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Legal Pluralism in the Thought and Works of Vasco de Quiroga

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The figure of Don Vasco de Quiroga, together with the work he completed in New Spain,[1] has for some time been the focus of historians', philosophers' and jurists' attention. Since the pioneering research by Juan José Moreno and Nicolás León, followed by Silvio Zavala, Justino Fernández, Edmundo O'Gorman and more recently excellent studies by J. B. Warren, Carlos Herrejón and Alberto Carrillo, Don Vasco has been the subject of a prolific bibliography, which is still being added to. Fifty years ago Alfonso Trueba remarked on the number of works of quality on Vasco de Quiroga, pointing out that 'adding one more to those already published without offering anything new would be a pointless task'.[2] Nonetheless he himself took the risk of publishing a little biographical essay 'imagining that it would be not only useful but necessary to introduce the history of such an eminent personage in our cultural landscape'.[3] I in my turn am daring to present a few thoughts on this illustrious first bishop of Michoacán, following the advice of Alberto Carrillo, for whom 'retrieving a more authentic image of the person and work of that great founder of the new Michoacán and the Indian church in the province may be a step forward in the duty to consolidate the national collective memory and reconstruct our spiritual history'.[4]

My thoughts are not based on new documents or archives; I have used the familiar texts that I have been able to refer to. These thoughts focus on an aspect of Vasco de Quiroga's personality that, in my view, has been insufficiently studied: his legal thinking, or more particularly the notions of legal pluralism contained in the texts penned by him that we know and within the context of which it seems necessary to situate his actions in New Spain and of course in the Michoacán region.

Intellectual background

To explain more fully Quiroga's ideas on legal pluralism we need to place our character in the period when he was formed intellectually and recall the context of the legal institutions he knew and in which he moved throughout his life.

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A native of Villa de Madrigal de las Altas Torres, he was born, according to one of the best scholars of his work, J. B. Warren, around 1477–8,[5] that is, in the final years of the Spanish late Middle Ages; we know from Quiroga himself that he took his *licenciatura*[6] in canon law, but we do not know whether he studied in Valladolid or Salamanca. Like some other biographers Francisco Miranda is inclined to think the latter because at that time a figure very close to the Quiroga family, Don Juan de Tavera, occupied the post of rector in Salamanca. Quiroga was a student between 1505 and 1515.[7] We should stress that he was trained in the law and that he studied in the environment of a society that was deeply influenced by legal matters.

The medieval period was one of great legal culture. Historians such as Jacques Le Goff consider that the prestige accorded to the law was characteristic of that period of history;[8] other authors go even further and link the rise of western legal systems in the late 11th and throughout the 12th century with the appearance of the first European universities and chiefly the Bologna law school.[9] The system of education based on the study of Roman law, developed in the time of Justinian and rediscovered around 1080 with the retrieval of a copy of the compilation put together by the Byzantine emperor, was exported to many other cities in Europe, among them Padua, Perugia, Pisa, Salamanca, Montpellier, Orleans, Prague, Vienna, Krakow and Heidelberg. Later the law course in Bologna, Paris, Oxford and other universities in Europe was extended to include something more than the Roman law contained in the *Corpus iuris civilis*. The main discipline, an addition dating from the second half of the 12th century, was the Church's canon law, which had been elaborated not long before and, unlike Roman law, was a current system.[10]

The study of law in Spanish as in other European universities concentrated on the Roman/canon *ius commune* and so its pillars were the *Corpus iuris civilis* and the *Corpus iuris canonici* taught by the chairs of law: Codes, Institutes, Old Digest and Volume; or in the Canons' Prime and Vespers: Decree, Decretal, Sextus and Clementinae.[11]

The instruction in law provided by the universities of the period gave jurists the opportunity to opt for the study of either canon or civil law, both of which were taught via the techniques of glossing, while until the end of the Middle Ages there prevailed both the *mos italicus* and the *mos gallicus*, the legal practice of which was in turn closely connected with the activity of theologians. Antonio García y García states that 'Theologians and canonists had one factor in common that united their efforts, in that they used both their whole baggage of theological and legal texts and knowledge, as well as their juridico-theological thought, to provide a response to the great problems of their time. This forced them to be ambidextrous and develop interdisciplinarity in order to be able to use philosophical/theological and legal knowledge in both canon and civil law.'[12]

And it is accepted today that medieval society, the society that Vasco de Quiroga knew, was characterized by the coexistence of different orders within a wider legal organization which is indicated by the term 'legal pluralism'. Paolo Grossi recommends that medieval law should be approached 'as a great legal experience that contained within it an infinity of organizations, in which law – before being a norm and a mandate – is an order of the social, a spontaneous driving principle arising from below, from a society that was self-regulating with regard to the disputes that were always ready to break out in everyday life, in order to build that autonomy, which

was a veritable screen protecting individuals and groups. The society was imbued with the law and survived above all because it was itself the law by virtue of its structure composed of legal organizations.'[13] Consequently, medieval law was a legal experience in which various legal organizations coexisted, creating spaces for autonomy very different from the modern idea of sovereignty, with a very strong legal presence which represented 'the authentic organization of the medieval universe, an ontic dimension that precedes and dominates the political dimension'.[14]

During that period a common law was practised which coexisted in balance with individual rights. This common law could theoretically cover all areas, applying for instance to all situations not provided for by specific or individual law, as Antonio Manuel Hespanha demonstrates: 'Far from being a closed system composed of normative levels whose relationship was defined once for all (as in systems dating back to the origins of the law and characteristic of contemporary legalism), common law was a flexible, open constellation of orders whose architecture could not really be determined except in concrete cases.'[15]

Vasco de Quiroga's legal thought seen through his actions in New Spain

In the legal controversy sparked off around the conquest of territories in the Americas Manuel Salord Bertrán distinguishes three stages: the first would begin with the early discoveries up to what he calls the 'colonialism of the first conquest'; the second, which covers the years 1512–33, is characterized by the use of the 'injunction'; and the third, taking in the period 1533–46, is entirely given over to developing what are called the New Laws. During the second stage a debate erupted about the validity or otherwise of the Just Titles presented in favour of Papal Theocracy, a theory deeply rooted in the Middle Ages and questioned by certain critical minds in the context of the emergence of state sovereignty.

Just as we are unsure of the place where Vasco de Quiroga studied, we know very little about the early years of his working life. However, we are certain that he held a post of royal functionary in the court of Charles V and even that he was clearly indicated as active in 1526 in the post of permanent judge in Oran, Africa, before being appointed member of the 2nd Court in Mexico City, New Spain.

Being close to royal circles, he was not unaware of the legal controversy that had begun over the conquest of the New World and the justification given by the Crown about the Just Titles. There is no doubt that he knew of the discussions in the Burgos Council and the laws that were decreed under its name in 1512 in the wake of that meeting. Those laws, thanks to which the Indians' freedom was recognized, themselves originated in a document known as the 'Injunction', an official explanation which the *conquistadores* were to give the Indians as they handed over the titles that justified their right of conquest in the name of the Crown. This Injunction was drawn up by the jurist and adviser to the king, Juan López de Palacios Rubio, with the help of Fray Matías de Paz, a theologian and teacher at Salamanca University.

Without a doubt Vasco de Quiroga knew about the 1513 Council of Valladolid at which the validity of the title giving over the American territories, which had been granted by the pope, was unanimously recognized, and it was agreed that the king

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could, through his officers, order the land to be handed over to him or otherwise that it should be forcibly taken if the Indians put up any opposition.

Vasco de Quiroga was no stranger to this control mechanism operated by royal authority. In the 1526 ordinance it is laid down that 'the Indians should be treated as free beings and not slaves, and that they should be ruled with justice, without imposing on them excessive work or taking them to the mines against their will, and always with the advice of the priest or his local representative, trying to draw the Indians to the Christian faith and the authority of Spain by conviction and political prudence. He ordered priests, monks and "all consciences" to protect the Indians, requesting that he should be informed of any abuse of injustice committed by anyone, whatever his rank, "so that we and people from our Council might send someone to investigate and punish him with all necessary rigour".'[16]

During the years when Quiroga was probably a functionary to the king, that is, the early years of Charles V's reign, the institutions that accompanied the first conquest of America – slavery, *encomienda*[17] and wars of conquest – underwent a radical reform which resulted in the promulgation of the Royal Ordinances of 17 November 1526 setting out the manner of conducting discoveries and maintaining security in the Indies.[18]

In the meanwhile all measures were being taken in the Courts to prepare the 1526 Ordinances and that same year, in the theoretical field, the first chair in theology at Salamanca University was awarded to Francisco de Vitoria who, at the end of 1528, on the occasion of his re-election to *potestate civili*, expressed his ideas about temporal sovereignty and the reason why it was necessary to protect the people of the continent so that, in their relations with the peoples of Europe, natural law should apply. He finally came to the conclusion, when he was re-elected to *potestate Ecclesiae* in 1532, that *Papa non est orbis dominus*.[19]

In his position as Auditor to the 2nd Court in Mexico City, Vasco de Quiroga faced head-on the fundamental problems the king's functionaries and the intellectuals of the period were dealing with – war, slavery – and he took part in the 1531 and 1532 ecclesiastical councils. At the first of these the main topic on the agenda was to take up a position on the war of conquest being prosecuted by Nuño de Guzmán; the second was about reducing the use of importers and middlemen and discussing the Indians' fate in the matter of slavery. At these meetings legal information had to be dealt with.

It is from this period that his text dates which today is known as *Información en Derecho*, though it has been seen rather as a legal plea that Quiroga presented to the Council of the Indies. In the view of the councillor Bernal de Luco it is constructed like a plea and so cannot help us in examining Quiroga's legal thought because for the moment we are restricting ourselves essentially to his commentaries on the part played in society by the legal structures of his period. In large part this text suggests that Vasco de Quiroga's legal culture was typical of *ius commune*. So we should not be surprised that it is built on the corpus of Roman law compiled by Justinian, on the corpus of canon law and on the use of theological sources from the period. Furthermore, it is written in accordance with the usage and characteristics of Castilian legal literature of the time. In general jurists wrote their works in Castilian and the majority of the apparatus of notes in Latin, unlike the works published at

that time in France and Italy, which were written entirely in Latin, the scholarly language of the era.[20]

And so during the 1530s, when Vasco de Quiroga was writing his *Información en derecho*, there were critical noises circulating as to this theory. Quiroga's position is one of pure orthodoxy with regard to medieval theory justifying the validity of papal bulls; and even more it was from that point that his whole project and his complete evangelical commitment in New Spain sprang. There is no doubt that he never abandoned his conviction regarding the validity of the titles and that he saw it as a veritable duty to fulfil his commitment according to the provision laid down in the papal bull:

> For among people who are mostly barbarians it is necessary to introduce and establish new and good customs and eradicate bad ones in order to implant the faith of our Christian religion with its hope and charity, and to do so in territory so alien and stranger to such virtues, and not just by force of will but through the most strong and most firm obligation of Pope Alexander's bull granted to the Catholic Kings of glorious memory, which seems to me to carry more than an appropriate execution but certainly great circumspection and prudence, diligence and necessity . . .[21]

This view, which is typically medieval, is of course meant from the standpoint not only of the duty to evangelize deriving from it, but also of the powers, both spiritual and temporal, acknowledged as belonging to the Catholic Kings and their successors, to govern and evangelize the lands in the new world, as he recognizes in another part of the text of *Información en derecho*:

> And thus His Majesty our King, Lord and Apostle of this New World, under whose command is all the great business of the same in temporal and spiritual matters, by God and the sovereign pontiff, possesses all the power and all the authority he needs to guide, show and direct, govern and command, he not only can but even must (for he is so commanded and advised by the bull), so that His Majesty might command and impose a certain order and way of life that the natives themselves and those they have to provide for might be enough and sufficient, and that they might behave and be converted properly as they should.[22]

This attitude is explained by Don Vasco's legal training and the reading that had consolidated his theoretical conception of the problems. In his book he quotes defenders of the theocratic view, for instance St Anthony of Florence (1389–1459), the Dominican Archbishop of Florence highly reputed for his theological writings, in which he dealt with both matters of civil law and those relating to the ecclesiastical area. His chief work, entitled *Summa theologica*, strongly defends the pope's powers in both domains.[23] On several occasions he also quotes Fray Tomás de Vio Cayetano (1469–1534), from the Dominican order as well, who was a theologian more in the Renaissance context and taught in Padua and Pavia, finally becoming Vicar General of his order. Cayetano was a fierce defender of the spiritual prerogatives of the papacy and of the pope's authority in temporal matters, which he saw as his concern because of his spiritual function, that is, indirectly. This reading also influenced Don Vasco's manner of dealing with the problem of the indigenous people. The stance regarding the papal bulls explains why several authors maintain that on this subject

Quiroga did not contribute anything new to the discussion, since he retained a certain orthodoxy in his theological position.

This was not the only topic he dealt with from a traditional standpoint. He also did so with fundamental matters that were being debated in the law courts and among Spanish intellectuals, such as the problem of war or slavery; in the two sections of St Thomas's theory on just war and on various occasions he came to the conclusion that it was unjust, as was for instance the war waged by Nuño de Guzmán in western Mexico. He conducted his defence of the native population and their rights in the context of the legal measures passed in 1526 and appealing to theological texts of the time, which he handled with the skill of a jurist and theologian. For example the writings of St Anthony of Florence, who had dealt with the question of the pope's power over infidels and had reached the conclusion that neither the pope nor Christian principles could strip a people of their possessions or their government, in that those rights were among the 'natural goods' that God gave to everyone, including demons; and so he used notions of natural law, which he attempted to link with theocratic theory.[24] For his part the cardinal of St Sixtus, Fray Tomás de Vio Cayetano, had drawn up a classification of infidels; and in the third group he seemed to refer, without mentioning them specifically, to native Americans; they were not subjects *nec de iure nec de facto* with regard to temporal jurisdiction, but pagans who were never subject to the Roman empire and lived in lands that were never Christian.[25]

Furthermore the citation and use of the source that Quiroga makes in various places in his compilation of laws, in accordance with the period of Alaric, and the role he allots to royal law and its antecedents, are worthy of note. On this topic Silvio Zavala points out that one of the discoveries made by the American Roos Dealy is identifying the work Quiroga uses to refer to Visigothic law: this is said to be a book printed in Louvain in 1517 with the title *Summae sive argumenta legum diversorum imperatorum*,[26] written by a certain Pedro Giles. Apart from the rarity of the work, he stresses the fact that Quiroga supports a number of his arguments with reference to laws from the Visigothic era, prior to the appearance of Castilian royal law and very seldom used by contemporary jurists. And he does so while allowing them a certain authority, but without diminishing the authority he recognizes for the *Corpus iuris*. He expresses it as follows:

> It is written thus in a law in the Summa of laws decreed by King Alaric, a Christian and a Goth, which I think is to the good of the Spains because it gives them more authority, as well as coming from the *corpus* of laws of the most Christian emperor Theodosius, from the writings of the emperor Valentinian Augustus and other emperors whom St Ambrose so praised in his epistles, from the judgments and opinions of the jurisconsults Caius Julius and Paulus, of no less authority for the good of the other laws from the emperors' *corpus* of common law which we have, from which these Summae or most them are drawn. Thus, in accordance with the laws of the kingdom, neither can we cite the others included in the *corpus* of civil law unless for natural scholars' reasons only . . . .[27]

As for the writing of the text, it appears that Vasco de Quiroga is referring to Alaric's *Breviary* and to no other book. This was probably a recent edition or a text that used the references from the collection of Alaric's laws itself. The *Breviary*,

better known under the title *Lex romana Visigothorum*, was promulgated by Alaric II in 506. The text does not contain any law of the Visigothic kingdoms; rather it is a compilation of post-classical Roman law, from the dual point of view of *leges* and *iura*.[28] The measures emanating from the emperor, which received the name 'laws' (*leges*), were the main source of the law, and the works of classical jurisprudence were called *ius* or *iura*.[29] It would seem that Alaric's work had first of all a political purpose, to attract the Franks by offering them a good compilation of the Roman law by which they were governed, but also a technical purpose, to clarify the law by getting rid of useless texts and eliminating ambiguities.[30] The *Breviary* was put together by various jurists and promulgated at a gathering of bishops and counts held at Aduris, which is now French territory; it was then initialled by the gentleman Aniano to give it the seal of authenticity, and Alaric commanded that it should thenceforth be applied to resolve disputes and cases in his courts, and that no other law should be used.[31]

Vasco de Quiroga was also attracted by the fact that Alaric's laws had resulted from a task of weeding out various measures which we know to have been carried out by jurists commissioned by Alaric – an operation comparable to the one later carried through by Castilian jurists in compiling various *corpora* of laws, which thus balanced the laws drawn up with those characteristics:

> . . . by virtue of the fact that they were drawn, assembled, corrected and amended, like a cleaner grain, more sifted and clearer, winnowed and separated from the chaff of their superfluity, inequity and ambiguity, as appears by this concession and preface placed at the opening of the book . . . .[32]

This commentary of Quiroga's coincides with another part of the *Información en derecho* where he criticizes the characteristics of Castilian law, dispersed among different laws and difficult to apply to indigenous groups, which is why he recommended the application of laws appropriate to the native customs, suggesting a number of measures with a view to converting them more easily to Christianity by gentle peaceful means:

> Let it be so by virtue of such ways, means and art, and by virtue of such laws and ordinances, that are adapted to the qualities, manners and conditions of the land and its inhabitants, so that they may know, understand, use, keep and employ them; and in this way, in my view, without the complexities, obscurities and multitudes of ours, for all who are yet to be born will not know them, will not understand them, will not use them from now till the end of the world, nor will they adapt them.[33]

He makes ample use of Roman law in his analyses of slavery and points out that among the native people slavery does not exist as it does among Europeans, repeating certain remarks on the role he assigns to laws drawn from the *Corpus iuris civilis* in Castille, seeing them only as scholarly points:

> . . . as they were for Roman citizens, laws that we have too, not as laws but as scholarly points.[34]

After carrying out the function of Auditor to the Court, Vasco de Quiroga devoted himself fully to his spiritual work, and accepted the post of bishop of Michoacán –

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having been ordained, probably around the middle of 1536 – but without ever leaving behind during his ministry his solid legal training, which was expressed in what Carrillo calls his legal/canonical ministry. At the head of his pastoral mission he represented a Church project that was opposed to the missionary Church, a situation that Carrillo summarizes as follows:

> On the one hand a missionary Church for the most part intent on the Indians' republic, and on the other a hierarchical Church, in the Spanish medieval style, which was trying to apply the same organization into parishes in the Spanish medieval canonical tradition to the two republics, that of the Spanish and that of the Indians.[35]

The canon lawyer Vasco de Quiroga was completely fulfilled by these activities and he remembered all the lessons taught by Graciano, professor of canon law in Bologna, who had written a *Concordantia Discordantium canonum* with the aim of harmonizing canonical norms that appeared contradictory, the result being the famous *Decretum Gratiani* around 1140, a text that followed the system of Justinian's *Digest*, which was a private work that rapidly became an official compilation. He also had the opportunity to apply his knowledge acquired through studying the *Clementinae*, canonical rules which Clement V had compiled and which were then reworked by John XXII, becoming almost compulsory first in the universities of Bologna, then later, as we have been managed to establish, in all European universities. Those texts were so successful that in 1500 they were finally included, with other compilations, in the *Corpus iuris canonici*.[36]

Berman is of the opinion that canon law is nothing less than the first western legal system, which was a fundamental contribution in the field of legal science.[37] And Le Goff, following Gabriel Le Bras, saw it as the most significant legal invention of the Middle Ages, being a system of law that regulated the working of the Church and its relations with society, thus underlining the importance of that kind of organization in a world in which the Church was omnipresent and attitudes were profoundly steeped in law.[38]

Quiroga laid much emphasis on organizing the native population as a solution for being able, by this means, to encourage their evangelization and conversion to Christianity. In this we can see his theological reading as well as Thomas More's *Utopia*. Starting with this reorganization he attempted to introduce order in both spiritual and temporal matters, and suggested a body of specific rules for the Indian peoples that was very different from the complicated laws he was familiar with.

This system he succeeded in developing in his Santa Fe project of refuge villages, for which he wrote rules and ordinances more or less associated with Roman or canon laws; his support was such, in his work on the various aspects, that he reached the point, in the section on justice, of indicating that cases arising among them should be resolved without the need to appear before a judge:

> *How complaints and cases should be examined that arise between them (be they few or very few) without need of a judge.*
> Furthermore, if among the poor Indians in this refuge someone should bring a complaint against another, or others, among you, with the Rector and Administrators you would examine that complaint simply and with goodwill so that everyone might tell the truth and

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> no one deny it, in order that there should be no need to go and complain to the judge in another place, where you would pay fees and then be thrown into prison. Do this even if one of you has to be the loser; for it is preferable to lose like that in peace and concord rather than win by prosecuting, hating your neighbour and trying to beat him and harm him; in short, you should all be brothers in Jesus Christ in this refuge with peace and charity as a bond, as you are much commanded and advised.[39]

It is here that Quiroga's other medieval culture appears, his confidence in custom, and recognition of the personal rights typical of medieval law, as Le Goff notes:

> Spontaneously anyone who mentions law thinks immediately of Roman law, the legacy of the empire, so powerful in the west. And so we underestimate the importance and creativity of the law in medieval civilization. Probably because Roman law stands out as a *written* law, whereas medieval law is based on *oral* customs and traditions.[40]

In medieval times the law was an experience and a state of mind that expressed more the rules for organizing daily life, and since at that period the law was left 'to individuals who freely organized themselves, those structures were the ones that, being least determined by the intervention of the authorities, send us the most authentic message about the forces – spiritual, cultural, social – that were truly in circulation in society'.[41] This situation does not disappear in the mature period of law and medieval society in the 12th to 14th centuries, when the *ius commune* was developed, a period, however, which gradually saw the emergence of certain individual rights, possible largely because of the absence of the State.

In a way the Morelian jurist Felipe Tena Ramírez noted that situation when he studied Quiroga's ordinances in order to compare his position with that contained in Thomas More's book, and so emphasize the significance of the autonomy of the Santa Fe refuge villages.

> Having looked in the preceding chapter at the convergences and their nuances between Thomas More's work and Quiroga's ordinances, we shall now attempt to identify an important difference, between the former's abstract work and its concrete realization completed by the latter, a difference that in itself is sufficient to place it outside the ideological boundary of Thomas More's imaginative creation. I mean the autonomy which, in the margins of any form of statism, always reigned over the destiny of the refuge villages, in contrast to the rigid authoritarian system established on the island of Utopia. That is where Don Vasco is distinguished from his model, freeing his assisted communities from any coercive intervention by the public authorities . . . In Quiroga's regime protection of the rule fosters a family organization that operated through persuasion and not compulsion.[42]

Thus we find ourselves faced with a false alternative: how should we situate Quiroga? By defining him as either a medieval or a Renaissance man, are we in a position to draw conclusions about his revolutionary character or otherwise? This alternative stems largely from the mistaken conception we have of the Middle Ages, as Le Goff maintains. The Middle Ages were dynamic, intensely creative, even if that is not discernible among the intellectuals of the period 'because in the Church – and the Church contained the whole of intellectual life – the word *novitas*, novelty, was full of fear and hostility for those who heard it. Saying that an author was *new*

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implied that you were criticizing him, as if you were accusing him of grave heresy. Creators, who were numerous in the Middle Ages, rejected that suspicion. They insisted they were imitators of venerable authorities. According to them they were taking up old ideas, dusting them off and *reviving* them.'[43]

Vasco de Quiroga, as a royal functionary, created within the context of the laws of the kingdom; he accepted Roman laws as the opinions of venerable scholars, accepted his evangelical mission relying on the canons of the Church and its law, which was in fact only compilation; he created villages on a new model with a law based on custom coming from below. But in no way did he claim, to paraphrase Le Goff, to be a new author. What he did claim was to revive, and that is why it seems to me legitimate to give him the title of medieval author of the Renaissance.

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Translated from the French by Jean Burrell

Notes

1. The name given during the colonial period to present-day Mexico.
2. Trueba (1958: 3).
3. Trueba (1958).
4. Carrillo Cázares (2003: 14).
5. Warren (1977: 9–14).
6. Which would roughly equate to a masters degree today.
7. Miranda Godínez (1990: 16–18).
8. Le Goff (2003: 114–17).
9. Berman (1996: 114–17).
10. Berman (1996: 130–42).
11. Barrientos Grandón (1993: 38).
12. García y García (2000: 128–9).
13. Grossi (1996: 52).
14. Grossi (1996: 56).
15. Hespanha (2002: 99).
16. Salord Bertrán (2002: 123).
17. Territory subject to the authority of a conquistador.
18. Salord Bertrán (2002: 62). Here the Indies are of course to be understood in the sense of 'American continent' according to the usage of the period.
19. Salord Bertrán (2002: 123–4).
20. Pérez Martín (2000: 72).
21. Pérez Martín (2000: 68).
22. Pérez Martín (2000: 118).
23. Castañeda Delgado (1996: 197–9).
24. Castañeda Delgado (1996: 197–9).
25. Castañeda Delgado (1996: 197–9).
26. Zavala (1993: 220–1).
27. Quiroga (1992: 143–4).
28. Tomás y Valiente (1997: 1016).
29. Fernández de Buján (1999: 150–1).
30. Quiroga (1992: 116).

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31. Quiroga (1992: 116).
32. Quiroga (1992: 144).
33. Quiroga (1992: 113).
34. Quiroga (1992: 140).
35. Carrillo Cázares (2003: 63–4).
36. Berman (1996: 211–15).
37. Berman (1996: 211–15).
38. Le Goff (2003: 114–17).
39. Quiroga (2003: 269).
40. Le Goff (2003: 114).
41. Grossi (1996: 114).
42. Tena Ramírez (1977: 97–8).
43. Le Goff (2003: 52).

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