

# THE PSYCHOLOGY OF "MINE"

LEON LITWINSKI

*Summary:* (1) Property a psychic link. W. James on self and mine. (2) Acquisition and conservation in the light of expectation. (3) Expectation in philosophy and psychology. (4) Baldwin and property. (5) Bentham. (6) Why acquisitions are conserved. (7) Property as the basis of expectation and as witness of foresight. (8) Possessive pronouns. (9) Animals and children. (10) Property viewed objectively by Petrucci and subjectively by Bentham.

(1) Throughout the following article I propose to consider the phenomena of acquisition and of possession, taken in their widest sense, i.e. comprising the acquisition and conservation of wealth, both material and non-material.

"Tell me—one might say—what you possess by way of lodging, furniture and tools, clothing, provisions and reserves, knowledge and ideas, relationships, links and attachments, etc., and I shall tell you exactly who you are."

"If you own nothing of all this, you are nothing."

One is somebody in the proportion of material and moral goods one possesses.

This is the reason why W. James could say that the *self*, taken in its broadest sense, envelops all that a man can call *his own* (*Précis de Psychologie*, p. 228).

The notion of *expectation* (in French *attente*, in Latin *ex-pectare*, i.e. to look out for, in German *Erwartung*, in Italian *aspettazione*, *attesa*) leads us to a revision of our ideas upon the ultimate character of a fundamental link in man's activity.

In the application of this notion of expectation to the links which the *self* creates and entertains with the outside world, taken in its most varied aspects, we shall try to remain within the boundaries of contemporary psychology. We shall undertake to demonstrate that the classic notions, as they appear in the handbooks and summaries on psychology, such as memory, interest, attention, etc., may easily be applied and verified in the instances taken from real life, as selected by us.

In his study on personality, Ch. Blondel justly took his inspiration from this idea of W. James's. According to Ch. Blondel (*Traité de Psychologie*, p. 534), the "self" never appears without bringing "mine" in its wake. My men, my workers, my soldiers, we talk of them all as though these beings were ourselves, incorporated in us.

(2) To devote one's attention to "mine" is in fact to understand the essence of personality. I propose to do so here with a view to extrac-

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ting a clearer picture of the phenomenon of acquisition, both material and non-material, among men.

I say material and non-material, for although as a rule we confine ourselves above all to material possession, it is evident that both ideas and objects can be equally well acquired and conserved, can be worked upon, transferred and abandoned. The *acquisition* of ideas is nothing else than their perception. Ideas may correspond either to concrete objects or to abstract ideas.

We say: "I have abandoned all my youthful illusions," which means: "I have detached myself from ideas I once cherished."

As I have satisfied myself that my ideas were wrong, dangerous, ridiculous, I am no longer linked to them, they have become foreign to my soul, I do not expect any good to accrue from holding them any longer.

This, therefore, is clearly a question of a *link of expectation*.

As to the conservation of ideas, it depends upon the memory in so far as we are gifted with the aptitude of *reproducing* them.

In short, it is by way of perception that one acquires ideas and it is through the memory that one conserves them.

Just like a household, a shop, a workshop, or a business, memory tries continually to organize itself within its mental scope, by putting things in order, avoiding over-crowding, advancing to an objective, economizing efforts, and struggling for an easier existence. With this end in view, certain ideas, certain relationships, are abandoned, must give way to others, are substituted, removed, or consigned to oblivion, just like material things that have grown too old, or have become useless, depreciated or dangerous.

The acquisition of material objects, of ideas, of relationships, whether due to sensorial experience within which our organic activity takes place, or due to our social experience within which our will-power is set in action on a large scale, always implies a *selection*. This selection is ruled by *interest* which governs it both at the moment of acquisition and during the period of conservation, in the latter working through ideas about the future, as based upon past experience. We direct ourselves through the mechanism of *attention*. According to Ebbinghaus (*Précis de Psychologie*), our attention becomes voluntary as soon as it becomes *provident*. It is the absence of all voluntary choice that explains the puzzling embarrassment of the man who comes unexpectedly into a legacy, or the comic element in winning the first prize in a lottery, a situation often quite grotesque and which has been made excellent use of by the novel, the film, and the theatre.

The *milieu* in which man leads his existence admits of three essential elements, in the presence of which he must continually act and react. These elements are: climate, nourishment and society.

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Bound to maintain his thermic equilibrium, on pain of extinction, man has recourse to nourishment and clothing. He does not find them always freely within reach. At the lowest stage of his evolution, man contents himself, to this effect, with establishing essentially unstable relationships of simple *appropriation* (detention, occupation). As his activity goes on developing, he transforms such relationships more and more into those of *possession* (stage of growing providence). And as social life advances and crystallizes, individual possession becomes coupled or more or less protected by social acknowledgment, and is called property.

The term *property* corresponds, therefore, to the most developed stage of the phenomenon with which we are dealing here. Property is consequently more complex than appropriation or possession, since it is the more provident and the least precarious of the three. It is also the most varied. We may, for instance, be proprietors or owners of objects that we have never appropriated. In the paper published in 1913, I pointed out the different aspects of this problem. ("Qu'est-ce que la propriété" in the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, Paris, 1913.) I analysed therein the indispensable conditions under which *appropriation*, *acquisition*, *possession*, and *property* are liable to appear.<sup>1</sup>

It is in this laboratory of "mine" that the work is unceasingly carried on to which we owe all that constitutes our personality. This personality is a result of our inborn tendencies, our preferences, our character, or absence of character.

We surround ourselves with objects, ideas, links, and incessantly we go on increasing or diminishing their number or their intensity. The different things attached to "mine" are not felt ours equally to the same extent. In our conscience we elaborate a hierarchy of their relative values. We prefer a building of bricks to one of wood, our mother to our mother-in-law, honour to money or vice-versa. There are ideas that we cultivate, and ideas against which we protest or defend ourselves.

Everybody knows the contempt of Diogenes for objects with which others greedily strive to surround themselves. He used to walk bare-footed all the year round, slept wrapt up in his only cloak, and used a barrel for his dwelling. He is said one day to have seen a child at a well drinking water out of the hollow of its hand. "This child shows me that I am still keeping superfluous things," exclaimed Diogenes, and smashed the bowl he had used for drinking. Diogenes set most value on spiritual acquisitions. A miser, on the contrary,

<sup>1</sup> From the juristic point of view, possession, i.e. the fact of exercising power over an object, is, under certain conditions, generative of the right of property. In this sense, to possess is equivalent to exercising a real right over an object, it being immaterial whether this right has been recognized or not.

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grows to be enslaved by the very objects which he heaps up around himself, utterly at a loss to know what to do with them. For him life becomes a burden, a load that is often unbearable.

Socrates, visiting one day the soukhs of Athenes, cried out joyfully: "How many things there are that I simply don't want!"

The position is the same if, after having observed the links of expectation that attach us to material objects, we turn to the world of spiritual ties, and to the world of social ties.

Our minds gather such a wealth of ideas and knowledge that we are unable to classify. Our faculties are overburdened. The mind is so to speak congested and confused.

On the other hand, it may be that the mind is so bare of ideas that for lack of associations we can retain very little in it.

The social relations we entertain may become so numerous, intense and absorbing that we can no longer follow them up. Relationships, which were once cordial and vigourous, relax after a time, become stale and tiresome. If we think of the worldly life we are tempted to say with Talleyrand that life would be easy to bear were it not for its pleasures.

There are others, however, who for lack of social ties become recluses, hermits and strays.

Between these two extremes is the perfectly balanced man whose rule is "nothing too much," who suffers from neither excess nor want of objects, ideas, or social ties.

(3) Up to now we have dwelt above all upon the *extent* and *intensity* of the phenomenon of acquisition and conservation among men.

Let us pass on now and consider more particularly the psychological nature of the link that attaches the self to the outside world.

The nature of this psychological link was first revealed by Bentham in his "Principles of the Civil Code" (Part 1, Chapter VIII), published some 125 years ago. It is true that in his study on property conceived as a link of expectation, Bentham confines himself to links between man and the objects of the outside world. In a couple of pages Bentham defines these links by the concept of expectation, unaware that the concept in question, far from being applicable exclusively to the material objects of the outside world which are tied to their holder, possessor or proprietor, can be extended to every important class of new objects or ideas, and in fact creates a category not only in the Aristotelian sense but also in the sense given to this term by J. M. Baldwin (in "The Origin of a Thing and its Nature," *Psychological Review*, 1895). In English philosophy and language this notion of expectation is, however, familiar also to some predecessors of Bentham's, such as Shaftesbury, Hume and T. Reids. (I have found it, incidentally, even in Seneca.)

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After Bentham, it was used by J. Mill, Baldwin and Ward. Hume employed it in his theory of causality, and Mill in his considerations on the uniformity of nature and his theory of probability.

In France, Lalande in his "Vocabulaire de la philosophie" (1926) merely states that it was Pierre Janet who first used the term, expectation, in his courses at the Collège de France, particularly in his "Analysis of Tendencies" (1907) and in "The Evolution of Memory and the Notion of Time" (1922), and that he gave it the following technical significance as regards the psychology of reaction:

"Expectation is quite a special activity which plays a considerable part in a great many psychological facts, especially in the construction of duration and time. In order to understand this activity it is necessary to recall the various stages of activating a tendency (the activation of a tendency), the principal ones being latency, erethism, wish, effort, consummation, triumph . . . Expectation consists in maintaining this tendency towards the stage of erethism, in inhibiting all kinds of derivation and disposition towards a rash consummation. This difficult work brings about tiredness and emotions, and gives occasion to many neurotic disorders."

In colloquial French the word "attente" (expectation) is used in the case of expectation based upon a promise. One *expects* a thing that one believes to be probable.

In Germany, the notion of expectation ("Erwartung") is found in Leibnitz in the form of cognition, and Kant conceived it as an empirical prevision or prescience of analogous cases. Among German psychologists and philosophers, Wundt regards expectation as a state in which our attention is projected not in relation to an actually present impression but rather in relation to a future impression or eventually in relation to a plurality of possible impressions (*Grdz. Ph. Psych.*, III, 346).

For Lazarus, expectation is a kind of predisposition, a "Bereitschaft zur Apperzeption" (*Leben der Seele*, II, 31).

According to Nahkowsky, to expect is to anticipate a future result "durch die denselben voraneilenden Reproduktionen" (*Das Gefühlsleben*, p. 96).

For Cornelius, each experience is part of a "Erwartungszusammenhang" (*Einkl. in d. Philos.*, p. 152).

Stöher visualizes expectation as predisposition towards a movement—"Bewegungsbereitschaft" (*Psych.*, p. 350).

(4) Among contemporary psychologists J. M. Baldwin has given to the notion of expectation the position due to it as a fundamental attitude of man's mind.

In the work referred to above, Baldwin distinguishes two fundamental attitudes that arise from the contemplation of an object—the retrospective attitude, and the prospective attitude. Baldwin

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maintains that all mental contents play a double function in mental life. Hence two attitudes throughout man's progressive development.

In so far as we conform to acquired habits, we display a retrospective attitude; in so far as our mental content has not been entirely used up in pursuing these habits, it originates an expectant or prospective attitude. So that, Baldwin concludes, the ultimate conception of reality calls in the aid of a category capable of reconciling these two attitudes in one way or another.

According to Baldwin, *expectation* is the term by which this composite attitude towards reality should conveniently be called. Mill described it, in the case of the outside world, as a "permanent possibility of sensation." Put in more adequate words, it is the voluntary control of a memory series so as to reproduce reality, or truth, in its original aspect under the constraining pressure of the conditions governing the limitation of activity.

Thus, the present value of a thing consists largely in the future services we expect it to be able to render, and this is neither more or less than what it has performed in the past. So that the conception we form in our mind of a thing is made up both of its past career and of our expectation as regards its future career.

If Baldwin had been acquainted with Bentham's theory of property—for we presume he was not so—he would have readily agreed with Bentham, and consequently with the development we are giving to the latter's theory, i.e. we acquire a thing, and idea or social link, simply because we think it capable of a future career and in view of the interest we have in it.

Baldwin, however, did not take this step towards the phenomena of acquisition and conservation, though he realized its importance. He simply states, with regard to property, as follows: "Psychologically, the 'acquisition impulse, or instinct,' as it is called, seems to be very deeply rooted and to require recognition. Its existence is a refutation of the view which makes property rights conventional, or artificial. Its utility, from the general point of view, is so great—extending into all details of personal life from the earliest period—that its survival and evolution would seem to be simply a great sociological fact" (*Dic. of Ph. and Psych.*, p. 360).

(5) As to Bentham, he has not enquired deeply into the notion of expectation. Indeed, I do not know he chanced to hit upon it. Bentham is known to have experienced great difficulty in expressing his conceptions in words. He was unable to create an organized whole out of the mass of scattered notes accumulated haphazard in the course of his observations and reflections.

Is this a serious, an irretrievable defect? Be this as it may, the practical Bentham found a solution for giving expression to his fruitful ideas.



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Bentham was undoubtedly weak in the art of demonstration, but he *did have ideas*, which after all is what really matters. In addition, he had a passion for travelling. He visited France, Switzerland, Germany, Russia. When in Switzerland, he made friends with E. Dumont, a member of the Representative Council of Geneva, who excelled in literary composition. Bentham gave him his notes, and thanks to Dumont these were eventually published under the title "Principes du Code Civil."<sup>1</sup>

(6) But let us revert to the notion of expectation in its relations with the acquisition of material or non-material things, intended for a more or less long and stable conservation. And let us submit it to a closer analysis.

It is generally considered that appropriation springs from a very deep-rooted tendency, but man does not appropriate things, nor does he acquire relationships, or ideas, without *discrimination*. Such is the case already with primitive men, and with the child. Suffice it to examine the pocket of a small boy. Here you will come across an already more or less organized system of acquisition. The interest of the boy presides over the selection of his little treasures. Protected by his parents, as a general rule, a child does not think about clothing or, except for sweetmeats, about food. Of these he is assured thanks to his guardians. His attention is directed towards things which have a meaning for him but which he does not easily find within reach, or which for one reason or another he is being systematically refused. It is considerations of this kind that are at work in his mind at the moment of his performing an act of acquisition with a view to future possession, and it is also from that moment that a link of expectation is established between the *self* and the object, now qualified as "mine." It is interest guided by the mechanism of attention that plays its rôle in the act of acquisition.

Now, once the thing has been acquired, thanks to one method of appropriation or another—the thing may have been seized, stolen, found, received, bought, etc.—it happens that its possession makes us regret the wish to have it.

"Nothing but the struggle pleases us—says Pascal—never the

<sup>1</sup> In Macaulay's *Works*, I came across the opinion expressed by the great English historian on the relation which existed between Mr. Bentham and M. Dumont. "The raw material," says Macaulay, "which Mr. Bentham furnished was most precious; but it was unmarketable. He was, assuredly, at once a great logician and a great rhetorician. But the effect of his logic was injured by a vicious arrangement and the effect of his rhetoric by a vicious style. His mind was vigorous, comprehensive, subtle, fertile of arguments, fertile of illustrations. But he spoke in an unknown tongue; and, that the congregation might be edified, it was necessary that some brother having the gift of interpretation should expound the invaluable jargon . . . M. Dumont was admirably qualified to supply what was wanting in Mr. Bentham" (Vol. V, p. 613).

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victory . . . We never seek for things, we seek to find again *the thing!*"

Why, then, do we keep things nevertheless, and why do we conserve them once the need or the desire for them has been gratified?

The reason is that our needs, our desires, our passions, are rhythmic just like so many other things in nature (day and night, summer and winter, etc.). It is because from past experience we know that our needs come to life again, that they repeat themselves. It is because the things we covet in life (with the exception of air, for instance, which owing to its abundance is, we feel, worthless as an object for appropriation) are either limited in number or scattered about, or rare, or not to be found in nature, or in the world. It is for all these various reasons that acquisition, through the objects it aims at, goes beyond the present moment, and survives so to speak in the form of conservation of varying range and duration.

We keep a pen-knife not because we are tied up to it like to our body, but because we know from past experience that it may come in useful later on.

We keep up our relations and social links because we reckon to profit by them in the future.

We preserve our knowledge and ideas, often acquired only by dint of great exertion, because we know that they will be needed, that they will have to be resorted to for help.

In short, we expect future services from all these different things, which, however, does not prevent the links attaching these things to our consciousness from being in perpetual movement. They tighten or relax, according to the requirements of life.

(7) Our objects, our fellow-men, our animals, our knowledge, our ideas, our relations, all of them are for us so many bases of expectation, provided that we can, by our own means or otherwise, get possession of them or conserve them, whether with or without help from the protection of society, in its different forms (customs, laws, etc.).

But the origin of appropriation does not depend solely on the abundance or scarcity of things. It depends equally on the degree of man's foresight.

A study of the links of expectation relating mankind to things or other beings, reveals considerable differences as to the degree of foresight between individuals and also between whole races or peoples. Thus it has been possible to say that the yellow races live in the past, the black ones in the present, and the white in the future.

The faculty of projecting our *self* towards the future is the most important of all psychic functions from the point of view of biology, in the evolution of man towards the conquests of civilization.



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The barometer of foresight, registering varying degrees in the exercise of the faculty of foresight among different individuals, or different peoples or races, reveals at the same time our different capacities in the struggle for existence, our capacities to persist and to survive.

“All that ‘we have been’—remarks Blondel—has often only an aesthetic or historical interest for us; alone ‘what we shall come to be’ has an actual and living interest. In time, as in space, it is natural for us to look ahead. In order to look back, the mind, like the body, has—so to speak—to turn round, in a kind of forced flexion. The consciousness is, therefore, concerned above all with ‘what I am going to do’ and with ‘what I am going to be’; in this respect the past is for the consciousness simply an enquiry office where it can get information on this point. It is for the morrow that we live” (p. 551).

The mother dreams of her child’s future. She thinks herself justified in expecting a great deal of that future, far more when her child is still a baby than she will later on when he has grown up into adolescence, or attained his majority. The hard realities of existence will see to the extinction one by one of the mother’s day-dreams—dreams sprung from the purest and most disinterested love. “What will he become?” asks the mother, bending lovingly over her baby’s cradle. “Composer, President of the Republic, Pope, Bishop, Minister, Physician?” He persistently sings out of tune, maintains a peculiarly stubborn indifference to sounds and noises—he will be no Chopin. The Republic is swept away by a monarchist revolution—baby will not be President. Baby grows up into a young man. He becomes engaged to a girl—he cannot now become Pope or Bishop. Another Minister has been assassinated. It is becoming positively habitual—he must not take up such a dangerous career. He fails irremediably in his leaving examination—he won’t become a Physician. But, on the other hand, he is very obedient, never discusses orders—he becomes a soldier. Willy-nilly, Mother resigns herself to her fate. She is appeased.

The career of men, as compared with that of women, being richer in events and possibilities, and consequently richer in expectations, parents generally attach greater importance to the birth of sons than to that of daughters.

Herbert Spencer, in his analysis of the sentiment of love, finds that the sentiment of possession plays a part in it. The two lovers *belong* to each other, they claim each other as a kind of property.

The question is sometimes discussed whether it is better to love or to be loved, a distinction which corresponds exactly to the Aristotelian one of active pleasure as opposed to passive pleasure. From the point of view of the relative strength of expectation, one may

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reply that the point is rather *to love each other mutually*, for, in that case, love becomes two-sided instead of being one-sided. From the point of view of security in love, there exists then assurance and counter-assurance. Jealousy in love comes from lack of sufficient security.

Let us consider an example of disappointed expectation.

I have bought a tool because I expect it to be of use to me.

The possession of this tool is the basis of my expectation that I shall be able to make good use of it in case of need. This is part of my thought projected towards the future.

To my feeling of expectation, as regards my tool, is associated a more or less strong, and a more or less actual feeling of uneasiness, since I may lose my tool, or I may be deprived of it as a result of theft, etc., against which, on the other hand, I am protected by law, by the teaching of the Church, by an insurance policy, by the care of watchman, by the vigilance of my dog, etc. All these guarantees and precautions taken together constitute in my mind a certain degree of security, of which my tool is the object. But all of a sudden, the thief in connivance with *my* watchman succeeds in stealing my tool, in depriving me of it. Thus my legitimate expectation of my being able to make free use of it in case of need comes abruptly to an end.

In the rather clumsy terminology of Bentham, to steal is to commit a serious offence against the sentiment of legitimate expectation, justified by the actual possession of an object in a society that is organized from the point of view of security.

To be unwilling to give back, wholly or in part, an object lent is likewise an attack upon the sentiment of expectation, although apparently a less grave one than that outlined above.

Not to be able to do it, or to delay doing it, or to hesitate in doing it, is an attack of similar nature, but deserving less blame than those in the above instances.

Deceit, treachery, lack of loyalty, fidelity, etc., represent another series of cases where attack is made upon psychical facts, such as confidence or faith.

A child's confidence in its mother is absolute and deep. This confidence need not be safe-guarded or guaranteed either by the society or otherwise.

In saying "*mère*" (mother) the French child acknowledges in principle a state of parenthood. In saying "*maman*" (*my* mother) it expresses more than that. It lays an affectionate stress upon it, it accentuates the existence of a link of expectation of quite an exceptional security. Its conscience, its instinct tell the child that it may rely upon its mother in all circumstances. The attachment of the mother for her child constitutes for the latter a firm foundation,

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the rock on which it bases its expectation projected towards the future.

But this gratuitous confidence expressed in a serene (because strong) expectation may in certain circumstances also be of quite a general character, i.e. an entirely superficial expectation, without analysis, without reflexion, almost without consciousness.

(8) The French say "*monsieur*," "*madame*," "*mademoiselle*," without first measuring or weighing either the social status of the person thus addressed, or the significance of the fact that they come upon him, or her, for the first and perhaps also for the last time.

One would say that thanks to a simple possessive prefix, added without too much discrimination to a "*sieur*" or to a "*dame*," they wish to extend the range of persons to whom they owe and pay a tribute of respect, thus including them in the great family of their respectable fellow-men or women, worthy of confidence. Incidentally, they also say "*mon Dieu*" (my God), although at times they use as well "*bon Dieu*" (good God).

In times of yore they favoured, in France, the expression "*monseigneur*" (my Lord). This was a somewhat more precise formula. While establishing the link with the ego, it took care to accentuate at the same time, the difference in status, dependance and hierarchy.

"*Mon général*," in the language of a sergeant addressing himself to a general, ultimately means to say that he regards himself as "belonging" to the former. But this same general, in addressing himself to the sergeant, does not call him "*mon sergent*," but simply "*sergent*." If he ever calls him "*mon sergent*" (my sergeant), this is when he talks about him to someone else and wishes to emphasize the fact that this particular sergeant serves under his orders. In this case, however, we are no longer in the field of general relationship among members of a determined society. We are rather in the domain of social relations in a special hierarchy.

(9) Is it possible to speak of expectation among animals? Does the animal world also evince the phenomena of attention, memory, abstract thinking, etc.?

The psychologists and sociologists are not as yet in agreement on this point, or else make reservations. It must be admitted that, on the whole, man is ill-placed for understanding exactly what in fact is going on in the brain of an animal. It is already very difficult to understand and to judge the mind of a child, or of a savage. And sometimes it is simply a mistake to try to interpret animal mind in terms of human mind.<sup>1</sup>

If the sentiment of the ego, the sentiment of personal identity,

<sup>1</sup> For more detailed development of possession in animal psychology, see my "Is there an Instinct of Possession?" (*The British Journal of Psychology*, July 1942).

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the consciousness in short, does form the primary and fundamental *condition* of the phenomena of acquisition and of conservation, with which we have been dealing above, it is obvious that such highly evolved phenomena are not to be observed among living animals, whether gregarious or otherwise.

In order to trace the phenomena of *mine*, it is above all necessary that the *ego* be constituted.

Now, animals have consciousness, but they have no consciousness of their consciousness.

As regards the child, he at first talks of himself as of an object. At first he does not know himself as a subject. He has no clear consciousness of himself. His ego is built up gradually, and only when this process is achieved the notion of his ego crystallizes up in his consciousness.

(10) Contrary to Petrucci,<sup>1</sup> Bentham looks upon property subjectively, i.e. from insight. Writing a treatise on the "Principles of Civil Code," Bentham, curiously enough, does not make any striking contribution to the legal theory of property as commonly understood, but he puts forward a conception of high psychological interest. Unlike many others, he does not see in possession simply an exercise of physical power over an object but an exercise of psychical power as well, the power of foresight. It is true that we do not possess anything on the moon because its riches are out of our grasp. But it is equally true that man would not possess anything on the earth also if he were completely lacking in the power of expectation which is the psychological key for the explanation of the phenomena which are the object of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> According to the author of the *Natural Origins of Ownership* (Brussels, 1908) property is a natural fact responding to the necessities of adaptation and applicable also to the animal and vegetable worlds (pp. 1 and 3, Chapter VI, and conclusion, p. 219). Thus for Petrucci, every object must be considered as the true owner of the space it occupies.