavering attachment to this right, "left a largely unarmed peasantry helpless" and upheld a glaring inequality of power (p. 72).

Social relations of this sort, Andress maintains, go a long way to explain the ambience of excitement and fear of the spring and summer of 1789. The lower classes saw the political crisis as the moment of liberation from the political authorities of the old regime, but feared that traditional leaders would use their influence to maintain power. The Réveillon riots, for instance, which took place at the end of April and the beginning of May 1789, saw thousands of demonstrators of the popular neighborhoods of the Faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marcel avenge themselves on two employers for allegedly favoring a reduction of wages at a time of spiraling bread prices. The demonstrators braved government troops and sacked the homes and factories of their enemies to cries of "Long live the Third Estate!" (p. 100). By July, the population of Paris was carried away in a flush of "vague aspirations to liberty and justice", agitation about "aristocratic treachery", and foreboding of a "climactic confrontation" (p. 103). When news of Necker's dismissal reached the city on 12 July, the people believed that a noble onslaught was underway and took up arms to meet the danger. Each subsequent clash with royal troops provoked new rumors about the treachery of the aristocracy.

The peasants, of course, bore the brunt of the power relations of the old regime. Andress writes on the very first page that the peasants' "obedience to all of their supposed superiors was taken for granted, and their triple burden of dues owed to state, church and feudal lord, or seigneur, seemed a fixed point in the social order". The peasantry had resented the monarchy's tax farms for centuries and continued to regard them as the principal injustice of the old regime in 1789. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the peasantry also showed bitterness toward seigneurial rights. Great nobles of Paris and Versailles and lords of provincial towns leased the collection of their seigneurial dues to unscrupulous businessmen determined to obtain as much revenue from the peasantry as possible.

Andress's conclusion evaluates the consequences of the Revolution for the peasantry. Rural communities liberated themselves from seigneurial rights and tithes and acquired national lands expropriated from the church and emigrés. Andress uses the recent research of Bernard Bodinier and Éric Teyssier to show that peasants not only purchased about one-third of the national lands, but also acquired many parcels from businessmen and

speculators who had bought national lands with the intention of dividing them into smaller units and selling them to the peasantry at inflated prices. These gains pushed the peasants' overall share of the French soil from under 45 per cent to around one-half. The abolition of the seigneurial regime and the acquisition of land improved the peasantry's material conditions, even if they did not stimulate much economic development. "Overall there was, perhaps ironically, more justice than progress in the agricultural system that emerged by the late 1790s" (p. 246).

In spite of the thoughtful evaluation of evidence and the rich texture of the narrative, Andress still leaves at least one major question unanswered. He states in the conclusion that the creation of "a single, rational, hierarchical system of administration" constituted a major advance toward modernity (p. 244). But did it alter the relations of authority between the propertied elite and the people? The first three chapters of the work show that seigneurs, employers, and government officials had enjoyed a personal sort of authority over other royal subjects. After reading the conclusion, the reader is left wondering if the formation of a modern bureaucratic state made social relations abstract rather than personal, whether it brought the populace into contact with the national state rather than with the local seigneur or office holder. Such a change would have been truly revolutionary. But Andress does not say whether it actually took place.

*Stephen Miller*

LITVIN, ALTER L. and JOHN L.H. KEEP. *Stalinism. Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium*. Routledge, London [etc.] 2004. 264 pp. £65.00. (Paperback £20.99.); DOI: 10.1017/S0020859005032220

This book is an overview of recent writing in Russian, English, German, and French about Stalinism. Part I, which is by Alter Litvin (Kazan), covers the Russian literature. Part II, by John Keep (Berne), covers the Western literature, mainly in the period 1997–2002. The purpose of the book is to give students and the interested general public a sense of what has been achieved of late by historians in Russia and the West in comprehending and interpreting the phenomenon of Stalinism. However, even specialists will find the bibliographical information valuable. Recent years have seen an outpouring of literature on various aspects of Stalinism. This has mainly resulted from the opening of the former closed Soviet archives, but also from changing political circumstances and intellectual fashions. This book provides a guide to much of that literature.

Part I is a rather politicized literature survey which will be useful to students looking for a guide to the main publications and their findings, although a more detached presentation would have been still more useful. It also tells non-specialists who may be unaware of this about the sharp ideological divisions among contemporary Russian writers on historical themes, in particular between liberals and "patriots". It devotes chapters to sources, Stalin's biography, Stalin's role as a leader, Terror, and foreign policy (the Nazi–Soviet pact and the origins of the Cold War). The discussion of sources rightly draws attention to the numerous document collections that have been published in recent years, such as the multi-volume *Tragediya sovetskoi derevni* [The Tragedy of the Soviet Village] which Litvin regards (p. 11) as "an indispensable basis for further research". This is just one of a number of document collections. Your reviewer entirely agrees with Litvin's statement (p. 16) that "putting out these documentary volumes has been one of the main

achievements of Russian historians over the last few years". In this connection he naturally notes (p. 10) the important contribution of the late V.P. Danilov to the publication of documents on the peasantry (i.e. the majority of the population). He also refers to the memoir literature, the Malyshev diary, and the important articles on the visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office. Litvin draws attention to the problem of the reliability of the data in the files of the security service, both on individuals and "organizations", and on the situation in the country about which they regularly informed (or misinformed?) the leadership. This is indeed a major issue.

In the chapter on Stalin's biography Litvin points out (pp. 34–35) that no authentic documents have been found confirming the frequently repeated statement that Stalin was an *okhrana* agent. On Stalin's industrialization programme Litvin concludes (p. 55) that, "In the name of a utopian goal, millions of citizens suffered imprisonment or worse, while works of art were exchanged for rapidly ageing technological artifacts. While the state grew more powerful, the people were reduced to beggary." The fact that per capita urban consumption in 1937 was above that of 1928, the rapid growth in living standards in the 1950s, and the fact that industrialization is a positive worldwide phenomenon that generates growing employment and in due course rising living standards, do not interest Litvin, who prefers to dwell on Stalin's crimes. These undoubtedly existed, on a gargantuan scale, and recent historical work has provided us with detailed information about them, but they were not the sole content of the Stalin era.

In his discussion of Soviet foreign policy Litvin draws attention to the finding (p. 79) that the speech Stalin is supposed to have made at a Politburo meeting of 19 August 1939 is a forgery. Your reviewer considers that Litvin's assertion (p. 83) that malnutrition and related diseases caused two and a half million deaths in 1946–1947 is exaggerated. Elsewhere I have argued that the true figure is in the range 1–1.5 million. The Medvedevs' speculation that Stalin's chosen successor was Suslov is wrongly treated (p. 44) as if it were generally accepted. A surprising feature is the neglect of World War II. In view of the role this plays in the Stalin legend (and also in the demographic history of the USSR) greater attention to it would have been desirable. (The inattention to the war in both Part I and Part II may be explained by space limitations.)

Despite its intrinsic importance, due to the enormous changes that took place, Litvin pays little attention to demographic history. Neither the two classic books of Andreev, Darskii, and Kharkova, nor the book of Vishnevskii (which Litvin would find ideologically attractive) are mentioned. Such important demographic phenomena as the World War II catastrophe, or the long-run decline in fertility, go unmentioned.

Part II is considerably better. It covers the literature in three languages (English, German, and French). It is sensitive to changing academic fashions and to generational differences among historians. It engages with various historiographical currents. Instead of Alter's politicized account it offers a serious theoretical discussion. Keep has a preference for traditional empirical history but is willing to judge all trees by their fruit. He criticizes (p. 221) Malia's polemics and prefers a more dispassionate approach. This sophisticated perspective is one that your reviewer endorses. Topics covered include the political system; social history; gender studies and daily life; faith, science, and history; Terror; and foreign policy. Keep constantly seeks to draw attention to what has been found by historians, traditional and postmodernist alike, while maintaining a running debate with the postmodernist writers. This produces an informative and interesting text. Anyone seeking a guide to recent writing in these areas will find much of interest.

On the findings of gender studies (pp. 138–144) he rightly points out that much of the experience of Soviet women cannot readily be assessed within the framework of Western feminism. He draws attention to the criminalization of abortion, the treatment of orphans, and the experience of women factory workers. In his discussion of education he sensibly refers (p. 157) to “the regime’s achievements in spreading literacy and skills”, and draws attention to Ewing’s excellent monograph on Soviet teachers in the 1930s. His discussion of the social sciences draws attention (p. 161) to Brandenberger’s valuable work on identification politics.<sup>1</sup> When discussing the Terror, Keep draws attention (p. 170) to the formative role of the Civil War and its accompanying diseases and starvation in determining the violence of the Stalin years. He also has a useful survey of recent writings on the “mass operations” which constituted the Stalinshchina of 1937–1938 and on Stalinist ethnic cleansing (pp. 174–180). On “the Icebreaker controversy”, he argues (pp. 197–198) that Rezun’s arguments are unfounded. However, he adds that “Had Hitler *not* invaded, Stalin might have launched a strike *later*, but this is to enter the realm of hypothesis.” On the Korean War, he deftly summarizes recent writing (pp. 204–205). Economic history (pp. 111–113), on the other hand, is inadequately treated. Keep does note the fundamental contribution of the “authoritative” 1994 Davies, Wheatcroft, & Harrison volume. However, although he refers to Harrison’s work on the economics of World War II (p. 119) as “rather technical”, it is actually a major contribution to understanding a central aspect of Stalinism – the victory in World War II.

Keep does not confine himself to works written by academics and devotes almost a page to Appelbaum’s informative and accessible volume on the Gulag, which he describes (p. 183) as “a comprehensive scholarly study”.

The book seems largely free of errors. However, the meeting which was held on 14–17 April 1940 to discuss the results of the Winter War is erroneously described (p. 193) as a “Central Committee meeting”. Actually, it was a meeting organized by – *pri* – the Central Committee. Also, the bibliographical information in footnote 4 on p. 133 is wrong.

As Keep points out (p. 217), according to traditional criteria Stalin was a very successful statesman. He won a major war; greatly expanded Soviet industry and GDP; implemented a major improvement in social indicators such as literacy, infant mortality, and life expectancy; enlarged the country’s frontiers; and made the country a major player in world politics and a country feared by its enemies. Hence, it is not surprising that many Russians today have a positive image of him. Nevertheless, Keep’s own criteria (like those of the Russian historian Pavlova to whom Litvin draws attention on p. 49) are different. He criticizes postmodernism, and in particular the “cultural turn”, for producing (p.220) “ethically compromised” work.

The outpouring of articles and books on Stalin and Stalinism is ongoing. This book offers a well-informed survey of recent work in this area in four languages. In view of the central importance of Stalinism in the twentieth century this is undoubtedly a useful project. Economic, military, and demographic historians will feel that their specialisms are inadequately treated or neglected altogether. Nevertheless, on the whole the book is successful in achieving its aims and deserves to be widely read or dipped into for information on specific topics.

Michael Ellman

1. David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956* (Cambridge, MA [etc.], 2002).

LENOE, MATTHEW. *Closer to the Masses. Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution and Soviet Newspapers*. [Russian Research Center Studies, Vol. 95] Harvard University Press, Cambridge, (Mass.) [etc.] 2004. viii, 315 pp. \$49.95; £32.95; DOI: 10.1017/S0020859005052223

The modern era is a time of mass politics. In contrast to earlier periods when the masses were excluded from politics (except, perhaps, when they occasionally rebelled against authorities, mostly in an unorganized fashion), nearly all modern political parties in “advanced” countries court the masses of people. The Soviet Union was no exception. At a time when a large segment of the population was still illiterate, films played a very important role in Soviet mass politics. Yet, as everyone was expected to become literate in due course, print culture began to play an equal or even more important role. In 1923 Stalin said that the press “is the single tool by which the party daily speaks to the working class”. He saw the relationship between the party and the masses as one in which “tens of hundreds of thousands of workers respond to the call of the party press” (p. 33).

Matthew Lenoe’s work focuses on the role that the Soviet mass newspapers played in the formative years of the Soviet Union. Drawing on extensive research in both published and unpublished documents, Lenoe carefully analyzes the political functions of the Soviet press, and makes two broad claims. The first concerns the origins of the Soviet cultural doctrine, “socialist realism”, which dictated the terms of artistic and cultural production from the 1930s onward. This is the most original contribution the present book makes to the field. The second claim concerns theoretical and conceptual issues – the refutation of “postmodernist” approaches to Soviet history and the proposition instead of what Lenoe calls “neo-traditionalism”.

Lenoe locates in the year of 1930 a sharp turning point in the political and cultural roles the Soviet press played. Before the breakneck pace of the industrialization drive in the late 1920s, the economy (NEP) was “mixed”, with market relations regulating vital parts of the national economy and economic planning barely apparent. As with the economy, the new revolutionary government had to deal with leftover elements in culture. The government was exploring the ways in which to further the first proletarian revolution in the world and to secure its survival. Naturally, political leaders fought for power and vision. In the realm of the press as in others, revolutionary idealism was still a strong force in the 1920s. Many newspapers saw their mission as mass enlightenment, for instance, rather than mass propaganda. This point echoes Jeffrey Brook, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton, NJ, 2001). The mission of enlightenment drew lessons from both positive and negative phenomena and developments in Soviet society.

By the late 1920s, when the rapid industrialization drive was in full swing, the party and the Soviet cultural establishment became visibly concerned about the newspapers’ role in the enlightenment of the masses to the negative aspects of Soviet life (corruption and bureaucracy, for instance) and began to redirect the newspapers and other mass media decisively toward “positive enlightenment” – the creation of optimism through the depiction of the “success of socialist construction” colored with “revolutionary romanticism”. This redirection was made decisive in this instance, as in so many others, by the direct intervention of the party leadership in 1930. Yet Lenoe suggests that, in fact, the party was led in this direction by Soviet newspaper journalists who had in the 1920s focused their activity on the reporting of the “heroism of socialist construction” from the shopfloor. According to Lenoe, it is this kind of new mass journalism that opened the way

for the creation of the doctrine of “socialist realism” for all cultural activity. High Stalinist culture as represented by socialist realism was thus based on the rise of mass journalism in the 1920s. The adoption of the new doctrine was less “a one-sided imposition by Stalin and a small group of high-level agitprop officials than a collaboration between party leaders and their new cadres” (p. 181).

While Lenoe presents this contention well, he avoids engaging with other theories on “socialist realism”, leaving the reader wondering whether mass journalism was a decisive factor or not. This is a pity. In contrast, Lenoe seems to be much more interested in the second theme of the book, a rebuttal of the postmodernist (or, in this case, “modernity school”) approach to Soviet history. Like the proponents of the “modernity school”, Lenoe contends that the modern era is an era of mass politics and that all societies, regardless of political orientation, face the same kind of challenges. However, while the “modernity school” presents the Soviet experience with all its terror and horror as a mere variant of “modernity” (the school avoids the use of the term “modernization” for some reason), Lenoe emphasizes that, even though the Soviet state faced the same kinds of challenge as liberal societies, the Soviet solution was fundamentally different from that of democratic societies.

Democratic, capitalist societies rely on the “science” of public relations, which is about “understanding individual desires through psychology and marketing surveys and then stimulating and using those desires to mold popular opinion” (p. 7). The Soviet Union employed none of these PR methods. Instead it resorted to agitation and propaganda – “exhortations to heroic sacrifices” and “appeals to class resentments” (p. 7). In interpreting the Soviet experience, Lenoe draws on Ken Jowitt’s work on Romanian communism and Andrew Walder’s on Chinese communism, and proposes what he calls a “neo-traditionalist” model: “an amalgam of traditional and rational/legal authority, in which the former nonetheless dominates” (p. 250).

The Stalinist regime regarded itself as representing the march of history, against which capitalism fought. The Soviet Union, heir to a relatively backward society, strove to be at the forefront of modernity. In the process, it recreated traditional authority in the form of extra-legal powers and clientele networks and developed “an estate or status group hierarchy” (p. 251). In this new modern society, fundamentally different from liberal societies, newspapers played a critically important role. They became not media “to entertain, make money, promote rational debate, or even sell the party’s messages to the population at large”, but a tool of “mobilization of cadres to fulfill the social combat task of industrialization” (p. 254).

Lenoe discusses these points well. Yet the difference between the “modernity” and “neo-traditionalist” schools may be a matter of emphasis, for both assume that all modern societies have faced the challenge of modern, mass politics but sought to cope with it differently. One wonders how the “modernity school” would respond. Whatever the case, Lenoe’s book is sure to spark debate among those whose works he challenges.

*Hiroaki Kuromiya*

EDGAR, ADRIENNE LYNN. *Tribal Nation. The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan*. Princeton University Press, Princeton [etc.] 2004. xvi, 296 pp. Ill. £24.95; DOI: 10.1017/S002085900506222X

Edgar's book is the first English-language regional study (Jörg Baberowski's book on Azerbaijan is available in German) devoted to Soviet nationalities policy in a single republic of the interwar USSR on the basis of the new materials which have emerged from the opening of the former Soviet archives. Since the current Turkmen regime is the most closed in all the former Soviet Union, Edgar was unable to work in the republican and regional archives in Turkmenistan. Her work is based on material from the central Moscow archives, in addition to published material, also in Turkmen, consulted in the national library of Ashgabat.

Although the study has at its core nation-building policies, Edgar's work is a wide-ranging social and political history of Turkmenistan in the 1920s and 1930s. The central issue of the book is the complex interaction of the identitary affiliations (tribal, ethnic, social, gender) present in Turkmen society, and their changing political meaning under the influence of Soviet policies. Gender politics is dealt with in a chapter dedicated to the "liberation" of Turkmen women (already unveiled before the rise of Soviet power). Here, Edgar shows that the hypothesis advanced by Gregory Massell about central Asian women as "surrogate proletarians" is not tenable for the Turkmen case, and also demonstrates the erratic nature of policies directed at emancipating women: for instance, in 1925 in Turkmenistan the possibility of divorce was restricted, at a time when women elsewhere in the Soviet Union had unprecedented freedom to end their marriages. Edgar demonstrates, in her analysis of these policies, the importance of debates and conflicts inside the regional party apparatus. In this regard, another example is given by language policy, subject of hot debates in the republic during the 1920s, when Turkmenistan cultural institutions devoted themselves to the creation of a national language. Until then, the Turkmens had lacked a common written idiom and spoke dialects which were typical not of different regions, but of different tribal divisions.

Throughout her book, Edgar underscores the active role played by the most important Turkmen party chiefs and intellectuals, albeit very limited in number: "Far from being passive recipients of a national culture invented in Moscow, Turkmen themselves played a major role in shaping the institutions and discourses of nationhood in the 1920s and 1930s" (p. 5). At the same time, Edgar stresses the colonial nature of the Turkmen socio-political situation, where urban centres were inhabited mostly by Europeans, who represented the overwhelming majority in the government of the republic. What is more, "the lines of power ran from Moscow through its hand-picked emissaries in the republic, for the most part bypassing local officials" (p. 120); Turkmen officials "complained bitterly about their lack of real authority and the failure of Russian colleagues to take them seriously" (p. 118). Edgar manages to give a multi-faceted picture of the complex relationship between Moscow and the Central Asian periphery.

Although it is evident that the Soviet government implemented policies of social transformation and modernization towards the entire Soviet population, nevertheless, from the author's analysis, the colonial implications for Turkmenistan of policies decided in the metropolitan centre clearly emerge. Edgar's study shows that there were significant differences in the ways in which Russians and central Asians experienced Soviet rule. Regardless of "the policy of indigenization, which mandated preferential treatment for the indigenous nationality and language within each republic, [...] indigenous communists did not enjoy the same career opportunities as their European counterparts. [...] The assumption of non-Russian 'backwardness' [...] often prevailed among even the most committed communists and internationalists. The ethnic tensions that plagued non-

Russian republics as a result of indigenization had no direct equivalent within Russian regions” (p. 13).

Although Soviet “modernization” policies, such as women’s emancipation, were more similar to those carried through in Kemal Atatürk’s Turkey than those in the French and British empires, nonetheless, according to Edgar, unlike the Turkish experience, they had only minor success in Turkmenistan precisely because changes in women’s status were associated with colonial coercion, and not with the strengthening of the modern nation-state: “the Soviet regime carried the taint of alien rule” (p. 260). So, unlike the European regions of the USSR, Soviet power in Turkmenistan brought with it social categories – nation and class – alien to the local society that described itself as divided in discrete genealogical units. As Edgar explains, lineage divisions inside Turkmen society were hierarchical, and functional to access to resources and social status: some tribal groups were richer and had a higher status position than others. From this point of view, the language of class introduced by the state could find a “tribal” translation.

What is more, until the early 1930s, the Soviet government did not feel strong enough to eradicate the tribal organization of Turkmen society; together with class policies that aimed to favour poor peasants and nomads, the party put into practice a policy of social peace and of neutrality towards different tribal groups in conflict. These policies had unintended effects: “Through land reform and other ambitious programs aimed at transforming Turkmen rural life, the regime broadened the scope for descent group competition and reinforced the rationale for kin-based solidarity. At the same time, ‘tribal parity’ implicitly recognized and sanctioned the very genealogical categories that the regime was determined to eradicate. Finally, because of the close linkage between genealogy and socioeconomic standings in Turkmenistan, Soviet attempts to foment class conflict worked against the policy of ‘tribal parity’, inadvertently exacerbating descent group conflict. Instead of creating new social fissures in the Turkmen countryside, Soviet policies simply deepened existing ones” (p. 168).

The only reservation which a reader might raise in relation to such a documented and scrupulous work is the choice of period. This study does not deal with the problem of continuity and the transformations undergone by Turkmen society during the two main periods of crisis of the first half of the twentieth century: the period of war and revolution, from the great revolt of 1916 to the civil war, and that of collectivization in the first half of the 1930s. Although Edgar chronicles the first one in an introductory chapter, the actual treatment begins from the “national delimitation” of central Asia in 1924, when Turkmenistan came into being. Edgar’s account of this episode, which established the shape of modern central Asian states, is the most documented, together with the recent book by Arne Haugen. In another chapter, the policies of collectivization and attack on nomadism are analysed. These measures were accompanied by a push for cotton cultivation; nonetheless, the book lacks an in-depth analysis of the social consequences of collectivization. In particular, the author doesn’t deal with the problem of interaction between the new economical-administrative units (the collective farms) and the genealogical divisions, a problem that other scholars, such as Bertrand Bouchet, have already brought to the attention of central Asian specialists. The problem here is the particular ways in which Soviet socialism altered the function and meaning of tribe and clan affiliation, and the mechanisms of identity reproduction in a mutated economical and political context.

Furthermore, although Edgar often opens illuminating comparative perspectives with

the nation-building and social-transformation policies of other colonial states, what is absent is a contextualization of the Turkmen experience with those of other central Asian regions of the Soviet Union, above all with the two republics which had a preponderantly pastoral economy, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Even though these were different from Turkmenistan because of the presence on their territory of hundreds of thousands of Slavic agricultural settlers, significant analogies with the interwar Turkmen situation could be pointed out. For instance, analogies regarding the power relations between locals and Europeans in the administration or in the policies against nomadism carried out during collectivization, which had similar disastrous outcomes. As in Kazakstan, in Turkmenistan in 1932 the party also took the decision to return collectivized livestock to its owners in order to save what remained of the pastoral economy, which had been reduced to a catastrophic condition by collectivization. In this connection, Edgar only reports that with these measures “the Soviet regime tacitly permitted Turkmen pastoralists to return to their pre-collectivization way of life” (p. 220), without problematizing the profound impact that collectivization had on Turkmen social structure.

Despite this, the book is one of the most important of the regional studies that are currently enhancing our knowledge of nation-building in the interwar Soviet Union. Its fluent and easy style, and Edgar’s disposition not to take for granted an acquaintance with Soviet history, make it a very good introduction to Soviet nationalities policy through case study, and a book also suitable for undergraduate courses.

*Niccolò Pianciola*

GODICHEAU, FRANÇOIS. *La guerre d’Espagne. République et révolution en Catalogne (1936–1939)*. Odile Jacob, Paris 2004. 459 pp. € 29.00; DOI: 10.1017/S0020859005072226

This study, which addresses a very specific region, autonomous Catalonia, is the fruit of lengthy university research. It aims at casting new light on some little-known aspects of the Spanish Civil War. The author, who has placed great emphasis on the mutations of the Libertarian Movement (ML, *Movimiento Libertario*), focuses mainly on political violence within the antifascist camp itself. Rather than dwelling on deeply entrenched generalities hardening into a few antagonistic viewpoints, he informs us of the statistical evaluations and analyses of significant cases (the Torelló events, the “clandestine cemeteries” scandal of Sitgès, the professional judges’ response to “chaos”), based on unpublished materials.

Through the progressive re-establishment of a judiciary apparatus guaranteeing the lawfulness of proceedings, François Godicheau concentrates on the process that led to the “reconstruction of a state that had been almost completely shattered” in July 1936 (see p. 19). He goes on to show that, thanks to favourable conditions on the military scene, this republican state grew more and more authoritarian and repressive, with police action prevailing over justice. But this evolution, which was at the expense of the most active among anarchist militants in factories and militias, would not have been possible, he argues, without the desire for unconditional political collaboration shown by the leaders of the chief workers’ organization: the National Confederation of Labour (CNT, *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*), which, steeped in pretendedly intangible libertarian ideals and principles, had been able in the past to preserve its “non-integration into a system of peaceful relations with the state” (p. 17). This leads him to wonder about the

surprising shift from an uncompromising revolutionary stand to an attitude of systematic participation which was to condemn the ML as a whole (trade unions, anarchist groups, libertarian youth) to internal rifts and ceaseless recantations.

Does this mean that the author's explanations are convincing? The section of the book devoted to institutions under the restored monarchy, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and the Second Republic is a good summary of the period's history: changes in the form and continuity of ideas, characteristics of the armed forces, the specific nature of caciquism, and the parliamentary pseudo-regime. The absence of an in-depth analysis of class relationships, however, is to be regretted. Nor is the pronounced ideological designation of the establishment as "the elites" consistent with the author's claims of reserve and objectivity.

There are some excellent pages about movements such as Catalanism and Lerrouxist populism. The part about the ML, however, contains a few errors, especially regarding the personalities and roles of several well-known activists. Some surprising shortcomings appear as well. One concerns the misinformation about the ideas of the *solidarios*, identified with mercenaries hired by the CNT unions in 1920–1923 (p. 54). Another example is the failure to consider the nineteenth-century clashes between "collectivists" and ultra-revolutionary "communists" that heralded the dispute between *treintistas* and *faistas*. Likewise, the author neglects to cover the insurrection of 8 December 1933, although of the three anarcho-sindicalist "putsches", this one claimed the heaviest casualties and material losses and had the most serious political consequences. Finally, the author would have done well to examine in somewhat more detail the origins of the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI, Federación Anarquista Ibérica), its ties with the CNT, and the mythology surrounding it.

Asserting that the establishment of an Iberian trade-union bank "is surprising for a libertarian organization" (p. 399, n. 61) overlooks the mutualism of Proudhon and his "Banque du peuple", widely known and appreciated by many union members. The establishment of this trade-union bank was decided by the enlarged economic plenum of January 1938: the national CNT plenum of August 1938 (not to be confused with the Catalonia ML plenum held in June of that year) merely ratified the measure.

How are readers to understand that the CNT was integrated into a certain type of evolving state without a prior explanation of what the state is according to revolutionary anarchism, based on the writings of Bakunin or Kropotkin? After all, the concept of state is not self-evident. It is fluid, variable, and polyvalent, and requires a chronological and spatial context. At the highest theoretical level, different interpretations of the state are offered by Joseph de Maistre, Karl Marx, Max Weber, etc. And any carefully considered view of the state implies a correlative conception of revolution: an accelerated socio-political process, a popular revolt, or the more or less sudden and violent breakdown of a system of domination, coinciding with structural change varying in intensity and duration. The anarchists' Revolution (with a capital R) is a myth with high dynamic potential, whereas history offers examples of revolutions driven by ideologies across the political spectrum, and even of revolutions within "major" revolutions, such as the ones in France and Russia. Various sociologists and historians have examined this theme, from which ideology can never be dissociated. As with his review of the state, Godicheau is insufficiently rigorous in his discussion of this field. Contrary to what the title of his book suggests, he does not really think in terms of "revolution" and "counter-revolution" in Catalonia. He consistently writes about revolutionary "events" (pp. 96–97), a designation

that as so often served as a means to “camouflage” political-social and military realities that were felt to be somehow disturbing.

Godicheau somewhat hastily describes some authors as “anarchists” who are not so, and judges them on mere intent (pp. 122–123 and 329–330). We shall only point out that the “Bolshevization” of libertarian organizations was described over thirty years ago. This trend peaked in Madrid where the Comité de Defensa CNT had unparalleled control and enabled the “anarchists” to defeat the communists in 1939. This “Bolshevization” occurred very early, well before the junta led by General Miaja was established.

As regards Catalonia, the book evaluates the action of the “coordination and information sections” (pp. 351–355). Undoubtedly for lack of documents, however, there is no mention of the fact that this conspiratorial network, at bottom, gave concrete shape, although in a different context, to the “revolutionary army” that the *solidarios* had envisaged for years. Nor does the author explain that the network was controlled by Manuel Escorza, a member of the FAI Peninsular Committee and chief of the secret services of the Catalan CNT since the start of the Civil War. Without this man, who operated behind the scenes and was aware of the plot devised by the Stalinists, the anarchists would have been crushed in Barcelona in May 1937. As to the ML Executive Committee of Catalonia, we are not informed of the fact that it originated in 1926, with Garcia Oliver as its chief instigator. Around this time in Paris, Oliver devised a theory about the “seizure of power” that was shared, among others, by Rafael Vidiella (a future communist leader) and Perez Combina (who resurfaced alongside the “friends of Durruti”). It was also in Paris – then the home of Makhno and the defeated Russian libertarians – that militants from all over Europe discussed the “Archinov platform”, a veritable plan to “Bolshevize” anarchism internationally under the aegis of an “Executive Committee”. These discussions were a major factor in the establishment of the FAI in 1927.

Godicheau provides evidence in support of his demonstration that the CNT had been longing for a “preventive coup d’état” since late 1937 (pp. 355–357) but does not mention that it came close to materializing in April 1938. Defence Minister Indalecio Prieto, lacking the courage to give the “anarchists” the go-ahead, left them no choice but to work with Negrin for the time being; they did not naively rush into Negrin’s arms. It was a fierce struggle for survival that involved responding to the counter-revolution within Spain and to satellitization by the Soviet Union, while avoiding general extermination by the Francoist forces. The author reveals little about this course of events, focusing instead on the “adoption of a CNT-UGT economic program fully harmonized with the moderated one introduced by the socialist trade union” (p. 382). In 1938, however, the CNT had in fact convinced the Negrin partisans to accept a cohesive plan for joint worker control and a democratically coordinated pluralist economy.

According to the sources he produces, a tragic rift occurred as from May 1937 within the three branches of the ML, between their bureaucratized “leadership” and their “base” (the grassroots activists) disconcerted at the abandonment of traditional principles. Actually, the only identifiable elements among this “base”, a notion that can be stretched at will, were the “radical anarchist” groups – another convenient designation amalgamating purists such as Peirats, Bolshevistic leftists such as Balius, and elements who had arrogated absolute local power unto themselves. These “radicals” responded to those they considered to be capitulators by rallying in support of “antifascist prisoners”. As even Godicheau observes, no “alternative leadership” was available. Nor did they have “alternative

solutions”; their “rhetoric was futile” (p. 344). Accordingly, Godicheau’s thesis that the ML was on the verge of disintegrating (rivalry between the CNT National Committee and the CNT Catalan Regional Committee, antagonism between the bodies in charge and a minority, as large as one wishes, of raucous contestants) does not prove very convincing. Vital common interests and fear of irreparable disaster perpetuated the need for cohesion.

“The archives in themselves reveal nothing, one has to make them speak”, writes François Godicheau (p. 20), touching on one of the major problems of historical epistemology. Curiously enough, he then takes up, in his own way, the discourse of the leftist historian Miquel Amorós (*La revolución traicionada*), although from an entirely different perspective. Various approaches thus converge and may one day be considered characteristic of historiography in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At any rate, much remains to be said and re-interpreted about the Spanish Revolution and the Civil War, as these courses of events are admittedly “complex” (cf. p. 418) and of outstanding interest.

César M. Lorenzo

KOO, HAGEN. *Korean Workers. The Culture and Politics of Class Formation*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca [etc.] 2001. xii, 240 pp. Ill. \$45.00; £29.50. (Paper: £11.50.); DOI: 10.1017/S0020859005082222

SOONOK, CHUN. *They Are Not Machines. Korean Women Workers and Their Fight for Democratic Trade Unionism in the 1970s*. Ashgate, Aldershot [etc.] 2003. 214 pp. £45.00; \$89.95; DOI: 10.1017/S0020859005092229

As South Korea’s *minjung* movement has faded into historical memory, the much heralded 1970s labor movement and young women factory workers have been gradually forgotten. Thus, Chun Soonok’s *They Are Not Machines: Korean Women Workers and Their Fight for Democratic Trade Unionism in the 1970s* and Hagen Koo’s *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation* make valuable contributions to this small, but important field. Both books pay particular homage to the indelible mark that women factory workers left on the South Korean labor movement and political activism, and in so doing, both authors remind the readers of the tumultuous labor history of the country as it emerged from dictatorship. The authors, however, bring different styles and perspectives to the understanding of the lives of women workers and their contribution to political activism.

Both authors base their work on the well-documented experiences of Korean workers. Chun “draws upon three sources of first-hand experience of women workers. They are: (i) circumstances as described by them to the author in one-to-one interviews and in group seminars; (ii) contemporary recollections as detailed in personal diaries which were made available to the author; and (iii) reflections of the author’s own experience as a teenage worker in the Peace Market during the period under review” (p. 79). Koo relies on both workers’ and activists’ narratives and interviews with them: “The major sources for my study are a wealth of materials produced by workers and labor activists in South Korea. [...] I have also conducted many informal interviews with factory workers, unionists, and labor experts over the past ten years” (p. 14).

Young women workers made invaluable contributions to the early phase of industrialization in the 1960s, and to the democratization of the labor movement in the 1970s and 1980s in South Korea. Thus, Chun asserts “that the process of the democratization of the labour movement in South Korea was begun by women workers in the textile and garment industry in the decade of the 1970s” (p. 189), and similarly, Koo argues that “the women-led struggles in the 1970s made a tremendous contribution in promoting worker consciousness, class identity, and networks of solidarity. Based on this groundwork, the Korean working-class formation developed rapidly in the next decade” (p. 99). Their claims are supported by another important author writing about the South Korean labor movement: “when in the mid-eighties the male workers began to take action of their own, they found that they were standing on the shoulders of women who had been struggling for justice for more than ten years”.<sup>1</sup> I agree with their position that women labor activists provided a crucial foundation of the movement that culminated in the nationwide labor uprising of 1987.<sup>2</sup>

The contributions of women workers, especially in the 1970s, have become a standard feature in the work of labor historians writing from the 1990s on, but, Chun asserts in her book that this important contribution or “achievement has gone unrecognized and unrecorded” (p. 189). According to her, scholars in the “conventional view” camp totally neglected significance of the women workers’ involvement in the crucial period of 1970s due to their neglect of paying attention to women’s voices (p. 2). Although she does not cite any specific works, the accusation is directed toward young male scholars who expressed their doubts about the women workers’ contribution to the labor movements in the 1980s and 1990s: these scholars argued that women workers’ scattered strikes, focusing on inhumane labor conditions and sub-standard wages during the height of Yushin period (1970s), were not driven by their clear class-consciousness, and thus did not contribute to the later workers’ labor movement.

Male-focused perspectives were prevalent especially following the “watershed” of the 1987 nation-wide labor uprising, when labor activism changed its character and became much more open and politically powerful. After this transition, the struggle of women workers became overshadowed by the more spectacular conflicts between the *chaebol* and their militant unions of male workers. Although, I argue in my work that women’s activism continued to be important, the post 1987 role of women workers has not received a great deal of scholarly attention.

The undervaluing of women’s contributions with which Chun appears to take issue also needs to be understood in the specific context of scholarly debates. These “conventional views” were produced against extravagant claims, especially in Korean-language literature, for the political accomplishment of women workers as activists, particularly during the 1970s. Against this backdrop, Koo’s argument that “a gender shift in the main actors of the Korean labor movement” happened during the 1980s, and that “this marginalization of women occurred, however, not just in the dynamics of the labor movement, but, more important, in the popular representation of and scholarly discourse on the women’s labor struggle” is persuasive (pp. 181–183).

The most troublesome aspect of Chun’s book is her claim for herself of the status of “true” spokesperson for women workers, and how she seeks to discredit academic

1. George Ogle, *South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle* (London, 1990), p. 86.

2. See Seung-kyung Kim, *Class Struggle or Family Struggle? The Lives of Women Factory Workers in South Korea* (New York [etc.], 1997).

researchers who are not from a working-class background, as being “inaccurate or incomplete” (p. 5). Her special status is inarguable. She is the sister of the famous labor martyr Chun Tae-il, and the daughter of Yi So-sun, who is widely regarded as the mother of the Korean labor movement. I find her suspicion of academic researchers understandable, but also problematic.

Issues related to the “politics of representation” have been debated widely among scholars in anthropology, sociology, and women’s studies, etc. Scholars who were influenced by Foucault’s notion of “power”, Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony”, Marx’s notion of “class”, and Scott’s notion of “everyday resistance” discussed the uneven relationship between the researcher and the research subjects. Feminist scholars such as Patricia Hill Collins, Sandra Harding, Nancy Hartsock, Donna Haraway, Dorinne Kondo, Dorothy Smith, and Judith Stacey have extensively examined the ambiguous location of the researcher, and how her standpoint determines the authenticity of representation. Hill Collins’s interrogation of the notion of insider/outsider position would have been useful for Chun to consider. In this context, I find Chun’s claim that, only she, as a former worker, can correctly represent the women factory workers, extreme.

While I do appreciate Chun’s detailed description of the lives of young women workers (e.g. their earnings and spending and their day-to-day life on the shopfloor in chapter 6), I wish that she were more reflective about her role as a researcher/activist in writing this book. Rather than examining her multiple roles vis-à-vis the women workers and thus enriching her analysis, Chun’s way of presenting the lives of women workers is one-dimensional. Her claim to have unique access to the truth about workers because she is one ultimately shuts out any of her readers who are not factory workers.

Contrasting with Chun’s overreaching assertions, Koo uses workers’ written materials carefully. His book tells a good story about how the first generation of Korean workers became “working class” and developed “a new sense of collective identity”. Examining this process, Koo refers to workers’ essays and diaries extensively in order to make his arguments, while being candid about the problematic nature of generalization from these essays: “I make extensive use of workers’ essays in this study. This could introduce some methodological problems because these essays may not represent the level of consciousness of ordinary workers during the 1970s and early 1980s. [...] For this reason, I try not to use workers’ essays to make generalizations about the state of class identity or consciousness in the working class as a whole. [...] I use workers’ writings primarily for the purpose of looking into their experiences, not to gauge the level of their class consciousness” (p. 50, fn. 2). I appreciate his efforts in paying close attention to the details of how complicated it is to understand the process of class-consciousness.

Koo points out that “[o]ne of the most distinctive aspects of the labor struggles in South Korea was the involvement of a large number of students and intellectuals in the labor movement” (p. viii). In chapter 4, he discusses the role of churches (both Protestant and Catholic) in helping to organize women workers during the 1970s and early 1980s. In chapter 5, he goes on to discuss the complex relationship between student activists and workers during the 1980s. In so doing, Koo argues that “the close interconnections that developed between labor and students was to a great extent the product of the state’s repressive control of labor” (p. 124). The alliance between labor and students that became the most important force that pushed the democratization of South Korea was anything but simple. I agree with Koo’s argument that South Korea’s working-class formation and the workers’ class-consciousness would have developed anyway, given the historical

events, but that it would have happened a lot slower if it were not for the activism of students, intellectuals, and church leaders.

Lastly, I would like to go back to the marginalization of women workers in Korean labor history and the multiple subjectivities of women workers. As I stated earlier, discussions about women's participation in the labor struggle in South Korea have veered between the extremes of leaving women invisible or presenting a romanticized view that overstates women's accomplishments. Koo attributes women's invisibility to "both a gendered representation and a myopic historical vision" (p. 185). Chun, on the other hand, places blames scholars who have not presented the "truth", when women workers were the ones who started the democratization of the labor movement. As a scholar who has written about a similar topic, I would argue the need for a nuanced understanding of the lives of women workers. In my experience, ordinary women workers often had to make compromises and accommodations with those who were relatively powerful in their own lives. They experienced society not so much as a struggle of capital versus labor but as one with more proximate types of unequal relations (line leader–worker, under manager–line leader, older sister–younger sister, landlord–tenant, etc.). They were not only militant workers, but also had personal identities that were complicated and sometimes conflicted.

As I argued then, "Wisdom, short-sightedness, self-interest, selflessness, altruism and greed are all part of the behavior of the women factory workers".<sup>3</sup>

*Seung-kyung Kim*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 184.