

and reciprocity of woman and man.

Many reading this book will dismiss a theology so heavily grounded in her experiences as too subjective, peripheral, trivial. Whilst one must bear in mind the disclaimer to write a cerebral theology, she pays disproportionate attention to experience with the result that much good material is swamped. She is right that the tradition must be in dialogue with our experience if our theology is to be authentic, body and soul. But in a sense there is no theology that does not include experience to some degree (no matter how remote!).

If one is prepared to stomach embarrassing terminology (e.g. "malestream" for "mainstream", p. 2), cringeworthy phraseology (e.g. "let us name it and claim it," "women are pregnant with hope" p. 117) and wade through superfluous material, there are many valuable insights in this book which are worth considering. Thurston has given us an important reminder of what it means to be human.

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Book Notes

Gerald A. McCool SJ, in *The Neo-Thomists* (Marquette University Press, 1994, \$20.00), offers a clear and concise guide to the interpretations of the writings of St Thomas Aquinas that dominated, even *constituted*, Catholic thought from the 1880s until the 1960s. All the familiar names are here. Tommaso Zigliara OP (1833-93), significantly a friend of the future Pope Leo XIII, stressed the Aristotelian elements in Aquinas and the argumentative rigour. Alberto Lepidi OP (1838-1925), on the other hand, insisted on the Augustinian and Platonic side. This difference of emphasis remains crucial. But the return to Aquinas, or the invention of neo-Thomism, was an element in a much larger struggle. Basically, as Modernism and the modern world advanced, the Catholic Church attempted to restore premodern, i.e. pre-Cartesian and pre-Kantian philosophy.

The decisive figure was Josef Kleutgen SJ (1811-1883), who was also immensely important in the drafting of the Vatican I decrees. In *Die Theologie der Vorzeit* (1853-70), he attacked Catholic theology of the modern age (*die Neuzeit*) for its submission to Cartesian/Kantian idealism, recommending a return to the Aristotelian realism of what would now be labelled 'premodernity' (*die Vorzeit*). He followed up with *Die Philosophie der Vorzeit* (1863-70). In effect, this return to premodern philosophy anticipated by a century some of the most fashionable movements in philosophy today, Continental and Anglo-American. (Kleutgen figures prominently in Alasdair MacIntyre's *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* and deserves a book.)

The form of Neo-Thomism later called transcendental Thomism originated with Pierre Rousselot SJ (1878-1915, killed in action) and

Joseph Maréchal SJ (d. 1944): a re-reading of Aquinas through Kant which suggests that just as space, time and cause are notions that must be known in advance of our experience if we are to make sense of it, so too the concept of God might be some such transcendental condition. The influence of this on Catholic theology, through Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan in particular, needs no detailing here. Instead of trying to cancel modern philosophy, these thinkers sought to combine it with Aquinas.

Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), a convert to Catholicism who rejected the philosophy he studied at the Sorbonne, developed a quite different, equally influential version of Thomism. His major work, *Distinguer pour unir*, which appeared in 1932, and 'represents twentieth-century Thomism at its best', according to Ralph McInerny in the introduction, has reappeared in a splendid edition as volume 7 of the **Collected Works: The Degrees of Knowledge**, translated under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan (University of Notre Dame Press, 1995, \$34.95). Maritain defends the critical realism of Aristotle and Aquinas in a way that has parallels with currently much-discussed work by Hilary Putnam and John McDowell among others. Moving as he does from a philosophy of nature to a study of mystical experience, he no doubt ranges beyond anything that any philosopher would now consider a viable project for any individual. But Maritain's Thomism is not just of historical interest. Insisting that Thomism is not a 'system' but a 'spiritual organism', he offers a 'sapiential' view of the world which is attractive in many ways. His book is relevant to the current debate between realism and anti-realism.

Thomists of different schools took part in the acrimonious controversy over Maurice Blondel's *Lettre* (1896), of which the English translation by Alexander Dru and Iltyd Trethowan has recently reappeared: **The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma** (T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1995, £13.95). It is difficult to understand what happened at Vatican II without knowing something about the history of the controversy. Blondel distinguished between an 'extrinsic' apologetics, concerned with justifying Christian faith by appeal to signs, miracles, and historically verifiable testimony, and an 'intrinsic' apologetics, in which faith resonated with the natural desire of the restless heart to see the face of God. (Perhaps much that has happened since Vatican II shows that the debate was not concluded successfully after all.)

The illusions of Kantian Thomism were attacked also by Etienne Gilson (1884-1978), another French layman who had as much influence in North America as at home. His exposition of Thomist realism first appeared in 1919 (English version 1924), and has been much revised since. But mainly he has exercised enormous influence on the interpretation of medieval thinkers, with major studies of St Bonaventure (1924), St Bernard (1934), and Blessed John Duns Scotus (1952 — 'Blessed' since 1993), among much else.

In The Shadow of Scotus: Philosophy and Faith in Pre-

Reformation Scotland (T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1995, £16.95), Alexander Broadie lists Gilson's book on St Thomas but ignores the book on Duns Scotus. Will is the faculty of our freedom, so Scotus taught, but this does not mean that he was the extreme voluntarist of neo-Thomist legend (page 35). He teaches that we can learn something about how we ought to live, without relying solely on divine revelation, so that 'the attribution of moral irrationalism to him is false' (p. 41). 'Scotus is no Scotist' (p. 47). But Broadie's main concern is to recall important Scots-born philosophers who worked in Scotus' wake. In his *Meroure of Wyssdome*, written in Scots, John Ireland (c.1440-95), a St Andrews graduate, who taught in Paris, defends the concept of free will developed by Scotus, according to which the possibility of sinning is the price that we pay for our freedom (p. 56). Broadie then examines the concept of faith in relation to assent and certainty as it is found in the work of John Mair or Major (c.1467-1550), one of the most important philosophers of the late Middle Ages, whose lectures in Paris were attended by Ignatius Loyola, Francisco Vitoria, Rabelais and Calvin, among others, but who spent the last twenty years of his life back in Scotland, at St Andrews. There is no recent study of Duns Scotus to which readers may turn who doubt if Gilson's account is the last word. Who better than Alexander Broadie to bring Scotus out of the shadow of 'Scotism'?

John Mair was frequently quoted by Francisco Suárez SJ (1548-1617), whose *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (1597), little read by modern philosophers, addresses every metaphysical issue discussed by medieval and Renaissance philosophers. It exercised enormous influence on early modern philosophy, on Protestant as well as Catholic thinkers. For Grotius, for example, he 'hardly had an equal'. Descartes seems to have studied the book. Leibniz, Schopenhauer and Christian Wolff regarded Suárez as the consummation of Scholasticism. Thus, when Kant rejected metaphysics, as Gilson noted long ago, it was very largely Wolff's Suárez that he was rejecting. It is high time that students of modern philosophy had more access to the *Disputationes*, to see if the metaphysics that Kant taught them to reject without reading it ever really existed. The last of the fifty four disputations has now appeared in English: **On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis)**, translated with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle (Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1995). Students reared on Bertrand Russell's puzzle about the baldness of the present king of France will find themselves at home with the goat-stag (*hircocervus*) which Suárez resurrects from Aristotle: how is it that we can talk of impossible things? Far from being wildly irresponsible and obsolete speculation, this disputation deals with the intelligibility of mental entities, error and falsehood, logical fictions etc., in a way that is perfectly consonant with recent discussions of the logic of intentionality. (This is the fifth item by Suárez to appear in Marquette's Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation, a series which should be in every philosophy library.)

Analogical predication has always been a central issue for neo-

Thomists. In **On Analogy: An Essay Historical and Systematic** (Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, DM 19), Ralf M.W. Stammberger traces the origin of the concept in Plato (ontological) and in Aristotle (logical), moves into Aquinas (logical but drawing in the principle of the similarity of cause and effect), discusses recent Anglo-American accounts (all unsatisfactory), and concludes with his own proposal: recent theories of meaning, especially Hilary Putnam's, dissolve the traditional problem of analogy since it presupposes that meaning can be established independently of cultural context. In fact, 'the unity of the world implies the relatedness of the things that make up the world', which is why analogy is 'a basic concept for philosophy' (p. 69). There is nothing uniquely difficult about religious language: analogy of predication is no problem either there or anywhere else. This elegant essay of some seventy pages would be fruitfully developed into a book. The bibliography, half as long as the text, is very interesting, in what it omits as well as what is included.

As regards recent books directly related to St Thomas himself, all students of his work (even those with Latin!), and anyone interested in the problem of evil, will welcome the very readable and accurate translation made by Jean Oesterle and her late husband John of the disputed questions *De Malo : On Evil* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1995, \$49.95). This is an extremely important work, covering the nature, causes and diversity of sin, as well as a detailed discussion of the seven deadly sins, together with a question on *acedia* and a lengthy analysis of the psychology of the demons. It was probably composed about the time that Aquinas began on the second part of the *Summa Theologiae* and might thus be studied for the light that it casts on his final thoughts.

Thomas S. Hibbs, in **Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas: An Interpretation of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*** (Notre Dame Press, 1995, \$34.95), argues that, contrary to the received reading of the work as a missionary or apologetic handbook, the intended readership is Christian and the subject is Christian wisdom. The title, as he says, is suspect, since the manuscripts favour *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium*, which both helps and somewhat weakens his thesis. On the one hand, it is a *book*, able to deal with specific issues without being obliged, like a *summa*, to cover everything. On the other hand, Hibbs wants it to be a book that confronts the wisdom of the Greek philosophers (the *gentiles*), dialectically, with the wisdom of Christian theology, and not simply a refutation of the errors of the infidels. 'No other work of Thomas focuses on the great debates of antiquity over the best way of life and over who teaches authoritatively concerning the highest good' (p. 3). Above all, then, Thomas uses Aristotle to highlight 'the incompleteness of, and the dialectical anguish attendant upon, philosophical reflection about the end' (p. 111). He repeatedly quotes Aristotle in support of the concept of a transcendent end, but also cites his thesis that we can attain only imperfect happiness. Scripture confirms the limits to our natural capacities but also counteracts any temptation to

despair concerning the highest good. According to Hibbs, St Thomas reads Aristotle, going beyond the letter of the texts, in such a way as to save the philosophical basis of natural desire for, and the possibility of, ultimately fulfilling beatitude — without, however, diminishing the mystery of faith and the supernatural character of the dispensation of beatitude. As Hibbs insists, the term 'happiness' is analogical, in Aquinas, which is why he need abandon neither 'imperfect happiness' nor 'natural desire for God'. These slogans, shibboleths even, in the pre-Vatican II controversies, need never have set the modern followers of Suárez and Cajetan over against admirers of Henri de Lubac SJ and his famous book *Surnaturel* (1946). If our end is not naturally desirable to us, Hibbs asks, would pursuing it not mean substituting one nature for another? But, as Aquinas writes: 'If something essential should be either subtracted from or added to a nature, immediately it will be another nature'. That is to say, bereft of any natural openness to the beatific vision, the supernatural exalting of our nature in the dispensation of grace would not be the perfecting of our nature but the destruction of one nature and the substitution of another. Thomas insist that, for all the difference between creatures and the Creator, the two natures are 'not utterly foreign as sound is to sight or an immaterial substance is to sense'. That does not mean, on the other hand, that he ever suggests that the natural desire to see God in any way anticipates the gift. Hibbs quotes Hans Urs von Balthasar's criticism of transcendental Thomists on the grounds that they threaten to negate the 'drama of finite and infinite freedoms' by anticipating the dispensation of grace in the experience of transcendental subjectivity — *this* Thomism would be a form of neo-Platonism (p. 114). Once again, although this is only one theme in an immensely rich and satisfying book, surely the finest reading of the *Contra Gentiles*, Aquinas turns out to be at the centre of a perennial dispute — or, rather, he offers a way out of the supposed dilemma.

Aquinas certainly offers a way out of the impasse in Catholic moral theology. It is good to have **The Sources of Christian Ethics** (T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1995, £19.95), by Servais Pinckaers OP, professor of moral theology at the University of Fribourg, well translated into English. For a long time, ethics as a university subject has been dominated by a concern with right and wrong, with the options thought to be either utilitarianism or Kantianism. Within Catholic moral theology, the conflict is between proportionalists and antiproportionalists, in effect over whether any human act can be intrinsically evil.

Ancient theories of ethics, based on notions of virtue and happiness, offer attractive ways out of what seems a sterile and increasingly bitter debate. Previously dismissed by Kantians as egoistic and dependent on metaphysics of a teleological kind, the ethics of Aristotle in particular look like a good option for making sense of the demands and possibilities of morality. The contribution of classical scholars has been decisive, with such books as **The Morality of Happiness** (Oxford University Press, 1993, paperback 1995), by Julia Annas, now at the University of Arizona,

surely the best single book on ancient ethical theory, bringing careful textual analysis together with acute sensitivity to problems in modern moral philosophy. In recent years, as she notes, the option between consequentialist and deontological ways of thinking in ethics has come to seem 'deeply inadequate' (p. 4): 'If this is our option, then we must choose between calculating consequences to discover the right way to act, or rely [*sic*] on moral rules to guide us positively and negatively'. But this, she says, is 'to take a modern journey with a mediaeval map' — by which she means a map that leaves whole areas blank. Aquinas gets one mention in a book of 450 pages (as having the notion of natural law that can be traced from Cicero to Hobbes and Locke, p. 306). Philosophers have begun to take seriously, Annas says, the idea that morality might have to do with the agent's view of his or her life, with happiness, character and virtue, practical reasoning and the emotions. Consequentialist appeal to benefit and Kantian rule-following need to be integrated in a virtue-based ethics. In this marvellous book, Annas paints into her 'mediaeval' map an entirely convincing picture of the 'virtue ethics' to be found in ancient philosophy.

Classical scholarship is not the only resource. No philosopher has done more than Philippa Foot to focus interest in virtue ethics, from her first published essays in the late 1950s to her collected papers *Virtues and Vices*, published in 1978. In tribute, **Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory**, edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), with a splendid photograph on the wrapper, and a bibliography of her works, brings together twelve eminent philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic in exploration of various topics to which she has made a distinctive contribution. The volume opens with a formidable essay by G.E.M. Anscombe on practical reasoning (written in 1974, reprinted from the Library of Living Philosophers volume on Georg von Wright), followed by a defence of Humean projectivism by Simon Blackburn, Hursthouse on 'applying virtue ethics' (opponents say that it does not tell you what to do in a moral dilemma), Anthony Kenny on the principle of double effect, Lawrence on the rationality of morality, John McDowell on Aristotelianism but arguing that 'modern readers will always be prone to misinterpret Aristotle if they read him without first immunizing themselves against the damaging effects of modern philosophy' (p. 179). And much else besides. It is hard to think of any single book which would be a better introduction to the present state of play in Anglo-American moral philosophy. (None of the four references to Aquinas has anything to do with his being an exponent of 'virtue ethics'.)

In the wave of recent defences of virtue ethics we note **From Morality to Virtue** (Oxford University Press, 1992, paperback 1995, £12.95) by Michael Slote, a very valuable systematic study (one mention of Aquinas: we have no obligation of gratitude to ourselves for things we have done on our own behalf, p. 56), and **Character** (Oxford University Press, 1991, paperback 1995, £10.99) by Joel Kupperman, a stylish

insistence, over against the utilitarian and Kantian traditions, that a person's *character* is central to moral decision (no mention of Aquinas at all).

In **Happiness and the Limits of Satisfaction** (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 1996), Deal W. Hudson, currently president of the American Maritain Association and an editor of *The Future of Thomism* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), provides an invaluable account, for non-specialists as well as students of philosophy and theology, of virtue ethics. He seeks to retrieve the classical understanding of human life as the pursuit of happiness in an environment where happiness is customarily connected with pleasure, feeling good, and so on.

But we have to turn to Servais Pinckaers to find a reading of St Thomas as the author of a version of Christian ethics based on the virtues, gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the Beatitudes. As far as the internal neo-Thomist debates go, Pinckaers sides firmly with those who think Aquinas needs to be studied through his forebears and not through his commentators (Cajetan, Suárez et al.). He insists that Aquinas's moral thought is deeply evangelical, rooted in St Matthew, the Epistle to the Romans and certain texts of St Augustine as much as in Aristotle. His story is that the development of legalistic casuistry in the sixteenth century repressed the ancient and Thomist conception of the virtues as expressions of a graced connaturality between the moral agent and the true good. Duns Scotus is referred to twice: once as an exemplar of 'the importance and richness of the Franciscan school ... which was the self-styled guardian of the Augustinian tradition' (p. 240), and secondly as the master of William of Ockham (p. 245).

Ockham (c. 1285–1347), the Englishman who never received his master's degree at Oxford because the chancellor accused him of holding dangerous doctrines, is certainly the enemy in Pinckaers's book. 'Make no mistake: the demolition — and the word is chosen with precision — of St Thomas's moral teaching by Ockham and the nominalists was no unfortunate accident' (p. 338). On the contrary, with his notion of the 'freedom of indifference' Ockham inaugurated a breach between freedom and natural inclination to the true and the good which led in due course to Nietzschean voluntarism and Sartrean existentialism. Kant responded with an ethics of obligation, and in Catholic theology as elsewhere, even among Thomists (p. 352), our natural inclination to the good and to happiness was no longer recognized to be the condition of our freedom. There are simply two entirely different concepts of freedom, depending on whether freedom is self-affirmation in a hostile world or consent to the sovereignty of the good. The whole argument of Pinckaers's splendid book is relevant to the work of Philippa Foot, Julia Annas, and many others, in the Anglo-American tradition. There is at least one mediaeval thinker whose magnificent exposition of virtue ethics deserves more attention — not only by moral philosophers but also by moral theologians and pastors in the Catholic Church, by whom it has largely been ignored.