

the communion service in cathedrals, and Elizabeth insisted on copes being worn in her Royal Chapel (see, e.g., the Old Cheque-Book of the Chapel Royal, Easter Day 1593). A plain cope was not illegal. Since, however, in most Elizabethan parishes, communion was celebrated only three times a year, and since many clergy even resented wearing the surplice, it is no surprise that the Whitaker cope was sold. For Elizabethan Eucharistic piety, Kaufman draws on Christopher Sutton's *Godly Meditations*, 1601. The problem with this is that Sutton drew on the Italian Jesuit Luca Pinelli's *Meditatione brevi del sanctissimo sacramento*, and Sutton himself was more aligned to the piety of Lancelot Andrewes, and he was not representative of the more typical "godly" churchmen. The term "Calvinist" is used very broadly to a point of being unhelpful, since the sacramental theology of Elizabethan churchmen, though Reformed, differed widely. It is unfathomable how Kaufman came to the conclusion that the 1559 text of Cranmer's 1552 rite was influenced by John Calvin. Cranmer's favorite reformation theologians were Oecolampadius and Zwingli, and Cranmer's symbolic memorialism, which spills over at times into the symbolic parallelism of the early Bucer and the mature Bullinger, was not the symbolic instrumentalism of Calvin. There is simply no textual evidence that Cranmer's liturgical texts were inspired by the Genevan reformer. The bibliography lacks any references to liturgical studies, and had some been consulted, these errors could have been avoided.

There is also some curiosity lacking when Kaufman cites what in her own argument is an obvious anomaly. In parish accounts for Shipdham, Norfolk, in 1564, there are records of wine purchase for communion for obvious festivals, but also for Candlemas, Corpus Christi, and St. Faith. Given that communion was normally only three times a year, what was going on here? In the 1559 Prayer Book, St. Faith was a black letter day and not marked liturgically; the 2nd of February is called the Purification, not Candlemas; and Corpus Christi has been abolished. Was the churchwarden a closet Catholic, or was wine being purchased for some undisclosed reasons? Unless the priest was a hold-over from the Henrician and/or Marian Church, it is hard to explain these entries, but some attempt is needed. Kaufman rightly notes the flexibility allowed to parishes to make some adjustments, and the change in terminology in accounts may have much to do with a change of incumbent or churchwarden. The "godly" Richard Rogers, Vicar of Great Dunmow, Essex 1561–64, probably allowed far less of the old terminology and customs in his parish than was allowed by Christopher Trychay of Morebath. How the laity played a part in trying to preserve older customs and terminology would be an interesting sequel to this book.

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## Martin Mulsow. *Knowledge Lost: A New View of Early Modern Intellectual History*

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*Knowledge Lost* is a beautiful translation of a work that was originally published in 2012 as *Prekäres Wissen*. Readers of this journal who specialize in early modern history or who work

on intellectual history of any era will want to explore this thrilling book for its methodological insights. When this book was first published, the history of knowledge was emerging in Germany as an alternative to intellectual history. *Prekäres Wissen* quickly became a classic in this new field. Intellectual history, or the history of how great men produced great ideas, had already been challenged by scholars working on subaltern epistemologies. In coruscating insights, unusual vantage points, and relentless salvos of critical questions, Mulsow simultaneously further knocked intellectual history sideways while also demonstrating a way forward.

By focusing on the “knowledge precariat” rather than the “knowledge bourgeoisie,” Mulsow perches the history of knowledge on a tightrope rather than lodging it on a pedestal. In his account, not-so-great men produced knowledge that was often endangered. He highlights doubts, narrates emotions, and showcases the relation between power and knowledge production. This approach is more familiar to postcolonial and feminist historians such as Natalie Zemon Davis and Marisa Fuentes forced to read archives “against the grain.” It had not been applied to intellectual history nor to the subjects who frequently feature in intellectual history: white, university-educated, and (usually) Christian men who have left behind copious sources. None of Mulsow’s subjects were as marginalized in knowledge production as were women, non-Christians, and enslaved people. However, Mulsow’s approach could be deployed to open up a broader view of the history of knowledge. Indeed, it already has. As Simone Lässig and Swen Steinberg have written, citing Mulsow’s *Prekäres Wissen*, the history of knowledge “could open perspectives on forms of knowledge developed and used by groups outside the academic sphere ... to historical forms of secret, impeded, and ignored knowledge, to knowledge that was revalued or delegitimized, to knowledge that was stripped of its relevance or declared non-knowledge” (“Knowledge on the Move: New Approaches Toward a History of Migrant Knowledge,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 43, no. 3 [2017]: 313–46, at 320).

By identifying precarious knowledge with the knowledge precariat, Mulsow’s book might inspire several questions. Can sociopolitical and epistemic precariousness diverge? Can the weak create knowledge that is strong? Can the strong create knowledge that is weak? Can precarious humans challenge the weak knowledge promulgated by powerful people?

These questions relate to Mulsow’s frequent borrowings from the history of science, a field which has attended to both the sociology and the content of knowledge. There are a few moments when the epistemological issues at stake – and their relation to social precariousness – could be brought more up to date with the current history of science. Mulsow draws on the work of Benjamin Nelson (1911–1977) who argued that the Scientific Revolution can be defined as the replacement of medieval probabilism with truth (*On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings* [1981]). According to Mulsow, this led to the undermining of truth through the multiplication of conflicting and “ever stronger statements of belief, truth and certainty” in early modernity (141). Current historians of science often argue the reverse, stressing increased probabilism and conjecture. Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston have pointed out how Francis Bacon and others collected “strange facts” in order to query specious claims to universal and systematic truth (*Wonders and the Order of Nature* [1998]). Mulsow draws on this notion of “strange facts” (385–86), yet does not place the fact in a probabilist epistemic landscape. As Barbara Shapiro has established, the fact was drawn from English courtroom practices and sought a pragmatic “moral certainty” rather than philosophical truth. The “culture of facts” also offers an example of how sociopolitically powerful people (such as Francis Bacon or Robert Boyle) aimed for precarious knowledge (*A Culture of Fact: England, 1550–1720* [2000]).

Rather than probabilism, Mulsow poses the notion of a “precarious truth” that resulted from strong statements of heterogeneous truths. Individuals even defended their ability to hold conflicting truths when occupying multiple personae or roles (chapter 2, “The Libertine’s Two Bodies”). They navigated such knowledge heterogeneity through a “complex habitus” (194). Elegance in interpreting the habitus and strategies of his subjects is one of Mulsow’s great achievements in *Knowledge Lost*. Probabilism, however, could offer a simpler alternative, and its history might offer an explanation for why knowledge may have been

particularly precarious in early modernity. There are other instances (chapters 6 and 9) where pre-modern and well-studied hermeneutic approaches might be at play, such as Euhemerism and Christian Biblical criticism. The latter claimed that the Greco-Roman gods and the Hebrew Bible offered only a superficial or sordid covering of deeper, divine meaning. Through the new history of knowledge, one might offer a critical reinterpretation of these practices of appropriating and eviscerating meaning. Arguably, however, the Jenga-like construction of multiple levels of meaning was a successful strategy adopted by the knowledge bourgeoisie in order to render non-Christian people more precarious. The power of people glued together knowledge pieces that in and of themselves were conflicting and thus epistemically precarious.

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## **L. R. Poos. *Love, Hate, and the Law in Tudor England: The Three Wives of Ralph Rishton***

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Ever since Christopher Brooks revealed the full extent of the English litigation boom of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and the “law mindedness” that it encouraged and embodied, increasing numbers of scholars have sought to understand the history of legal institutions and to discern the legal, social, and cultural significance of lawsuits. Others continue to mine the rich seams of evidence that survive in voluminous legal archives, made increasingly accessible by digital finding aids and initiatives such as the Anglo-American Legal Tradition website (that makes available more than 10 million photographs of documents from Westminster courts). The fruits of these labors are transforming understandings of subjects as disparate as state formation and political culture, gender relations, and the nature and extent of “neighborliness.” Yet puzzles remain about the motivations driving individual litigants and about how they navigated, and sometimes sought to exploit, complex legal landscapes made up of multiple overlapping jurisdictions. L.R. Poos’s magisterial study of the legal machinations of a single family from Northwest Lancashire offers insights into both these questions, while also providing a fascinating and important history of a range of matters in England’s north.

Poos’s focus is the Rishton family in the mid-to-late sixteenth century. Drawing upon a remarkable abundance of legal evidence and estate papers, he has painstakingly reconstructed intricate narratives of the Rishtons’ lives that read at times like scenes from a lurid soap opera. Roger Rishton spent years fighting various of his neighbors, physically as well as legally, often over disputed visions of the correct use of sacred space in the chapelry church of Church Kirk. One rival he wounded with an arrow before later taking his pews out of the church and burning them. Roger’s son Ralph, as Poos’s title suggests, embarked on three marriages of questionable validity. In 1531, when he was only nine years old, he married Ellen Towneley who later succumbed to mental illness. Bribing Chester officials, he obtained a forged annulment so that he could marry Elizabeth Parker in 1546 after he made her pregnant and then in 1561 sought to have that marriage annulled so he could marry his mistress, Ann Stanley. She was the wife of a close relation whose property the pair worked to misappropriate.