

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL CRISIS:

Buenos Aires, 1810–1860*

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This article will provide an overview of the changes in household composition in the city of Buenos Aires during the first decades of nation building. The discussion of household structures is based on a detailed analysis of the homes of thirty-five thousand *porteños* (residents of the city of Buenos Aires). The quantitative data are taken from three relatively complete manuscript census returns for the years 1810, 1827, and 1855. Once certain flaws in these census tracts are taken into account, the tracts represent an ample cross-section of urban Buenos Aires society. The variations found in household structures will be used to advance a theory about an underlying dimension of the durability of caudillo rule in Argentina. The proposed thesis on the relationship between strongman leadership and popular following is also based on interpretations employing classic sociological theory. The tentative conclusions concern the nature of early nineteenth-century political culture and afford opportunities for fresh explanations of the period's *caudillismo*. The data are thus presented in the hope of broadening the scope of discussion about political leadership in the early stages of nation building in Spanish America.¹

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

The period under study was punctuated by dramatic political cycles. The *Revolución de Mayo* in 1810 heralded a decade of war waged against both external enemies and internal oppositionists. In the Río de la Plata area, the war for independence from Spanish domination and the struggles for political hegemony among Argentines coalesced into

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
massive, enervating movements. The republican Porteños' formula for political leadership met at the earliest stages with strong resistance from various sectors in the important regions of Córdoba, Santa Fe, and elsewhere. In the ensuing military confrontations, men were uprooted from their native environments to fight for causes they only vaguely understood. Rosas said of his own men in 1820, "the majority . . . are not so immediately conscious of the imminence of the risks or of the need for sacrifices."² The enlightened formulations of Locke and Rousseau, espoused by liberals like Manuel Belgrano and Mariano Moreno, conflicted sharply with the beliefs of patrimonial traditionalists like Córdoba's Dean Funes, who did not equate the political independence of the state with the diffusion of power among its citizens.³ At the outset, the utopian liberalism of Bernardino Rivadavia, Bernardo Monteagudo, and the youthful Moreno was at odds with what José Ingenieros called "fuerzas de herencia," the traditions that consolidated the past.⁴

Differences in political philosophies were compounded by conflicts of material interest. Animosity spread among regions, and consequently among those who derived their incomes from the regional economies. Thus elites who depended on the silver output of Alto Perú—with its wide network of affiliated production, service, and Indian servitude—feared with reason the expansion of a coastal economy founded on pastoral goods, owned by pampean interests, and manipulated by Anglophile creole merchants in Buenos Aires.⁵ Apprehensive about their economic future, elites from the interior were aware of the historically disproportionate allocations of silver revenues going to the Buenos Aires bureaucracies. Within the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, the Intendancy of Buenos Aires had been consuming almost 90 percent of the revenues from Potosí's silver mines in order to support its political, military, and ecclesiastical administrations.⁶

The fundamental issue to be settled by any emerging nation-state—the formulation of processes of governance and mechanisms for allocating power and resources—would not be resolved until the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus because of the lack of consensus on matters related to the political order, the decade of 1810–1820 was characterized by war. Offensives, counteroffensives, mobilizations (sometimes of entire populations), blockades, desertions, and all the other consequences of war took their toll on the lives and finances of the citizens of Buenos Aires.⁷ By mid-decade the aspirations of the first utopian liberals had foundered on the reality of discord and bloodshed and were eventually replaced by a hard-bitten, virtually "aristocratic" conservatism intent on retaining power over the recalcitrant populations of the interior.⁸

In the end, however, Porteño elites were forced to accept the dissolution of the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and the end

Buenos Aires circa 1855



of their pretensions to national leadership and resigned themselves to ruling over the reduced space of the city and province of Buenos Aires. Through most of the 1820s, the city was governed by economic liberals, anticlericals, and socially conservative men who had experienced the costs of a generalized war. These groups were bent on maintaining an order made precarious by the lack of formal and lasting bonds among the various rulers of the different Argentine regions. Stability was also challenged by the Brazilian threat in neighboring Uruguay, which resulted in yet more war (1825–1828), as well as from within by *federalistas*, who opposed the centralist bent of the Porteño elites.

The federalist domination that began in 1829 ushered in an era of tenuous political continuity under the caudillo Juan Manuel de Rosas. He insisted on stability at the cost of the nominal liberties promised by the revolutionaries of 1810 and restricted by the liberals of the 1820s.⁹ The process of redeeming conservative Iberian and Catholic values during the Rosas era, although tailored to current needs of the conservative order, would spend itself by midcentury. The military defeat of Rosas in 1852 signaled the entrance of a new generation of liberals, who became known as the “Generation of ’37.” Their disillusioning experiences in Argentina and their European intellectual foundations led these liberals to a cosmopolitanism in the art of government and to political formulations not seen earlier. They also put into political practice their inherent distrust of the masses, whom they held responsible for Rosas’s success and durability. By 1860 leading members of the Generation of ’37, now positioned in key political offices, had begun to give legal form to organizing government by its various functions. The fact that this codifying and institutionalizing of governmental procedures entailed neither democratized political power nor popular electoral politics indicated the elites’ continued concern for maintaining order. Clearly, their collective memory of seemingly endemic war was a motivating factor. But in this regard, the members of the Generation of ’37 resembled previous generations of politicians since the early years of the century, who had also sensed the illogic of their expectations for early consensus and social peace. Against this backdrop of turmoil, the population of the city of Buenos Aires underwent significant changes. In the process, Porteño families were forced to surmount powerful forces and adopt strategies for survival if they were to maintain their cohesion.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The changes that Porteño families underwent will be analyzed with the help of two data sets, both drawn from the city’s manuscript census returns for 1810, 1827, and 1855. Although the two data sets

culled from each census overlap in some variables, each set generally addresses different issues. One set of data includes every individual who resided within the four *cuarteles* (wards) selected for this study on the basis of their socioeconomic and racial representativeness. This "selective universe," as it will be called, corresponds to the *cuarteles* numbered (for purposes of this study) 3, 4, 12, and 19 (see map).

Two objective criteria had to be met as closely as the archival data permitted for a *cuartel* to be included in this study. The first criterion was that the census returns for each of the selected *cuarteles* had to be as complete as possible in all three years under consideration. The second criterion was that the selected *cuarteles* together would provide a reasonable overview of the socioeconomic and racial composition of Buenos Aires. Each *cuartel* selected consists of a sixteen-block square and retains the same numerical designation and territorial boundaries established by the census enumerators in 1855 (which were exactly the same characteristics the *cuarteles* had in 1827). In 1810 the numerical identifiers and the area covered by each *cuartel* differed considerably. It should therefore be kept in mind that the numerical and geographical frames of reference employed in this article reflect the organizational schema used by the census enumerators in 1827 and 1855.¹⁰

The second requirement, that the *cuarteles* comprise a reasonably complete and representative profile of the city's social groups, was satisfied in the following manner. *Cuarteles* 3 and 4, lying immediately north and south of the Plaza de Mayo, contained the greatest concentration of merchants, professionals, and bureaucrats. Within the arc around the plaza lived the scions of governmental and clerical administrations and commerce, as well as the large service retinue that ran the gamut from lawyers and notaries to slaves and freedmen who attended their masters and employers. Immediately northwest of the Plaza de Mayo was Cuartel 12, somewhat more recently populated but at mid-century, still containing *quintas* (small farms). Here tradesmen, merchants, teamsters, and farmers congregated as permanent residents or transients. The wagons and stalls of the marketplace of the Plaza Nueva, occupying the site of block 195, formed the western hub of Cuartel 12, while the Plaza de Mayo's larger assortment of goods lay at its southeastern corner. Cuartel 19, situated at the southwest corner of Cuartel 12, contained a large concentration of the city's *gente de color*. This neighborhood was popularly known as the Barrio de los Tambores. Within its administrative boundaries and occupied by the Plaza Monserrat was block number 222, which served most of the market needs of the population of slaves and freedmen who operated shops and farms on their own or for their masters. In this *cuartel*, the socioeconomic position of most residents was precarious, and crime was considered a greater problem than in most other urban wards. This *cuartel's* racial

composition was to change as European immigrants began to settle in the *barrio*.¹¹

A second data set, which will be called the city sample, was employed for two purposes. First, it serves as a control device, in the face of missing data, to substantiate the assumption that the tendencies and directions revealed by the computations based on the selective universe would be shared by data drawn from the city at large, where missing data are more likely to be randomized, thereby minimizing error. The second purpose was a practical consideration. Because the caseload of the selective universe was so large (28,579 individuals), it could quickly deplete the time and assets available. In contrast, the smaller caseload of the city sample (1,149 households, totaling the records of 6,020 individuals) provided greater flexibility both in coding intrahousehold relationships and in managing the computer files. The city sample consists of one random sample of the urban population taken from each of the census years available. The urban population was emphasized for two reasons: first, to retain compatibility with the locational characteristics of the four *cuarteles* of the selective universe; and second, to avoid the much greater incidence of missing data found in the suburban wards, the *suburbios* and the *campaña*.¹² The city sample was coded and manipulated so as to provide a precise, representative look into the internal composition of the families and households of Buenos Aires. Unlike the selective universe, the city sample's more manageable caseload permitted a wider variety of frames of reference and comparisons among households. The total data base analyzed consisted of 34,599 men, women, and children concentrated in 7,459 households.

This study, which focuses on household structures rather than vital records, makes little use of evidence from ecclesiastical parishes. Nor did my approach include verifying census listings on marital status. But because significant numbers of consensual unions occurred during this era in Buenos Aires and elsewhere in Latin America, the nature of the conjugal union must be considered in the methodological framework. It would be counterproductive to suggest that only a strictly religious definition of marital status be applied. From a purely statistical perspective, it would depress significantly and unreasonably the extent to which couples in consensual unions behaved as legitimate conjugal units. This study employs the marital status categories as reported in the census tracts by the enumerators, regardless of the investigator's suspicions about the reality of illicit relations, and it follows the inference rules suggested by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure.¹³

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

The dramatic growth of late eighteenth-century Buenos Aires was one of the major consequences of the Bourbon Reforms as applied in the Río de la Plata region. With trade at the port legalized and the city designated as the viceregal capital in 1776, Buenos Aires began to attract a considerable number of migrants from both Europe and the interior. They swelled the ranks of the population by almost 70 percent between 1778 and 1810, causing a community of twenty-five thousand to grow into a humble, but respectable, town of over forty thousand inhabitants by 1810. Yet seventeen years later, the population had increased by only 5 percent to fewer than forty-three thousand, which meant that almost a generation had passed without appreciable growth. By about midcentury, however, the population had expanded by 112 percent to ninety thousand. This growth preceded the mass immigration from Europe, which would not begin until the 1870s. The fundamental difference between the two periods was that enervating war characterized the era of demographic stagnation while the spurt in the population took place during a period of fewer and more sporadic military confrontations.

Porteños of the period tended to consider their domestic groups as located within a neighborhood, the *barrio* or the *cuartel*.¹⁴ But the composition of these neighborhoods was not static, as is shown by the considerable changes that occurred in the make-up of the populations of several *cuarteles*. For example, in 1810 the population of Cuartel 3 contained approximately 15 percent of the total population of the selective universe and increased its share by 1855 to more than 26 percent. Significant downward shifts in the relative proportions of population were registered in Cuarteles 4 and 19 between 1810 and 1827. The proportion of the selective universe's population living in Cuartel 4 in 1827 was virtually half (16 percent) of what it had been in 1810, and in Cuartel 19, the proportion fell from more than 28 percent to less than 23 percent. Furthermore, Cuartel 19, which had been mostly black and mulatto, by 1855 contained a larger population of whites, composed partly of European immigrants of humble status. During the same period, Cuartel 12 dropped from its 1827 position as the most populous *cuartel* to second most populous in 1855. In sum, the city underwent general growth, but the increases varied considerably among *barrios*. Differing rates of growth tended to result from the variable effects of change on different areas of the city and on certain types of Porteños. Migrants from Europe and the interior swelled the population, creating pressures on the already relatively crowded zones lying within the city's southern half and close to the coast. Immigration from Europe ebbed and flowed in response to political and economic cycles, but internal

migration appears to have been continuous and increasing, especially in the late 1840s.¹⁵

THE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS

Important determinants of a population's demographic growth are found in the characteristics of its married cohort. In the group comprising the selective universe, the negative effects of the campaigns of the revolutionary era (1810–1820) and the war with Brazil over Uruguay (1825–1828) are noticeable in the increased percentage of widowed women from 10 percent in 1810 to 15 percent in 1827.¹⁶ In fact, the mortality rate for men (evident in the declining ratios of males to females) is a salient feature of the evolution of early-nineteenth-century Porteño society. No documentation flaws could be so sexually skewed as to explain the sexual imbalances of the period. The best estimates for mortality indices during this era are the crude death rates from 1822, which were 30.2 per thousand for whites and 60.0 for freedmen.¹⁷ One can only speculate about what share of these figures represent the consequences of war, but the indications from the sex ratio data point strongly in the direction of the military events taking place during the most unstable and militarized period between 1810 and 1830. Sex ratios from three different sources—the general population, the selective universe, and the city sample (composed largely of family members)—all point toward a precipitous decline in male-female ratios between 1810 and 1827. By contrast, the sex ratios in 1855 point in the direction of recovery or attenuation of the previous decline. Each population group displayed differing rates of decline, however, particularly during the first intercensal period. The city as a whole witnessed a drop of 30 percent in its masculinity index, compared to a 22 percent drop for the selected cuarteles, and only a 14 percent decline for those who belonged to formal family groupings. What accounts for these differences?

Race and socioeconomic position were instrumental in determining the extent of damage to the coherence of the Porteño household and—through military conscription and service in troubled times—the life expectancy of men. In table 1, one can observe indications of this selective mortality process by noting that both Cuartel 12 (containing a large number of lower-class laborers and farmers) and Cuartel 19 (the most African and Afro-Argentine cuartel) reported the lowest sex ratios. The smallest drop in sex ratios was reported among members of complete family units, while the largest drop was registered by single men, servants, live-in apprentices, and other young men not married or not residing with their spouses and children. Many, and probably

TABLE 1 *Distribution of Sex Ratios in the Selective Universe, Male:Female*

Year	Cuartel 3	Cuartel 4	Cuartel 12	Cuartel 19
1810	1.39	1.50	1.10	0.89
1827	0.98	1.80	0.79	0.69
1855	1.07	1.09	0.78	0.73

Source: Sample data.

Note: The number of individuals included is 28,579.

most, of the latter were men of the lower classes, including the non-whites. The data thus indicate that race was an important causal variable in delimiting the life chances of Porteño men.

The overwhelming majority of the whites in the city sample belonged to family units; by contrast, relatively greater numbers of persons of color were listed as singles or lodgers. These findings are borne out by the results of a sample of 1810 and 1827 populations drawn by Reid Andrews. In 1810 almost 83 percent of the sampled black population lived within households headed by whites; in 1827 the figure dropped to 74 percent.¹⁸ Thus whether freedmen or slaves, family units of nonwhites were usually situated within a white household. They were not family members of the heads of the households but figured as appendages, dependent to some extent on a white man or woman who headed the household. The relatively small decline of 14 percent in masculinity levels for members of families—as distinguished from households—reflected the historical realities that generally sheltered whites from the most extreme ravages attendant on poor sanitary conditions and men in particular from military conscription. The statistical evidence points to artificial, not natural, sources of mortality for young men, such as military service to fight political enemies and Indians. No natural phenomena of the period can account for the consistently lowest rate of masculinity appearing at ages 15 to 19 and 20 to 24, as shown in table 2. The brutalization of political relations and the militarization of male society are factors that need to be taken into account to help explain the slowly dwindling pool of young men in Buenos Aires; and within this generalized demographic debacle, the lower-status groups—the *gente de pueblo* and *gente de color*—bore the brunt of the losses. The nonwhite population was drafted into military service in numbers far above its proportion in the city's general population: "Given the province's never-ending quest for men to fuel its war machine," summarizes Reid Andrews, "military service was an experience that virtually every black man who reached adulthood in nineteenth-century Buenos Aires could count on having."¹⁹ This human tragedy in turn

bore consequences for family and household structures that affected the majority of Porteños.

The extent of generalized concern for the plight of families who had lost members in battle can be inferred from the periodic auctions and raffles held in the city to relieve the burdens of widows and orphans.²⁰ Ceremonies of public awards to widows began as early as 1807 in response to the loss of life during the English invasions in the Río de la Plata. *Cabildo* authorities began this practice, but in adjudicating funds, they revealed racial bias in donating to white widows and orphans twice the sums given to free families of color.²¹ Slaves whose wounds rendered them invalid were awarded a small monthly pension and their freedom. The names of unwounded slave men who had participated in repelling the English entered a pool along with slave women who could prove that their husbands had lost their lives in those engagements. The names of thirty individuals were to be drawn and given their freedom. Although private donations increased the number finally awarded their freedom, only seventy slaves out of the 686 who entered this raffle were manumitted.²² In similar procedures a generation later, Rosas's officials turned national celebrations into occasions for providing charity to "alleviate part of the misery and destitution of the families who have lost their fathers in war." On one such occasion, awards totaling five hundred pesos were raffled off to twelve widows in a public ceremony at the Plaza de Mayo, "with all the formalities," to celebrate Argentine Independence Day in 1830.²³ These official awards were usually meager compared to needs, and even they were eventually phased out by Rosas. Neither official proceeds from the government's pension funds for widows nor ad hoc charity affairs sufficed. As one needy porteña pleaded in 1823, "The only thing my husband left was his military pension. What will I do under these circumstances . . . ? Turn my children's hopes over to a usurer?"²⁴

CONJUGAL PATTERNS

Cycles of change within Porteño families can be observed in the trends in the ages of married women. In 1810 women between thirty and thirty-four years old comprised the largest age group of married women in the entire city, some 45 percent of married women between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four. Over time, however, younger women comprised a larger percentage of married females, as the proportion of married women between thirty and thirty-four fell to 40 percent in 1827, and finally to 35 percent in 1855. First, this decline corresponded to slight increases in the proportions of married women in two other groups, ages fifteen to nineteen and twenty to twenty-four; more sig-

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE IN BUENOS AIRES

TABLE 2 Age Distribution by Sex in Buenos Aires, 1810–1855, in the Selective Universe

Age Intervals	1810		1827		1855	
	Males % (n)	Females % (n)	Males % (n)	Females % (n)	Males % (n)	Females % (n)
0–4	51.9 (322)	48.1 (299)	46.1 (419)	53.9 (489)	49.4 (669)	50.6 (686)
5–9	51.6 (255)	48.4 (239)	49.2 (519)	50.8 (535)	48.4 (602)	51.6 (641)
10–14	55.9 (367)	44.1 (289)	52.4 (596)	47.6 (542)	46.7 (579)	53.3 (661)
15–19	45.5 (296)	54.5 (355)	37.5 (391)	62.5 (653)	35.9 (495)	64.1 (884)
20–24	53.8 (382)	46.2 (328)	39.4 (415)	60.6 (637)	41.5 (579)	58.5 (815)
25–29	54.3 (351)	45.7 (295)	42.4 (448)	57.6 (609)	46.9 (631)	53.1 (714)
30–34	58.5 (313)	41.5 (222)	48.7 (524)	51.3 (552)	49.7 (618)	50.3 (625)
35–39	64.0 (171)	36.0 (96)	54.1 (305)	45.9 (259)	54.6 (516)	45.4 (429)
40–44	51.7 (180)	48.3 (168)	52.2 (400)	47.8 (367)	50.4 (396)	49.6 (390)
45–49	58.0 (94)	42.0 (68)	60.9 (212)	39.1 (136)	49.6 (245)	50.4 (249)
50–54	53.8 (140)	46.2 (120)	54.3 (258)	45.7 (217)	50.3 (232)	49.7 (229)
55–59	71.1 (54)	28.9 (22)	56.1 (78)	43.9 (61)	50.2 (137)	49.8 (136)
60–64	54.0 (74)	46.0 (63)	58.4 (177)	41.6 (126)	44.6 (123)	55.4 (153)
65–69	61.5 (8)	38.5 (5)	73.3 (44)	26.7 (16)	46.2 (54)	53.8 (63)
70 and older	61.4 (54)	38.6 (34)	55.1 (87)	44.9 (71)	49.3 (109)	50.7 (112)
Total all ages	54.0 (3,061)	46.0 (2,603)	48.0 (4,873)	52.0 (5,270)	46.9 (5,985)	53.1 (6,787)

Source: Sample data.

Note: The number of individuals in each category is found in parentheses underneath the percentage. The total number of individuals in the selective universe is 28,579.

nificantly, the period witnessed a considerable rise in the percentage of married women between twenty-five and twenty-nine years of age. In 1810 this age cohort had comprised only 25 percent of married women; it then rose to 30 percent in 1827 and to 33 percent in 1855.²⁵ The increasing youthfulness of brides in Buenos Aires, as shown by the age-cohort averages, points to a tendency for women in Buenos Aires to marry at younger ages as the nineteenth century progressed. The statistic that most succinctly summarizes this tendency is the women's mean age at first marriage. This measure shows a decrease in mean age at first marriage from nearly seventeen and a half years in 1810 to not quite seventeen in 1855.²⁶ These are very young ages at first marriage by European standards of this period, which averaged between twenty-three and twenty-five years of age.²⁷ Such youthfulness in the mean age at first marriage provides a strong indication of the prevalence of consensual relationships, especially among the majority of the population (which was composed of lower-class households). Because their finances could not sustain the costs, heads of households often bypassed church marriages.

The composition of each age cohort of married women was influenced by socioeconomic considerations. Table 3 demonstrates the percentage of married women in the city sample between ages fifteen and thirty-four, divided into two general socioeconomic groups based on the occupation of the head of the household. The manual category consists of workers in unskilled, semiskilled, and subsistence agricultural tasks; the nonmanual category includes occupations related to commerce, the liberal professions, and proprietary landed activities.²⁸ Women marrying men of lower socioeconomic rank tended to marry at younger and younger ages over the course of time, a trend reflected by the much higher proportions of cohorts aged fifteen to nineteen and twenty-five to twenty-nine who were married in 1855 than had been the case in 1810. It thus appears that the lower socioeconomic groups were most responsible for the decline in the mean age at first marriage noted above. At the same time, women of lower status between twenty and twenty-four, and especially those between thirty and thirty-four, formed a relatively smaller proportion of married females than in 1810. Among women married to men in nonmanual occupations, the picture shifted less radically.²⁹ By 1855 the age cohort between twenty and twenty-four grew in representation, and small losses were evident in the other cohorts. It therefore appears that women from the city's upper social levels did not participate much in the general tendency toward marriage at very young ages. This finding further indicates the prevalence of consensual unions among lower-class women who married much younger, whereas women from the middle and upper sec-

TABLE 3 *Distribution of Married Women by Occupational Status of Head of Household in Buenos Aires, 1810–1855, in the City Sample*

Age Groups	1810		1827		1855	
	Manual % (n)	Nonmanual % (n)	Manual % (n)	Nonmanual % (n)	Manual % (n)	Nonmanual % (n)
15–19	1.5 (1)	9.6 (5)	10.9 (6)	0.0 (0)	6.3 (4)	8.0 (4)
20–24	26.2 (17)	21.2 (11)	20.0 (11)	27.3 (12)	18.8 (12)	32.0 (16)
25–29	26.2 (17)	25.0 (13)	27.3 (15)	34.1 (15)	43.8 (28)	20.0 (10)
30–34	46.2 (30)	44.2 (23)	41.8 (23)	38.6 (17)	31.3 (20)	40.0 (20)
Totals	100.1 (65)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (55)	100.0 (44)	100.2 (64)	100.0 (50)

Source: Sample data.

Notes: The total number of households in the city sample is 330. Deviations from 100.0 result from rounding.

tors upheld the societal ideals that would eventually percolate down through the social structure.

Location also affected the relative proportions of households headed by married couples, as can be seen in table 4. The married populations of the selective universe differ considerably from those yielded by the citywide sample. The relative share of the married heads of households in the selective universe increased from 42 percent in 1810 to 56 percent in 1855. During the same period, the proportion of single or widowed male heads of households decreased dramatically from 43 percent in 1810 to 27 percent in 1855. Considerably different results appear in the same analysis applied to the sample of households citywide. Here the proportion of households headed by married couples decreased from approximately 72 percent in 1810 to 63 percent at midcentury; at the same time, the share of female-headed households rose from 19 percent to more than 24 percent. The differences in the kinds of households shown by the two sets of data can be explained largely by the effects of the mercantile sector on the city's commercial hub. Already noted were the sharp distinctions made in the early part of the century between *Porteños* and Spaniards in terms of the age differences between them and their wives. Because the group of married females did not evidence great fluctuations in their own ages, it is reasonable to conclude that Spaniards, who formed the city's largest

TABLE 4 Heads of Households, Buenos Aires, 1810–1855

Head(s) of Household	Selective Universe ^a			City Sample ^b		
	1810 % (n)	1827 % (n)	1855 % (n)	1810 % (n)	1827 % (n)	1855 % (n)
Married couples ^c	41.5 (460)	40.6 (954)	56.1 (1,601)	72.1 (276)	62.1 (238)	62.9 (241)
Male, single or widowed	43.3 (480)	42.2 (992)	27.3 (778)	8.9 (34)	14.6 (56)	12.5 (48)
Female, single or widowed	15.2 (169)	17.2 (403)	16.6 (473)	19.1 (73)	23.2 (89)	24.5 (94)
Totals	100.0 (1,109)	100.0 (2,349)	100.0 (2,852)	100.1 (383)	99.9 (383)	99.9 (383)

Source: Sample data.

Note: Deviations from 100.0 result from rounding.

^aThe selective universe consists of 6,310 households.

^bThe city sample consists of 1,149 households.

^cSlight discrepancies arose between the numbers of married men and married women. They resulted from husbands being away from the city when the enumerators arrived and from husbands being counted at their places of work. The differences were very small (0.4 percent). In this table, the figures for households headed by a married female more accurately represent homes headed by married couples because married women were usually enumerated at home, along with their resident family members.

single group of merchants, married later in life. Similarly, the concentration of merchants in the city's commercial center, including Cuarteles 3, 4, and part of 12, resulted in an abnormally high proportion of adult males still too immersed in the formative stages of their careers to enter married life.

The citywide results provided by table 3 are more representative of Buenos Aires at large, but they also mask the relative protection from violence enjoyed by the merchants during the years of greatest political and military turmoil. In the selective universe, the proportions of widows in Cuarteles 3 and 4 virtually equaled the proportions of widows in Cuarteles 12 and 19. Yet of the households headed by females in 1827 within the selective universe, the smallest concentrations of widows lived in Cuarteles 3 and 4, with the largest proportions of widows now found in the less commercial and more racially heterogeneous neighborhoods of Cuarteles 12 and 19. In 1810 only half of the widows in the selective universe resided in Cuarteles 12 and 19 combined; this figure rose to 70 percent in 1827, and then fell to 60 percent in 1855.³⁰ The disproportionate rise in the mortality rate among married men in Cuarteles 12 and 19 in 1827 from a previous position of equality in 1810 indicates how severely the weight of war had fallen on the shoulders of

the families of *peones*, *agricultores*, *jornaleros*, and the other sectors of the *gente de pueblo* that comprised the city's low-status, casual labor force. These data combine to provide two distinct perspectives on the dimension of family coherence in Buenos Aires. These two views are reflected in the distribution of the households that were headed by single persons and by married couples among the populations of both the selective universe and the city sample. Among the households of the selective universe, the strong presence of the merchant sector helped to maintain the proportion of single heads relatively constant at 57 percent until 1827; thereafter, the single heads of households dropped significantly to 44 percent. In turn, the married population in charge of households increased dramatically from 42 percent to almost 60 percent. By contrast, the citywide sample contained many more lower-class individuals, which produced an inverse distribution of heads of households compared to that found within the selective universe. That is to say, the inclusion of low-status Porteños resulted in a sharp drop in the proportion of households headed by married couples between 1810 and 1827 and a concomitant rise in households led by widows. This situation still had not corrected itself by midcentury.

CHILDREN AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

The average Porteño home had strikingly few children. This observation is especially true of the first intercensal period, when the number of households without any children (out of the total 1,149 households comprising the city sample) rose significantly from 84 to 142, then declined somewhat to 126 by 1855. By the same token, the number of households that in 1810 had contained one, two, three, or four or more children (72, 64, 46, and 116 households, respectively) declined significantly in the following years.³¹ The relatively small number of children at home did not necessarily result from low fertility rates because small family size and high fertility rates can coexist. Indeed, the image of the preindustrial household swarming with children of closely related ages is a historical stereotype that has not stood up well to empirical investigation. Among the laboring classes, high infant mortality rates, deferred procreation by means of prolonged suckling of infants, and various means of removing children from home combined to prevent overcrowded conditions.³² But this article on household structures is not the place to discuss vital statistics; moreover, no conclusive evidence regarding general fertility rates is yet available for all the women of Buenos Aires. The limited evidence available suggests that Porteñas in lower socioeconomic positions may have been forced to deal with birth rates beyond their economic means by the drastic measure of child abandonment in order to limit family size. Physicians in

Buenos Aires expressed dismay throughout the nineteenth century at the high rates of infant abandonment.³³ The practice was institutionalized in the form of the Casa de Expósitos, run by the city's Sociedad de Beneficencia. Even so, infants were regularly left at the doorsteps of churches and private homes. The number of abandoned newborns in 1840 documents the prevalence of this strategy of limiting family size and suggests that both socioeconomic and racial determinants were responsible for such action. In the parish of Monserrat, 6 percent of white children and 3 percent of children of color were abandoned; in the parish of Concepción, 19 percent of white baptized children were abandoned; and in the parish of Catedral al Norte, the figures totaled 16 percent of white and 31 percent of *pardo* and *moreno* infants. The situation was worse still in the poorer outlying districts, such as the parish of Chascomús, south of the city, where nearly 46 percent of all newborns became abandoned infants.³⁴

Family strategies followed from economic positions in Argentina, as elsewhere. For example, wholesale merchants in Buenos Aires, who were linked to import-export activities like their counterparts in other important ports of trade, characteristically had the largest families. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the wholesale merchants of Buenos Aires fathered an average of seven children, not much different from their contemporaries in the port of Salem, Massachusetts.³⁵ Among the elites of Buenos Aires during the same period, the median number of children was eleven.³⁶ The lower median number of eight offspring among wholesale merchants of this period was one consequence of deferred marriage practices among the Spaniards, who formed the single most prominent group of merchants in the late colonial and early national periods. This difference also helps illustrate the causal relationship linking occupation with family and household formation.

Men engaged in lower-level occupations practiced considerably different family formation strategies. Statistical data for this study and others show that families of the social levels below merchants and elites in port cities tended to have relatively fewer children. For example, artisans in early nineteenth-century Salem averaged six children, while laborers had four children.³⁷ Thus Salem's merchants, the city's elite, had an average of 42 percent more children than the families on the lower rungs of the social ladder. In Buenos Aires, the indications of similarly smaller numbers of children ever born among the lower classes come from the age-standardized marital fertility data of the city sample. These show that in 1810, families of merchants and professionals had a fertility rate of 865 births per thousand, 48 percent higher than the figure of 583 births per thousand among lower-status occupational groups.³⁸

Marital fertility ratios aside, Porteño households with few children require precise explanations that are not yet possible with the data at hand. Two sets of possible explanations (neither being mutually exclusive) are suggested here for subsequent study and refinement. One set of possible explanations rests on vital statistics, which would signal that the infant mortality rates were too high to permit households of children in nineteenth-century Buenos Aires. Infant mortality indices, which are available for the period from 1827 to 1831, are described as "very high" for both white and nonwhite populations, with death tending to occur within the first three months of life among infants of color.³⁹ Infant mortality among the families of color, at a rate of 409 deaths per thousand births, was 65 percent higher than the incidence of 248 per thousand shown among whites in 1828. But infant mortality indices have their limits in explaining household size and structure. Even high infant mortality rates, especially if they occur within the first few months of life, do not preclude new conceptions that over time can result in households with some minimum of children.

In Buenos Aires, some empirical evidence suggests that the lower classes indeed increased their marital fertility rates in the course of the nineteenth century. This trend is demonstrated in table 5, which shows the differential marital fertility rates by occupational status of the heads of households in the selective universe. The data in this table indicate that the secular trend for the families of the *gente de pueblo* was to increase their marital fertility rates, while the *gente decente* decreased their rates. In the context of household size, one would consequently expect to see some increase in the incidence of coresident children. Their absence is therefore all the more puzzling. Here the nondemographic, political characteristics of the era, particularly during the first two decades of independence, can be plausibly advanced as possible explanations for historians to consider when examining nineteenth-century society in the Río de la Plata region.

The role played by military conflict in the Río de la Plata in undermining the integrity of the family is seldom noted. The usual references skim along the macroscopic level of gross population tendencies. For example, it is known that the Artigas movement depleted a great percentage of the rural population of the Banda Oriental. Likewise, the male labor force of the rural littoral was seriously undermined during the civil wars in the 1810s.⁴⁰ But virtually nothing is known about the effect of war on the coherence of urban households. How successful were Porteño families in escaping the worst effects of the war-making that plagued Buenos Aires?

A helpful way for researchers to approach this era of political and military turbulence would be to view the actions of the state as destructive to families, or conversely, as supportive of families. In such

TABLE 5 Number of Children per Thousand Married Women by Occupational Status, 1810–1855, in the Selective Universe

Age Group	1810		1827		1855	
	Low Status (n)	High Status (n)	Low Status (n)	High Status (n)	Low Status (n)	High Status (n)
15–19	273 (11)	818 (11)	368 (19)	267 (15)	676 (34)	333 (18)
20–24	818 (33)	1,269 (33)	750 (52)	1,149 (67)	797 (133)	989 (95)
25–29	1,282 (39)	1,105 (38)	1,338 (71)	1,433 (90)	1,287 (174)	1,621 (103)
30–34	206 (34)	428 (35)	476 (63)	421 (57)	500 (154)	435 (131)
35–39	545 (22)	1,042 (24)	682 (44)	706 (51)	733 (101)	865 (96)
40–44	235 (34)	773 (22)	265 (34)	244 (41)	405 (79)	390 (82)
45–49	67 (15)	0 (9)	118 (17)	227 (22)	259 (27)	123 (57)
15–49 ^a	574 (188)	779 (172)	706 (300)	831 (343)	773 (702)	766 (582)
15–49 ^b	583	865	709	822	775	766

Source: Sample data.

Note: The selective universe consists of 2,287 women.

^aComposite marital fertility.

^bAge-standardized fertility.

a context, researchers can note the changing household structures of Porteños discussed here. To be sure, contemporaneous literature contains little that is directly related to the subject, but there are hints and “pointers” suggesting that the wars during much of the period between 1810 and 1852 (especially in the years prior to the implantation of the Rosas regime) were disastrous for Porteño households. The issue of childless homes provides an opportunity to explore the relationship existing between militarization ensuing from political dissension and familial integrity.

In a short period at the start of the nineteenth century, Porteños integrated the concepts of militarism and militant politics into their collective consciousness. These new considerations naturally created important roles for young men and even children. Youngsters as military fighters were not a historical feature of the region until the urban militia’s value was heightened. The militia had only recently assumed a more practical role as the Bourbons sought to minimize expenditures

and maximize the defensive readiness of their possessions in the Indies.⁴¹ In the Río de la Plata region, the crown's greatest concern was the military presence of the Portuguese in the Banda Oriental. After creating the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires in 1776, the crown responded to this threat by elevating the Buenos Aires militia into something more than a means of bestowing status upon its members.⁴² The militia ultimately became the most effective instrument of war against the English, who were defeated when they invaded the city in 1806. Soon after this *reconquista*, military service took on connotations of honor and glory never before experienced by Porteños. As new units formed and identifying characteristics and titles were awarded to these regiments, the city developed a heightened urban military consciousness in the period following 1806.

After the militia defeated the British, the city of Buenos Aires became the scene of continuous celebrations. During these heady days, the role of the private citizen was radically transformed. No longer was public life limited to affairs of the church or the viceregal court, and no longer were the participants in public processions limited to notables. Now the militia—and the growing social value placed on all things military—made celebrations matters of patriotic pride, symbolized by such accoutrements of power as weapons and military regalia. The martial celebration became a new form of popular entertainment, one that few Porteños in 1806 suspected would soon be policed by officers, manipulated by the authorities, and feared by the public.⁴³ For the next several years, church and *cabildo* carillons periodically called the urban multitudes to assemble. The Plaza Mayor and other public spaces became arenas for parades and drills, oratories and public hangings. In these exercises, where participants and victims now ran the social gamut, young men and even young boys were routinely included by the unavoidability of such affairs and also by official design.

Consequently, the manpower used in war tended to be young. But how young were these men? In Buenos Aires, indications are that boys as young as twelve were being recruited into military service. During this period of generalized euphoria and sense of prideful obligation, children took an active place alongside young men in the military formations. One of the most impressive rituals of newfound patriotism occurred on 15 January 1807 on a field outlying the city's southeast fringe, near the Riachuelo. The general alarm was sounded at 2 a.m., signaling all the regiments to assemble and converge. By sunrise nearly eight thousand men in full dress and gear were gathered on the field, ready to be reviewed by the new viceroy and hero of the *reconquista*, Santiago Liniers. Following a mass, bands played, food and drink were served, and Liniers read a proclamation appropriate to the spirit of the occasion. He then gave orders for a general fusillade. The account of

this incident in Juan Manuel Beruti's diary illustrates how far down the age ladder the newly militarized pride had descended. His words, naive in the context of the political and military misfortunes that would follow in the next two decades, recount the continuous paeans honoring the city redeemed from the English infidels. "The artillery had all been placed to one side. It started to fire with such a powerful blare that it lasted for about three-quarters of an hour, first one wing, then another, and so on. In all that time, sixteen batteries fired four volleys, each one the equivalent of 250 rifle shots. At this point, it was truly joyous to watch the children's company, composed of volunteers between the ages of twelve and fourteen, with their two cannon pieces . . . fire a volley of such thunderous power and with such precision that they easily matched the best and most seasoned veterans."⁴⁴

After this time, it was not possible to turn back from youthful and plebeian participation in military exercises. As the fortunes of war determined the manpower needed, the *leva* (the legal device for forced recruitment) became the single greatest threat to the coherence of Porteño families. Regulations on the *leva* did contain some relief for sectors of the male population considered to be economically vital, resulting in disproportionate recruitment of the unskilled and the unemployed.⁴⁵ The inequalities of the system of military exemptions became notorious enough that Rosas's spokesmen were forced to announce their restrictions of "this scandalous abuse" early in 1830, even if the system continued in practice.⁴⁶ Despite the laws regulating military conscription, however, the authorities at times circumvented them. Men who had broken no laws and were fully employed were nevertheless recruited, often by means of raids on *café*s and *pulperías*.⁴⁷ "This form of ill-treatment occurs repeatedly," complained an observer in 1827. "These procedures, whereby *under the name of the 'leva' and the necessities of war* citizens are being forcibly taken away, must be eliminated."⁴⁸

The state helped perpetuate military confrontation by closely monitoring the city's population and demanding more and more young men to serve in the military.⁴⁹ Not even children were spared in this perceived hour of need. By 1826 this regimen of conflict had undermined productive capabilities in the countryside and enervated morale in the city. During the decade of the war for independence (beginning in 1810) and even through the mid-1820s, the political and military authorities "were mostly successful in limiting their military recruitment to the socially marginal sectors."⁵⁰ The strains on the affected families had begun to show. One observer lamented, "Because of the indiscriminate conscription in the city and the countryside—without any concern for whether the conscripts were vagrants or laborers, married or single, grown men or even twelve-year-old children—poverty-stricken mothers and aged fathers have been left desolate in the absence of the protec-

tion that their sons had been providing them." Young boys were no longer available to sell milk and other home-produced goods on the streets, forcing mothers to do so instead, and "provoking the sympathy" of onlookers.⁵¹

At the time of these observations, the military campaign against the Brazilians over the contested Banda Oriental was being fought in two circumstances reminiscent of the earlier revolutionary era.⁵² First, it became clear that the prosecution of the earlier war against royalist and internal dissidents could be carried out only with a full-scale commitment by the political authorities. This commitment meant that resources assigned to the army, including manpower recruits, would have to be radically increased—a measure that would quickly cause forced conscription of the lower classes and almost universal conscription of the city's slave force.⁵³

The second similarity to the revolutionary era was the impatience shown by the professional military with the politicians. The growing distance between these two groups can be inferred from the euphemistically contradictory language that José de San Martín employed in addressing the besieged junta of 1812. He stated that whatever decisions the political authorities might make would of course be obeyed by the military officers; but, he warned, the politicians could be fatally mistaken if they took the military's loyalty for granted.⁵⁴ A generation later, similar dangers loomed over Rivadavia's government in its approach to the Brazilian enemy, and the results recalled those observed during the previous military era: massive conscription, especially of the lower classes, and the eventual fall of the government. In June of 1827, with the government stymied by the failure of the other provinces (except Tucumán) to adopt the centralist constitution drafted the previous year, "it took only the imprudent preliminary peace agreement . . . , signed in Rio de Janeiro, to hasten the fall."⁵⁵ Thus the failure to prosecute war vigorously had its antecedents in the 1810s. Manuel Dorrego, the governor of Buenos Aires province and Rivadavia's political enemy, summarized the militants' analysis of the failed prosecution of the war against Brazil: "blood still pours from the wounds inflicted on us, and much time will have to pass before they will heal. Whenever one surveyed the brave and virtuous army on the field of battle, along the borders with Brazil, one would see the naked soldier without any pay, the small number of troops, and everything in danger of complete dissolution."⁵⁶ Even normally calm observers who were not given to bleak prophecies reported that any sort of peace with the Brazilians would cause a lengthy civil war throughout the country.⁵⁷ From social, political, and economic perspectives, the situation appeared to be "a return to the past thought to be forgotten and gone forever in 1820" (at the end of the revolutionary decade), and yet, "it would soon be seen as a

process much worse than the previous one."⁵⁸ For example, the financial tailspin of the Porteño economy, occasioned by the Brazilian blockade of the port, hurt most the largest sector in the city—the lower classes, petty traders, and artisans.⁵⁹ Other studies have detailed the political and economic effects of the period, but the data on households presented here indicate some of the effects of political and military instability on the quotidian lives of Porteño families.

Were matters so different after the fall of the unitarians and the advent of the Rosas regime? Rosista conscription policies were based on philosophical tenets similar to those of his predecessors; indeed, the superior efficiency of his machine probably gathered more recruits. The military regulations that had been drafted in 1823 to incorporate the unemployed and the troublemakers (*vagos y malentretenidos*) into the ranks of the provincial army were vigorously followed. This policy fostered the growth of the military apparatus as well as increased dependence on the army as the single largest purchaser of goods from urban production and commercial sectors and also from rural producers.⁶⁰ Moreover, the French blockade of 1837 certainly promoted home manufacturing. Whatever the principal stimulus, the provincial economy expanded considerably under Rosas's rule.⁶¹ Other indications of relative stability and growth emerged by the 1840s: for the first time in years, immigrants were arriving and political émigrés were returning to reclaim confiscated properties.

But these developments obviously do not indicate an idyllic existence. They do suggest, however, that scholars should distinguish between the consequences of the growth of the military establishment per se as opposed to the consequences of protracted, bloody wars. These differences were considerable. The Rosas era was marked by two factors that required large numbers of men to be under arms—actual military conflicts and political security needs. The military conflicts, however, differed qualitatively from the military encounters of the previous eras. They were sporadic, and although Rosas consciously employed the rhetoric of war, each conflict was terminal and self-contained. Such was the nature of his Indian campaign in 1833, his war against Bolivia in 1837, his nationalist crusade against the Anglo-French forces in 1845, and his reactions to the periodic challenges that unitarians like Paz and Lavalle mounted. Although many continued to desert both federalist and unitarian forces, the danger of military service apparently had diminished enough to encourage lower-class volunteers to join during the economically restrictive period of the 1840s, as their predecessors had done almost two generations earlier when they joined the evolving urban army in 1810.⁶² Tulio Halperín Donghi draws similar conclusions about both periods. Regarding the formative era of independence, when lower-class enrollments precluded forced conscription, he asks,

"Why were the plebeian classes in the city so deaf to the appeal to their own interests in orderly government and diminished military expenditure? It may have been the case that militarization in fact proved to be more of a boon than a burden to them . . . , transferring wealth from the higher to the lower social groups [in the form of soldiers' pay]."⁶³ He notes elsewhere that during the era of the late 1830s and early 1840s, economic conditions in the city encouraged similar military voluntarism from the lower classes. Despite the absence of any "direct testimony to this effect," enrolling in the army must have offered the "guarantee of subsistence (and not much more than subsistence) to individuals in the city's least prosperous groups."⁶⁴

The lackluster performance of Rosas's troops during his last battle at Caseros in February of 1852 suggests that the lower classes sensed the differences between "peacetime" military service and campaigns of war and that they retained their collective memories of the destructive effects of previous wars. Even before Caseros, British diplomatic agents in Buenos Aires indicated to their superiors in London that they need not be too concerned about a protracted war in Argentina. These observers noted that despite militant speeches by Porteño demonstrators, popular sentiments could not mask the difference between voluntary enrollments, with their attendant military drills, and actual warfare. In October of 1850, wild mobs paraded through the streets calling for war with Brazil. Yet Henry Southern noted that this behavior was so much rhetorical emotionalism, that behind the apparent enthusiasm lay much real hostility to war. This ambivalence was particularly true of the Buenos Aires region: "the evils of war are nowhere felt more cruelly . . . [and] war strikes at the very root of the well-being of nearly every individual in the country, whether native or foreign."⁶⁵ Writing at the beginning of 1852, Robert Gore observed that Argentines were not interested in war, preferring instead a swift and painless victory by Urquiza because although "there is no sympathy for Urquiza in Buenos Aires, . . . there is a very general desire for peace, to permit individuals to attend to their private affairs."⁶⁶ In the end, the Rosas army dissolved before the enemy on the outskirts of Buenos Aires: the ambivalence of the lower-class enlistees in the army was demonstrated by their ennui in actual battle.⁶⁷

If it can be accurately said that "Rosas preserved the inherited social order, reinforced it, and handed it on intact," then he succeeded in part because his political supremacy resulted in less loss of life in the field of battle.⁶⁸ This realistic approach was better understood by Rosas than by either the authorities of the independence era or the revanchist leaders toward Uruguay in the 1820s. The differences between Rosas and his predecessors had nothing to do with humane concerns. Rosas was no more respectful of the "rights" of the masses than were the

more overtly aristocratic unitarians who ruled before him, but he understood the limits defining plebeian loyalties to him. The patrimonial aspects of the Rosista formula were motivated by fundamentally political considerations, based on his assessment of his predecessors' failed policies toward the lower classes. By contrast, noted the caudillo, "I thought it important to gain influence over the people of this class in order to restrain them and lead them. . . . I found it necessary to . . . protect them and look after their welfare."⁶⁹ On the eve of Rosas's formal arrival on the Buenos Aires political scene at the end of 1829, his supporters paved his way by emphasizing in the city the peace that reigned in the countryside commanded by Rosas: "while elements of discord are being manifested in the city [even] among people loyal to the same cause, nothing but the most complete harmony reigns in the countryside, where [thanks to Rosas] only one sentiment prevails—that of *living in peace*."⁷⁰

The calculated aspect of Rosas's patrimonialism is not being offered here to explain the rise of caudillo rule, which has already been done comprehensively, albeit suggestively, by Tulio Halperín Donghi in *Revolución y guerra*. He indicates that Rosas's rule was the natural and even necessary consequence of the restless, nonconsensual, and intolerably destructive first two decades of independent Argentine existence.⁷¹ John Lynch has provided an economic and political framework for understanding the rise of Rosas and his tenure, which was based on the caudillo's intense concern for efficient order from above and complete subordination below. The data presented here on households suggest that Porteño homes were relatively more coherent and relatively more successful in keeping conjugal partners together and that the young were more likely to survive to adulthood after 1827. To this extent, the efficient authoritarianism of caudillo rule succeeded better than before in maintaining human life and thereby served its own ends by maintaining the loyalty of the masses. That same plebeian solidarity, so feared and resented by anti-Rosas liberals, was instrumental in the caudillo's durability.

CORESIDENTIAL KINSHIP

Many families responded to the troubles visited upon them by the period's political and military disturbances by adopting reactive strategies to ameliorate their personal situations. One strategy often adopted was to form extended families, an instrumentally motivated reaction that calls into question the ability of traditional, culture-based variables to explain the structure of Spanish American households.

Affective kinship (the emotional bonds, rights, and obligations that link kinfolk) has long been a fundamental characteristic of Spanish

American society. From the time of the conquerors, patriarchy was an organizing principle of the social order of the Indies. Kinship extended the normal care of subordinate intimates and loved ones to the forging of networks to carry out trans-Atlantic commerce, landholding patterns, and political power; and kinship in Spanish America thus signified both affective and strategic relationships.⁷² Spanish American households have consequently been assumed to incorporate features of this important phenomenon of kinship by housing extended families that often encompassed two or more generations. According to the data presented in table 6, however, Buenos Aires did not fit this pattern. The evidence provided by the selective universe and the city sample demonstrates that coresidential extended families were rare. But historical trends indicate that complex households (conjugal family units that incorporate relatives other than offspring in their homes) were emerging. In other words, as Porteños edged closer to the modernizing era of the export boom economy during the second half of the century, coresidential kinship increased.

Within the selective universe, the percentage of heads of households who shared their homes with kin doubled from 5 percent in 1810 to 11 percent in 1827.⁷³ This doubling was also evidenced in the city at large, from 10 percent of the sampled population in 1810 to 19 percent in 1855. Most extended families involved the coresidence of only one relative: 9 percent of the citywide sample in 1810, 12 percent in 1827, and 18 percent in 1855, according to the data in table 7. Moreover, the data indicate that coresidential kinship was a dynamic phenomenon strategic to the well-being of husbands among the kin who shared homes. The data presented below support this hypothesis.⁷⁴ Thus when the extended family developed in Buenos Aires, it did not take on large dimensions. On average, two-thirds of the extended families included no more than five members, or only one more individual than in the normal Porteño nuclear family.

Who were the likeliest candidates for taking up residence with kin? Table 8 shows that adult siblings comprised the largest category of relatives sharing a home in 1827 (42 percent) and in 1855 (31 percent); but in 1810, siblings accounted for only 21 percent of all coresidential kin citywide. Coresident sons-in-law dropped dramatically from a high of 29 percent in 1810 to 6 percent of all coresidential kin in 1827. Closely related to this decline was the increase in coresident grandchildren, which rose from 1 percent in 1810 to 13 percent in 1827, then slipped to 10 percent by 1855.⁷⁵ The congruence between the sharp drop in the presence of sons-in-law and the dramatic rise in the presence of grandchildren reflected the misfortunes of war, as soldiers commended their wives and children to the care of their parents or parents-in-law. Women left alone tended to invite their parents to share their homes,

TABLE 6 Coresident Kin as a Percentage of the Population in Buenos Aires in Three Censuses

Year	Selective Universe	City Sample
	% (n)	% (n)
1810	5.1 (286)	9.5 (236)
1827	6.1 (618)	11.8 (202)
1855	11.0 (1,407)	18.9 (349)

Source: Sample data.

rather than move in with their in-laws, as is illustrated by the increasing proportion of mothers or fathers of the heads of households in residence from 1810 (1 percent) to 1827 (4 percent) to 1855 (6 percent). The percentage of mothers- or fathers-in-law in residence diminished, however.

An interesting aspect of the data in table 8 is the increase and subsequent decrease in the number of adopted young children who had no apparent relationship to the head of the household, children who became wards. Although these children fulfilled needs that were often domestic in nature, they were not permanent or professional servants. Sometimes called *entenados* in the census tracts, these boys and girls tended to appear in homes headed by elderly persons, where the children found temporary shelter. This domestic tradition helped house some of the city's many abandoned children. Given the high rates of abandonment, it is not surprising to find a slight rise in the absolute number of *entenados* between 1810 and 1827. By 1855 the percentage of complex households containing unrelated minors dropped to 3 percent. This informal variety of charity may have fallen victim to the rise of the nuclear family, a trend that grew in importance in the course of the nineteenth century, especially among young married couples.

Coresidential kinship often occurred when a home was offered to persons related to the head of the household by marriage. The city-wide incidence of households made complex as a result of marriage declined from nearly 63 percent of all complex households in 1810 to 39 percent in 1855, figures reflecting the percentage of households that included in-laws. At the same time, the presence of consanguineal relations of the head of the household (sisters, brothers, nieces, nephews, mothers, and fathers) increased from 23 percent of all complex households in 1810 to 44 percent in 1855.⁷⁶ Table 9 summarizes data from marriage-related complex households for the selective universe and the

TABLE 7 *Number of Kin Living in Buenos Aires Households, 1810–1855, in the City Sample*

<i>Kin in Home</i>	1810	1827	1855
	% (n)	% (n)	% (n)
0	77.1 (295)	76.5 (293)	63.0 (241)
1	8.6 (33)	12.0 (46)	18.0 (69)
2	6.5 (25)	4.7 (18)	5.7 (22)
3	3.4 (13)	3.4 (13)	5.5 (21)
4	0.5 (2)	0.5 (2)	2.6 (10)
5 or more	4.0 (15)	2.8 (11)	5.3 (20)
Totals	100.1 (383)	99.9 (383)	100.1 (383)

Source: Sample data.

Notes: The city sample consists of 1,149 households. Deviations from 100.0 result from rounding.

city sample. Two important characteristics emerge from these data. The first reflects the cultural norms that prolonged protection of females in general and daughters in particular. The data in table 9 show coresident sons-in-law greatly outnumbering coresident daughters-in-law, indicating that among the relatively few young married couples living with one set of parents, daughters were more likely to remain in their paternal homes after marriage than were sons.

The second characteristic is congruent with the cycles in household structures noted earlier, especially among males. In 1827 households experienced a general decline in the proportions of coresident sons-in-law and a rise in coresidence among daughters-in-law and especially sisters-in-law. The sharp increase in the presence of sisters-in-law within Porteño households directly reflects the need for married women left alone by their husbands (who were away defending the frontier against Indians or warring against the Brazilians) and for widows of soldiers killed during the revolutionary era of the 1810s to move in with kin until they could set up their own homes again.

In 1810 the lower classes were much likelier than the upper classes to form complex households by incorporating kin into their homes, as is shown in both the city sample and the selective universe. Coresidential kinship was less common among the well-to-do in 1810,

TABLE 8 *Type of Incidence of Resident Kin, Buenos Aires Households, 1810–1855, in the City Sample*

<i>Relationship to Head of Household</i>	1810 % (n)	1827 % (n)	1855 % (n)
Adopted minor	4.4 (4)	7.7 (7)	2.9 (4)
Son-in-law	28.6 (26)	5.5 (5)	10.1 (14)
Daughter-in-law	7.7 (7)	5.5 (5)	5.1 (7)
Grandchild	1.1 (1)	12.8 (11)	10.1 (14)
Sister or brother	20.9 (19)	41.8 (38)	31.2 (43)
Sister- or brother-in-law	17.6 (16)	12.1 (11)	16.7 (23)
Mother- or father-in-law	8.8 (8)	4.4 (4)	7.2 (10)
Niece or nephew	1.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	7.2 (10)
Mother or father	1.1 (1)	4.4 (4)	5.8 (8)
Unknown	8.8 (8)	6.6 (6)	3.6 (5)
Totals	100.1 (91)	100.8 (91)	99.9 (138)

Source: Sample data.

Note: The city sample consists of 320 households.

although about one-fourth of the complex households were composed of well-to-do extended families. By 1855, however, coresidential kinship was as common for the wealthy as for the poor. This eventual similarity between rich and poor in forming extended families is not easily explained by standard modernization theory, which posits that over time the poor tend to retain the traditional characteristic of forming extended families and complex households. As material conditions improve, however, educational levels increase, traditional values are left behind, and the household tends toward nucleation.⁷⁷ The Buenos Aires situation seems to have been the inverse of this model, in that well-to-do families increasingly resembled their poorer counterparts. But it should be noted that the Porteños' affinity for extended households over time was not so exceptional. For example, Florentine households were much more laterally extended in the sixteenth century than they had been

TABLE 9 *Complex Households Resulting from Marriages in Buenos Aires, 1810–1855*

<i>In-Laws Present in Household</i>	<i>Selective Universe^a</i>			<i>City Sample^b</i>		
	1810 % (n)	1827 % (n)	1855 % (n)	1810 % (n)	1827 % (n)	1855 % (n)
Sons-in-law	38.2 (39)	17.0 (29)	16.7 (50)	45.6 (26)	20.0 (5)	25.9 (14)
Daughters-in-law	7.8 (8)	9.4 (16)	11.0 (33)	12.3 (7)	20.0 (5)	13.0 (7)
Sisters-in-law	23.5 (24)	40.9 (70)	33.3 (100)	17.5 (10)	28.0 (7)	29.6 (16)
Brothers-in-law	15.7 (16)	14.0 (24)	14.7 (44)	10.5 (6)	16.0 (4)	13.0 (7)
Mothers-in-law	14.7 (15)	15.8 (27)	19.7 (59)	8.8 (5)	8.0 (2)	16.7 (9)
Fathers-in-law	0.0 (0)	2.9 (5)	4.7 (14)	5.3 (3)	8.0 (2)	1.8 (1)
Totals	99.9 (102)	100.0 (171)	100.1 (300)	100.0 (57)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (54)

Source: Sample data

Note: Deviations from 100.0 result from rounding.

^aThe selective universe consists of 573 households.

^bThe city sample consists of 136 households.

in the early fifteenth, for reasons based on their own historical experiences.⁷⁸

Extended families were the exception in Buenos Aires, where family nucleation was the norm for married couples. During the first half of the nineteenth century, two out of ten households headed by married couples contained kin. By 1855 almost three out of ten such households were shared with kin. But beyond these figures lies the question of how dynamic or static the nuclear family was in the lifespan of the heads of the household. In 1810 coresidential kinship tended to increase when mothers were likely to have fewer coresident children in the home, at an average age of forty. At this point, husbands or wives might also be modifying the composition of the household as a result of the death of one of the marriage partners, a pattern equally evident in 1855. In 1827, however, the cycle was very different, with the incidence of married households without kin at home remaining uniformly high (an average of 85 percent) for the age groups of forty to forty-four, forty-five to forty-nine, and fifty to fifty-four years.⁷⁹ Coresidential kinship in 1827 appears to have been most common when wives of the

heads of households were between twenty and twenty-four (38 percent). This pattern reflects the increase noted earlier in the numbers of coresident sisters-in-law, who were contemporaries of the wives whose homes they shared (see table 9). Thus married couples tended to retain their private, nucleated pattern under normal circumstances. If extended families were formed in Buenos Aires, such a trend reflected less the Iberian or Mediterranean inheritance of Porteños than the practical necessity of providing lodging for aging patriarchs and the desolate young.⁸⁰ Their practices thus manifested the ubiquitous social norm requiring grown children to care for their elderly parents.⁸¹

CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A CLASSICAL THEORY OF CAUDILLO RULE

The foregoing analysis of censal data spanning half a century of life in Buenos Aires underscores the complex changes experienced by families living in a region in search of political stability. Moreover, the approach taken in this study suggests the value of a paradigm shift in explaining nineteenth-century caudillo rule. The dislocations created first by the struggles for independence, then by violence in the absence of political and organizational consensus, followed by the campaigns against Brazil all took their heaviest toll on the *gente de pueblo*. Militarizing much of the male population and the increasingly brutal political relations profoundly affected the families of Porteños, especially because their mean family size was relatively small at the start (less than five persons in 1810). The data show that by 1855, the losses of the 1810s and 1820s had been recouped and the city's population had doubled since 1827.

This cycle is consistent with the European pattern of rapid rise in population following a period of high mortality rates. Historically, years of crisis have been followed by years of much lower mortality. If marriages—whether consensual or sacramental—had been postponed or interrupted because of externally imposed hardships, a rush of new or resumed marriages would follow the end of the crisis, “and a spurt of births would coincide with the reduction in the numbers of deaths to give a few years in which population could rise rapidly.”⁸² The rise in the number of births would occasion a sudden jump in the number of young adults about twenty years after the crisis. If these young men and women started families, a wavelike surge would result in the numbers, with a periodicity of about a generation. Each baby boom thus produces a demographic echo in the course of about twenty-five years as those former babies themselves begin to establish families. This pattern occurred in Buenos Aires, as can be noted in the proportion of males in the selective universe under the age of twenty-five, which was

much greater in 1855 (according to the data in table 2) than it had been twenty-eight years earlier.

In light of the evidence presented here, can the demographic data be used to formulate broader perspectives to explain the behavioral aspects that supported the durable caudillo political order so well exemplified by Rosas and his regime? Support for Rosas among Porteños reflected not only their fear of his repression but their recognition of the most fundamental benefit they derived from his imposed domestic peace—much-improved chances of remaining alive. This benefit redounded particularly to the city's lower classes and black population. Reid Andrews has demonstrated that as late as 1840, blacks reached their largest proportion in the city's population (about 26 percent in 1838) since 1810, when blacks comprised 30 percent of Porteños. The figures for the 1830s represented significant increases from the declines shown by city's censuses following 1810, despite high infant mortality and the sexual imbalance registered among blacks. Although Andrews believes that official statistical data hid the actual size of the black population, it appears that the rise in their numbers resulted largely from the return of lower-class men of all colors to their families following prolonged military involvements.⁸³

Porteños of the period did not perceive the detailed demographic implications of their political struggles, of course. But they experienced the general impact of those struggles enough that even those who would eventually oppose Rosas appreciated the stability of his regime. Marcos Sastre, in whose home the *Salón Literario* first met on 23 June 1837 (giving rise to the term *Generación del '37* to identify the group of anti-Rosas liberals), noted his appreciation of the stability of these times and of the Rosas government "because [it] is the only suitable one, the only one powerful enough to pave the way toward national prosperity."⁸⁴ Even Domingo Sarmiento, who condemned Rosas most harshly, recognized the caudillo as one who apprehended the sociopolitical framework of the Río de la Plata area, rather than a mindless barbarian. Sarmiento wrote in 1844 that no one knew Argentine society better or felt the need to control the masses more than Rosas: "he is the owner of the [masses] and is very much aware of their power and of their instincts . . . ; he has come to understand South American society so totally that he can, at any time by his rare cunning, pluck just the right social chords to produce the sounds he desires."⁸⁵ While a political exile in Chile, Juan Bautista Alberdi admitted in 1847 that "the unitarians have lost, but unity has triumphed."⁸⁶ Moreover, Alberdi perceived that the passivity of the masses in the face of authoritarian leadership derived less from inertia and ignorance than from salutary political deference. In sharply criticizing Europeanized romantic liberal-

ism, Alberdi accused Sarmiento of not understanding the needs and motivations of the peoples of South America. Responding to Sarmiento's call for the masses to rebel against those who would keep them under the federalist yoke, Alberdi wrote from the Chilean city of Quillota in 1853:

It is not "resistance," Mr. Sarmiento, that good writers must teach our Spanish America, already so vitiated by rebellions; rather, it is "obedience." "Resistance" will not provide "freedom"; it will serve only to make impossible the establishment of "authority," something that South America has been searching for since the beginnings of its revolution and something that forms the starting point and the cornerstone of its political existence. . . . The current symbol of civilization in South America is the principle of authority; anything that prevents its establishment is merely barbarousness and savagery with gilded exteriors. "Authority" is not founded by discussion nor by "resistance." Instead, it rests fundamentally upon "obedience."⁸⁷

Most of the members of the Generation of '37 were correct in identifying "the rabble" as the largest source of support for Rosas, but they erred in their assessments of the masses' motivations. The *gente de pueblo* were not simpletons who were blindly following any demagogue who came along to stir their passions. Calculations were made on both sides—by the methodical, literate ruler and by the amorphous, inarticulate masses. To a large extent, what has been said of the dilemma of a typical nineteenth-century Spanish American liberal intellectual may be said of many individuals among the *Porteño* masses: "forced to choose between liberty and order, he chose order."⁸⁸ A transactional exchange of sorts was taking place in nineteenth-century Argentina, one that did not always require exact and material reciprocity but was conditioned by cultural elements such as patriarchal traditions. Such traditions were further reinforced by the behavioral traits of politico-military leaders that were valued by workers in the Río de la Plata region, including good horsemanship, military ability, and the elusive quality of charisma. These were the elements of a system of political patriarchy that permitted the existence of war and its dysfunctions but one that also recognized war's practical limits and thereby the positive functions of relative stability. The system's own logic provided the political support from warriors and their kin for the leader who succeeded in eliminating his enemies to such a degree that he could impose stability.⁸⁹

These propositions and conclusions involve the mental states of individuals, most of whom could not present their thoughts in written testaments. This situation leaves scholars today with the thorny problem of incomplete empirical evidence, something obviously not peculiar to Argentina or Latin America. Indeed, family history draws its empirical base everywhere from the top five or ten percent of popula-

tions, the minority who left disproportionately large amounts of documentation. This discrepancy between the overwhelming evidence of a small minority and the meager literary evidence of the vast majority remains "one of the major unsolved weaknesses of family history."⁹⁰

It is therefore impossible to show conclusively that the masses of Buenos Aires indeed calculated their life chances with the authoritarian caudillo to have been higher than with anyone else. But the history of mental states, particularly among the inarticulate, does not turn on the issue of conclusiveness.⁹¹ Nor should the employment of cliometric techniques be expected to resolve such matters because the weight of proof in history (as in a number of other disciplines) is related less to technique than to the inescapable limitations of incomplete evidence. Such limitations force researchers to conceive the human experience in terms of probabilities only. In other words, the explanations articulated in terms of "proof" are really no more than solidly grounded expectations of plausibility.⁹² Thus historians of the family have become increasingly aware that economic variables have their proper role in explaining certain kinds of family changes, but only as one of several factors such as social structures and psychological attitudes. The growing awareness of the complexity underlying the constellation of causal sources that can be used to account for family and household changes over time has been enhanced by the recognition of two historical tendencies: first, that attitudinal changes took place before changes in the economic forms of production; and second, that those variable attitudes occurred in classes largely unaffected by such changes in production. These observations point strongly to the existence of attitudinal malleability among the inarticulate that is relatively independent of economic determinants.⁹³ Thus the outlook and behavior of individuals within the domestic group are modulated even in the so-called face-to-face societies.⁹⁴ This situation, I suggest, was the case in Buenos Aires and probably in the rest of preconsolidation Argentina.

In the final analysis, within the complex relationships among various political, economic, and demographic factors, the Rosista formula for authority provided a respite from massive loss of life and permitted Porteño households to regain their integrity. Forces destructive of the integrity of the family in the first two decades after 1810 and the subsequent relief from the continuous loss of young men's lives after Rosas's advent formed the extremes of the context within which historians of authoritarianism can analyze caudillo support and durability. Rosas's populist touches, his close relationships with the Afro-Argentines, and his support among *estancieros* in the countryside and *gauchos* in and around the cities all constituted rhetorical and stylistic forms that did not lack substance.⁹⁵

The enmities of the first half-century of Argentine nation building illustrate the classical propositions submitted by Georg Simmel (and further elaborated by Lewis Coser) suggesting the positive functions of social conflict. Rosas's imposed stability provided his fundamental legitimacy: the maintenance of life and production (although intolerant of certain lives) were goals and values that scarcely contradicted the assumptions underlying the relationship between governor and governed, and they tended to be beneficial to the membership of the social structure.⁹⁶ By the middle of the nineteenth century, an entire generation had matured under the frighteningly efficient authoritarianism of Rosismo. Consequently, when the caudillo formula became an enervated form of political rule in Buenos Aires by the 1850s, its dissolution took place before an adult population containing a large contingent of citizens who were inexperienced in the costly and seemingly endemic convulsions of 1810–1829. This young population was willing to risk yet another political experiment, under the leadership of a new generation of liberals who were politically less utopian than the early revolutionaries and who would succeed in reconstituting the power of the urban elites during the century's second half.

NOTES

1. Raw data come from the manuscript census schedules for the city of Buenos Aires of 1810, 1827, and 1855. The schedules of 1827 and 1855 have been employed minimally or not at all in longitudinal studies. They are located in the Archivo General de la Nación (hereafter cited as AGN): Sala IX, 10–7–1 (1810); Sala X, 23–5–5 and 23–5–6 (1827); and Sala X, vols. 1390–1404 (1855). Frequently consulted works on the population of Buenos Aires include Emilio Ravignani, *Documentos para la historia argentina: territorio y población*, vol. 12 (Buenos Aires, 1919); *Registro estadístico del estado de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires, 1854–1857); Emilio R. Coni, *Movimiento de la población de la ciudad de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires, 1889); Emilio Ravignani, "Crecimiento de la población en Buenos Aires y su campaña (1726–1810)," *Anales de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas*, vol. 1 (Buenos Aires, 1919), 405–16; Nicolás Besio Moreno, *Buenos Aires, puerto del Río de la Plata, capital de la Argentina: estudio crítico de su población, 1536–1936* (Buenos Aires, 1939); *Registro estadístico de la provincia de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires, 1822–1826); Ernesto J. A. Maeder, *Evolución demográfica argentina de 1810 a 1869* (Buenos Aires, 1968); César García Belsunce et al., *Buenos Aires: su gente, 1810–1830* (Buenos Aires, 1976); Marta B. Goldberg, "La población negra y mulata de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1810–1840," *Desarrollo Económico* 61 (Apr.–June 1976):75–99; Alfredo E. Lattes, "Las migraciones en la Argentina entre mediados del siglo XIX y 1960," *Desarrollo Económico* 48 (Jan.–Mar. 1973):849–65; Lyman L. Johnson, "Estimaciones de la población de Buenos Aires en 1774, 1778, y 1810," *Desarrollo Económico* 73 (Apr.–June 1979):107–19; and José Luis Moreno, "La estructura social y demográfica de la ciudad de Buenos Aires en el año 1778," *Anuario del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional del Litoral* 8 (1965):151–70.
2. Julio Irazusta, *Vida política de Juan Manuel de Rosas a través de su correspondencia*, 8 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1940), vol. 1, p. 85, cited in John Lynch, *Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829–1852* (London, 1981), p. 27.
3. For an overview of the impact of English liberalism on the revolutionary generation,

- see Mario C. Belgrano, "Fuentes anglo-sajonas en la formación intelectual de Manuel Belgrano," *Anales* (Buenos Aires) 1 (n.d.).
4. José Ingenieros, *La evolución de las ideas argentinas* (Buenos Aires, 1946), 1:178.
 5. For excellent analyses of mercantile activities in viceregal Buenos Aires, see Susan M. Socolow, *The Merchants of Buenos Aires, 1778–1810* (Cambridge, 1978); and Jonathan C. Brown, *A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776–1860* (Cambridge, 1979).
 6. Herbert S. Klein, "Las finanzas del Virreinato del Río de la Plata en 1790," *Desarrollo Económico* 50 (July–Sept. 1973):369–400.
 7. For a review of military costs in the revolutionary period, see Tulio Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del estado argentino* (Buenos Aires, 1982), 73–144.
 8. Tulio Halperín Donghi, *Revolución y guerra: formación de una elite dirigente en la Argentina criolla* (Buenos Aires, 1972), 329–64.
 9. On the insistent measures of law and order, see Mark D. Szuchman, "Disorder and Social Control in Buenos Aires, 1810–1860," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 15 (Summer 1984):83–110.
 10. The 1810 census employed a different numbering scheme for the cuarteles, and the area included within each cuartel covered twelve city blocks rather than the sixteen blocks encompassed by each cuartel in the censuses of 1827 and 1855. I decided, for the sake of historical continuity and geographic standardization, to select the population that in 1810 resided in the same sixteen blocks that were incorporated within each of the four cuarteles used in 1827 and 1855. Further standardization was required to identify the same blocks throughout the three censuses because the numerical designations given to the blocks (*manzanas*) were different in every one of the three censal dates. It thus became necessary to provide universal numbering that could facilitate locational definitions and boundaries for large-scale statistical computations. The solution was to convert every manzana number from every census to the designation given in 1810, which had the advantage of already having been sequentially ordered from 1 to 406. The sequentially numbered city-block system employed in 1810 also permitted assigning block numbers to manzanas not existing in 1810 but occupied by 1855. This method is particularly appropriate for low-lying areas along the shores of the Río de la Plata. In the aggregate, the problem of missing data was kept to a minimum. The 1810 census had missing tracts for nine residential blocks in the cuartel that have been designated here with the number 3; none were missing in Cuartel 4; nine were missing in Cuartel 12; and four were missing in Cuartel 19. The 1827 and 1855 censuses had no missing data, containing every block of every selected cuartel. On the basis of average family sizes for the whole period in the blocks and neighborhoods covered, the data missing from the selective universe is estimated at 370 households. This figure implies if all the data had been available, the selective universe would have contained 6,700 households instead of the 6,310 analyzed here. Given the missing data of 1810, it should be noted that cuarteles designated by numbers 3 and 12 did not contain as much of the city's population as the older and more densely populated southern cuarteles. Cuarteles 3 and 12 later experienced growth and gentrification, but only after midcentury, when they became the hub of the highly regarded Barrio Norte. On this topic, see James R. Scobie, *Buenos Aires: From Plaza to Suburb, 1870–1910* (New York, 1974), chaps. 1–2. In sum, underenumeration is not an issue with the censuses employed here. All the folios were first ordered in sequence of pagination and then in the order of street name and house number that each enumerator followed when completing the assigned route, manzana by manzana. As a result of this procedure, a number of folios and *libretas* were found to be out of sequence and thus placed within inappropriate cuarteles. Analyses were made of the enumerators' routes and of the populations inscribed; if any underenumeration occurred, it appears to have been consistent, suggesting that the variations found over time are reliable indicators of change. In the end, the complete populations of the four wards were gathered, thereby obviating the concern for statistical significance. These procedures yielded a selective universe with a data base of 6,310 households, the basic units of analysis, which contained 28,579 men, women, and children.

11. Reid Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires, 1800–1900* (Madison, 1980), 80.
12. The statistical results of the tables employing the city sample are significant to the .05 level. The sampling technique employed a table of random numbers and yielded a total of 1,149 households, or 383 households enumerated in each of the three census years. The population of these households comprised the records of 6,020 individuals. The sample size of 383 households per census year is appropriate for the largest population of greater Buenos Aires considered by this article, which by 1855 amounted to ninety thousand persons, and for achieving the desired 95 percent confidence level and the .05 level of significance. See J. Dennis Willigan and Katherine Lynch, *Sources and Methods of Historical Demography* (New York, 1982), 199–200; Des Raj, *The Design of Sample Surveys* (New York, 1972), 59; Diego G. de la Fuente, *Primer censo de la República Argentina . . . (1869)* (Buenos Aires, 1872), 20; and Herbert Arkin and Raymond R. Colton, *Tables for Statisticians* (New York, 1963), 145.
13. “Those may be *presumed married* who are of opposite sex, appear first and second in the household and have the same surname [allowing for the retention of maiden names in the Hispanic tradition]. This presumption is strengthened if those following the first two have the same surname and/or are described as children. Those may also be *presumed married* who appear later in the household, i.e., not first and second, but who have the same surname and are followed in the household by those who have the same surname and/or are described as children. . . . An individual may be *presumed widowed* who is described as either mother or father of the head or other member of the household (a spouse not being present) or . . . the head of a household containing either or both a married couple and children (so described) with the same surname.” From *Household and Family in Past Time*, edited by Peter Laslett and Richard Wall (Cambridge, 1972), 88. The censuses that were used facilitated greatly the determination of household relationships. In 1810 respondents and enumerators usually listed relationships. The 1855 census contained the question, “What is your relationship to the head of the household?” Finally, the inference rules of the Cambridge Group were invoked when necessary in cases involving the census of 1827.
14. Sample data.
15. Alfredo E. Lattes, “Las migraciones en la Argentina,” 854.
16. Sample data.
17. Goldberg, “La población negra y mulata,” 86.
18. Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines*, 52–53.
19. Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines*, 115, 113–37 passim.
20. *El Censor*, 3 October 1816.
21. Juan Manuel Beruti, “Memorias curiosas,” Senado de la Nación, *Biblioteca de Mayo: diarios y crónicas*, vol. 4 (Buenos Aires, 1960), p. 3703.
22. *Ibid.*, 3703–6.
23. *El Lucero*, 5 July 1830.
24. *Teatro de la Opinión*, 13 June 1823.
25. Sample data.
26. Computed from John Hajnal, “Age at Marriage and Proportions Marrying,” *Population Studies* 7 (Nov. 1953):111–36.
27. Michael Mitterauer and Reinhard Sieder, *The European Family* (Chicago, 1982), 36–37; John Hajnal, “European Marriage Patterns in Perspective,” in *Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography*, edited by D. V. Glass and D. E. C. Eversley (London, 1965), 101–43.
28. Cases where the occupations of the heads of the households were unknown were not included.
29. Sample data.
30. Sample data.
31. Sample data.
32. Lawrence Stone, “Family History in the 1980s: Past Achievements and Future Trends,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 12 (Summer 1981):60; Roger Schofield, “Age-Specific Mobility in an Eighteenth-Century Rural English Parish,” *Annales de Démographie Historique* (1970):261–74; Rudolf Braun, “Early Industrialization and De-

- mographic Change in the Canton of Zurich," in *Historical Studies of Changing Fertility*, edited by Charles Tilly (Princeton, 1978), 291, 320; Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York, 1977), 26–28; Mitterauer and Sieder, *The European Family*, 41–43.
33. Cynthia Little, "The Society of Beneficence in Buenos Aires, 1823–1900," Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 97–98.
 34. AGN, X–17–2–7, Registros parroquiales, 1840; and AGN, X–16–10–7, Defunciones y matrimonios en Buenos Aires. The abandonment rates, although high, correspond to a generalized picture of high levels of illegitimacy. For the period between 1826 and 1831, the urban parishes witnessed illegitimacy rates of 33 percent for whites and 88 percent for persons of color. These figures come from baptismal information that recorded children of common-law marriages as *naturales*. See Goldberg, "La población negra," 86.
 35. Susan M. Socolow, "Marriage, Birth, and Inheritance: The Merchants of Eighteenth-Century Buenos Aires," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 60, no. 3 (Aug. 1980):392; Bernard Farber, *Guardians of Virtue: Salem Families in 1800* (New York, 1972), 46.
 36. Diana Balmori and Robert Oppenheimer, "Family Clusters: Generational Nucleation in Nineteenth-Century Argentina and Chile," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (Apr. 1979):241.
 37. Farber, *Guardians of Virtue*, 46.
 38. Sample data.
 39. Goldberg, "La población negra," 90.
 40. The concern is generalized throughout the periodical literature of the period. For example, see Halperín Donghi, *Revolución y guerra*, passim.
 41. The new regulations were to be applied to the urban militia by royal declaration in 1767. Their specific application came by way of the *Reglamento para las milicias de infantería y caballería de la isla de Cuba*, promulgated on 19 Jan. 1769, and extended to the rest of the American possessions by the Gálvez *Circular* of 11 June 1769. Juan M. Manferini, "La historia militar durante los siglos XVII y XVIII," in *Historia de la nación argentina*, edited by Ricardo Levene, 2d ed. (Buenos Aires, 1961), 4:253. For reviews of the development and consequences of military reforms of this period, see Allan J. Kuethe, "The Development of the Cuban Military as a Sociopolitical Elite, 1763–1783," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 61, no. 4 (Nov. 1981):695–704; Christian J. Archer, *The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760–1810* (Albuquerque, 1977); Allan J. Kuethe, *Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773–1808* (Gainesville, 1978); and Lyle McAlister, *The Fuero Militar in New Spain, 1764–1800* (Gainesville, 1952).
 42. Tulio Halperín Donghi, "Revolutionary Militarization in Buenos Aires, 1806–1815," *Past and Present* 40 (July 1968):87.
 43. Halperín Donghi, "Revolutionary Militarization," 101–2.
 44. Beruti, "Memorias curiosas," 3683–84.
 45. See *Recopilación de las leyes y decretos promulgados en Buenos Aires desde el 25 de Mayo de 1810 hasta el 31 de Diciembre de 1835*, first part (Buenos Aires, 1836), pp. 353–54, 365–66, 379–83; and *Registro nacional* (Buenos Aires, 1879), 1:28, 42.
 46. See the *considerando* of the government's decree of 8 Jan. 1830 in *El Lucero*, 8 Jan. 1830, and the decree itself in the *Recopilación*, p. 1034.
 47. Szuchman, "Disorder and Social Control," 90–91.
 48. *Crónica Política y Literaria*, 8 Aug. 1827 (emphasis in original); AGN, X–43–7–5, Pólíca, 1830–1838, 1850–1859; Serenos.
 49. See the police edict of 21 Aug. 1827 in *Crónica Política y Literaria*, 22 August 1827.
 50. Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 159.
 51. Beruti, "Memorias curiosas," 3990.
 52. Both of the circumstances can be found in the dialogue that took place on 8 October 1812 between leaders of the coup about to depose the revolutionary junta and the junta's members. The text of these exchanges can be found in Museo Histórico Nacional, *Acta del cabildo de Buenos Aires (8 de Octubre de 1812)* (Buenos Aires, 1912), unnumbered.
 53. Halperín Donghi, "Revolutionary Militarization," 96–97.
 54. Museo Histórico Nacional, *Acta del cabildo*.

55. Emilio Ravignani, "EL congreso nacional de 1824–1827: la convención nacional de 1828–1829," in *Historia de la nación argentina*, edited by Levene, 2nd ed., 7:113–14.
56. *Circular del 20 de Agosto de 1827 en respuesta al mensaje del Gobierno del 14 de Septiembre de 1827, precedida del mensaje mismo y de una circular a las Provincias* (Buenos Aires, 1827), pp. 1–2, cited in Ricardo Piccirilli, *Rivadavia y su tiempo* (Buenos Aires, 1943), 2:470–71.
57. See, for example, *The British Packet*, 1 Sept. 1827.
58. Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 155.
59. Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 36.
60. *Ibid.*, 133.
61. See Miron Burgin, *The Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism, 1820–1852* (New York, 1971), 249–81, for a review of the contradictions inherent in Rosas's economic policies.
62. For a discussion on desertion, see Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines*, 124–25.
63. Halperín Donghi, "Revolutionary Militarization," 106.
64. Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 222–23.
65. British Foreign Office, 6/152, Southern to Palmerston, 19 Oct. 1850, quoted in Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 313.
66. British Foreign Office, 6/167, Gore to Palmerston, 2 Feb. 1852, quoted in Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 324; and James R. Scobie, *La lucha por la consolidación de la nacionalidad argentina, 1852–1862* (Buenos Aires, 1964), 18.
67. For an excellent description of public sentiments in the city immediately after the battle of Caseros, see Scobie, *La lucha por la consolidación*, 17–26.
68. Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 100.
69. Ricardo Levene, *El proceso histórico de Lavalle a Rosas* (La Plata, 1950), 146.
70. *El Lucero*, 19 Sept. 1829, emphasis in the original.
71. Halperín Donghi, *Revolución y guerra*, passim.
72. Some of the best social science literature discussing the varied abilities of Latin American families to forge widespread economic and political networks can be found in these works: Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Earl Ratcliff, "Research Methods for the Analysis of the Internal Structure of Dominant Classes: The Case of Landlords and Capitalists in Chile," *LARR* 10, no. 3 (1975):5–61; Jorge Balán, Harley L. Browning, and Elizabeth Jelin, *Men in a Developing Society: Geographic and Social Mobility in Monterrey, Mexico* (Austin, 1973); Larissa Lomnitz, "Migration and Network in Latin America," in *Current Perspectives in Latin American Urban Research*, edited by Alejandro Portes and Harley L. Browning (Austin, 1976), 133–50; Arnold Strickon, "Carlos Felipe: Kinsman, Patron and Friend," in *Structure and Process in Latin America*, edited by Arnold Strickon and Sidney M. Greenfield (Albuquerque, 1972), 43–69; and Larissa Lomnitz and Marisol Pérez Lisaur, "The History of a Mexican Urban Family," *Journal of Family History* 3 (Winter 1978):392–409.
73. Sample data.
74. Sample data.
75. Sample data.
76. Sample data.
77. The cornerstone of the model rests on Pierre G. F. Le Play, *L'Organisation de la famille* (Paris, 1871). Fuller discussions of industrialization and family solidarities can be found in Anthony Wrigley, "Reflections on the History of the Family," *Daedalus* 106 (Spring 1977):71–85; and William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York, 1970), 10–26.
78. David Herlihy, *The Family in Renaissance Italy* (St. Charles, Mo., 1974), 5; Christiane Klapisch, "Household and Family in Tuscany in 1427" in *Household and Family in Past Time*, edited by Peter Laslett and Richard Wall (Cambridge, 1972), 278–81.
79. Sample data.
80. The elasticity of the family structure based on functional need has been demonstrated elsewhere. See Howard P. Chudacoff, "Newlyweds and Family Extension: The First Stage of the Family Cycle in Providence, Rhode Island, 1864–1865 and

- 1879–1880," in *Family and Population in Nineteenth-Century America*, edited by Tamara K. Hareven and Maris A. Vinovskis (Princeton, 1978), 169–205.
81. Peter Laslett, "The Family as a Knot of Individual Interests," in *Households: Comparative and Historical Studies of the Domestic Group*, edited by Robert M. Netting, Richard R. Wilk, and Eric J. Arnould (Berkeley, 1984), 358–59.
 82. E. A. Wrigley, *Population and History* (New York, 1974), 68–69.
 83. Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines*, 64–77.
 84. Quoted in Fermín Chávez, *La cultura en la época de Rosas* (Buenos Aires, 1973), 105–6.
 85. Domingo F. Sarmiento, *Obras completas de D. F. Sarmiento*, vol. 6, *Política argentina, 1841–1851* (Paris, 1909), 123.
 86. Juan B. Alberdi, *La República Argentina, treinta y siete años después de su revolución* (Santiago, 25 May 1847), a pamphlet quoted in Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 306.
 87. Juan B. Alberdi, *Cartas quillotanas* (Buenos Aires, 1916), 85–86.
 88. Harold E. Davis, *Latin American Social Thought*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1966), 148. Davis was discussing Latin American political liberalism and the Mexican liberal José María Luis Mora.
 89. For an overview of the transactional and cultural models of social processes, see Raymond T. Smith, "Introduction," in *Kinship Ideology and Practice in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1984), 5–14.
 90. Stone, "Family History," 56.
 91. For a good example of the difficulties of measuring changing attitudes and mentalities, see the recent debates on female sexual attitudes among Edward Shorter, Louise Tilly, Joan Scott, and Miriam Cohen, Cissie Fairchilds, and Jean-Louis Flandrin, among others. This literature is as fascinating as it is illustrative of the rich complexity that the historical literature can gain from such debates. See Edward Shorter, "Illegitimacy, Sexual Revolution, and Social Change in Modern Europe," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2 (Autumn 1971):237–72, and his "Female Emancipation, Birth Control, and Fertility in European History," *American Historical Review* 78 (June 1973):605–40; Louise A. Tilly, Joan W. Scott, and Miriam Cohen, "Women's Work and European Fertility Patterns," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 6 (Winter 1976):447–76; Cissie Fairchilds, "Female Sexual Attitudes and the Rise of Illegitimacy," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8 (Spring 1978):627–67; and Jean-Louis Flandrin, "A Case of Naiveté in the Use of Statistics," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 9 (Autumn 1978):316–21.
 92. Social historians may understand more fully their own problems in establishing proof as resulting from inherent limitations of evidence and can draw comparisons with the burden of proof encountered by other social scientists. See, for example, Stephen Ullman, "Semantic Universals," in *Universals of Language*, edited by J. H. Greenberg, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 217–61.
 93. Stone, "Family History," 72–73.
 94. Laslett, "The Family as a Knot," 369.
 95. For an overview of relations between blacks and Rosas, see Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines*, chaps. 6 and 8; for Rosas's relations with estancieros, see Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, chaps. 2–3.
 96. Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York, 1956), 151.