

the United States, both the Cyrillic Union Catalog and the Slavic Union Catalog (never integrated themselves or combined with the general Union Catalog) stand idle and incomplete for want of funding at the Library of Congress. Neither of them begins to provide the kind of comprehensive coverage of all the serials listed by Schatoff. But even if steps could be taken to revive these established union catalogue efforts, the Schatoff project was not conceived so its data would be compatible with these Library of Congress operations. The Slavic field suffers with many others from the lack of centralized, rigorous, and coordinated bibliographical efforts in the United States. Reference tools such as the Schatoff volumes are obviously the backbone of research, hence deserve considerably more effort and support.

PATRICIA K. GRIMSTED
Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

LETTERS

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Rudnytsky's criticism of *The Cossacks* (*Slavic Review*, December 1972) reveals significant differences of interpretation between us. These differences may be to some extent semantic (for example, over the connotation of the word "nation" as used in the seventeenth century); however, they derive from basic differences of approach, a clearer definition of which may help to promote a better understanding of some important problems concerning the role of Cossackdom in the development of Eastern Europe.

Rudnytsky sees the Ukrainian Cossacks as standard-bearers of national aspirations and inspirers of a national legend, while I regard them as a caste primarily intent on promoting their own economic and social interests. He approaches the subject of Ukrainian Cossackdom as the protagonist of the unique, while my approach stems from an interest in exploring general parallels and relationships. Hence his claim that I have paid insufficient attention to the role of the Cossacks in the development of the Ukrainian nation, and my claim that Rudnytsky's view of the Cossack phenomenon is distorted by a traditional political filter which obscures important historical problems and leads, inevitably, to serious misconceptions. An examination of some specific points which Rudnytsky raises will serve to illustrate these divergencies while, hopefully, clarifying some of the genuine issues and eliminating the bogus.

He berates me in particular for looking at Ukrainian history through "Russian spectacles." Although I am not altogether clear as to his meaning here, I assume it is related to his claim that the Russian Cossacks' "historical experience" has little to do with the Ukraine. This assertion is questionable however. To be sure, the development of the Cossack communities was uneven and there were singularities in the Ukrainian situation. Nevertheless, Rudnytsky himself does not deny that the Cossacks of Zaporozhia, the Don, and the Yaik were "sociologically similar," and the parallels go somewhat farther than he will admit. Ukrainian "town Cossacks," to quote but one example, were not altogether *sui generis* as he implies: they had their counterparts in Muscovy's town Cossacks. It is true that the latter were gradually merged into the ranks of the Russian *odnodvortsy*, and that the Ukrainian Cossacks constituted a much stronger, more compact, literate, and economically

advanced group for a time. However, they also were eventually merged into the tsarist social structure, and their differences from other Cossack groups stemmed primarily from greater settlement density and proximity to culturally advanced centers, rather than from any nascent nationalism.

In maintaining this, I am far from denying that cultural (religious and linguistic) differences between the Poles on the one hand and the Orthodox population on the other, in the seventeenth-century Ukraine, had importance. But even if a sense of community in the face of a social enemy of alien culture is tantamount to nationality, it is not necessary to posit such nationality in order to explain the historical events in question. Certainly, Rudnytsky attributes too much importance to it in my view (if not as much as some other historians). The old national perspective was always more conducive to skimming surfaces than plumbing depths; in this case, for all the careful references to social and economic factors, it is tantamount to studying history with blinkers on.

Predictably, Rudnytsky presents some interesting examples of the inadequacy of such a "national" approach. He contrasts the Khmelnytsky rising, for example, with Russian Cossack revolts in terms of literacy, religion, the broad spectrum of classes involved, and the goal of independence (repeating a case he has made previously in the *Slavic Review*). Yet the Yaik rebels of 1772 included literates, the movement had a religious dimension (Old Belief versus the established church), and it developed into a clear bid for secession from the Russian state. Clergy, elders, peasants, burghers, and even some gentry participated in the Pugachev revolt. Would Rudnytsky term these movements "nationalist" or "wars of national liberation" on these counts? Or is it the language the enemy happens to speak which constitutes the vital difference?

Again, the Cossacks' role as leaders of disaffected peasant masses and the peasants' hankering after free Cossack status were not unique to the Ukraine, as Rudnytsky implies. Cossackdom commonly fulfilled similar functions elsewhere, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but to a lesser extent in other periods as well. The question of when and to what extent Cossacks were ready to act as champions of the peasantry and to accept peasants into their ranks remains vital, however, and it is one which Rudnytsky ignores—although it applies to the Ukraine as much as Russia.

He contests my claim that Khmelnytsky's state was "hardly a Cossack one," although he cannot deny that Cossacks were a minority in that state (a situation parallel in some respects to that on the Don in 1917, by which time the *inogorodnye* had come to outnumber the Cossacks, giving rise to analogous social strains and internal political tensions). More significantly, he blandly asserts that this was a Cossack state by virtue of the fact that the Cossacks were the "representative social class"—but precisely what is a "representative social class"? And if he means that the Cossacks articulated and mobilized general discontent, how effective were they in this role after the initial successes? To be more precise: What say were the peasants allowed in the running of Khmelnytsky's Ukraine? How are the successive registration crises to be accounted for? What need was there for a "black" Rada if a homogeneous Cossack "estate" acted as effective representatives? And precisely how homogeneous were the Ukrainian Cossacks anyway? In his exposition of the 1648 rising (as in his description of the Don and Kuban Cossacks' attempt to achieve regional autonomy in the Civil War) Rudnytsky suggests a degree of common aspiration and group cohesiveness which never existed. Such

movements displayed only fitful strength and never embraced all the Cossacks of a given community.

The attempt to contrast Cossackdom in Russia and the Ukraine becomes more obviously fallacious when he states that the Don and Ural hosts could be “tamed and assimilated” easily, while the “distinct national traits of Ukrainian Cossackdom made it a continued potential threat to the unity of the Russian state” (p. 874). This statement is simply not consonant with the facts. The Don and Ural hosts (like the Zaporozhians) were not effectively tamed until late in the eighteenth century and not fully assimilated until the twentieth. And Razin and Pugachev constituted extremely grave threats to the unity of the Russian state—as the Bolotnikov movement had done before them and Cossackdom’s role in the Civil War was to do again. Russian Cossack-peasant rebellions were not inexplicable “elemental” outbursts; they aimed at social justice and communal freedom in Russia no less than their counterparts in the Ukraine. Moreover, these aspirations, together with the degree of generalized discontent and the power of the Cossacks to mobilize it, constitute a sufficient as well as a necessary explanation for the outbursts. The existence of some putative desire for a specifically “national” independence is irrelevant in this context.

Rudnytsky is correct in suggesting that when I write of the end of Cossackdom in the Ukraine, I mean Cossackdom as a free social formation. This is a necessary distinction: the institutionalized Ukrainian Cossacks of the eighteenth century *were* sociologically distinct from their functional Cossack predecessors (as were some of their contemporaries among the Austrian Grenzer from the Uskoks from whom they had derived). So far as the vestigial hankering after the old Cossack autonomy is concerned, as evidenced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this was due (and Rudnytsky would appear to agree with me here) to a novel exploitation of a long-standing social myth of Cossackdom, which, however, was as powerful among the oppressed peasantry in Russia as it was in the Ukraine. Shevchenko’s success in exploiting the myth to create a more effective nationalist ideology (what Rudnytsky rightly calls the “ideological cornerstone of the modern Ukraine,” p. 875) derived, among other factors, from the Ukraine’s greater proximity to the more developed post-Napoleonic West (where the national idea had seized the imaginations of the middle classes and was already seeping down the social scale). However, it should not be forgotten that similar attempts were subsequently made to exploit the myth in defining a distinct “nationality” for Cossack communities farther to the east.

There are other minor objections one could make to Rudnytsky’s article—the fact that he berates me for mistransliterating Ukrainian without pointing out that I offend equally against the canons of Russian transliteration, or his daring assertion that the “principle of legal equality for all citizens . . . did not exist anywhere in Europe” (p. 873) in the seventeenth century, whereas it did—in Venice. However, its basic defect stems from his insistence on considering the Ukrainian Cossacks in isolation, playing down the importance of Cossackdom as a social phenomenon (with parallels in other areas of Europe’s borderlands in the early modern period and, indeed, with unstable frontier areas the world over) in order to exaggerate the distinctiveness of the later Ukrainian form. It is this restricted approach which leads Rudnytsky to so many rash conclusions—that, for example, autocracy is a “basic national tradition” in Russia rather than a product of a sociogeographic situation and a traumatic fear of internal anarchy which Cossackdom itself did so

much to create; or his claim that the Razins and Pugachevs were only a “marginal phenomenon” in Russian history rather than important manifestations of social feelings and powerful determinants of governmental attitudes. Such misconceptions inevitably stem from such traditional approaches. Our understanding of the history of the Slavic borderlands is not promoted by exaggerating the “national dimension,” still less by claiming spurious uniqueness for Ukrainian Cossacks.

PHILIP LONGWORTH

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London

PROFESSOR RUDNYTSKY REPLIES:

Professor Longworth charges me with “claiming spurious uniqueness for Ukrainian Cossacks.” The charge is refuted by his own admission that “Rudnytsky himself does not deny that the Cossacks of Zaporozhia, the Don, and the Yaik were ‘sociologically similar.’” I feel no qualms about acknowledging similarities and parallels between Ukrainian and Russian Cossacks, whenever these common traits are to be found in the evidence. Historical uniqueness can, obviously, never be absolute, but only relative. Such relative uniqueness (or, to express it more accurately, distinct historical identity) I do, indeed, claim for the Ukrainian Cossacks—not as an aprioristic postulate but as an empirical conclusion, derived from the data of history. I must, however, remind the reader that I was writing a review, and not a treatise. Within the scope of a review article I could do no more than to point out certain shortcomings of Longworth’s book and to suggest alternative interpretations.

Thus Professor Longworth misrepresents the nature of our disagreement when he makes me to be the “protagonist of the unique,” while recommending himself as the explorer of “general parallels and relationships.” Both the unique and the general are legitimate and necessary categories of historical cognition. I certainly have no objections of principle against broad, comparative studies. The weakness of *The Cossacks* lies not in the comparative approach to the history of various Russian and Ukrainian Cossack communities but in the faulty application of the method. Comparative studies can lead to valid results only when equal attention is paid to both parallel and divergent features. Unfortunately, Longworth displays a strange inhibition in dealing with those aspects of Ukrainian Cossackdom in which it differed from its Russian counterparts. I have cited specific instances in my review of *The Cossacks*, and I see no use in covering this ground a second time. I would, however, like to reassert my view that no discussion of the Ukrainian Cossacks may be considered satisfactory which accords to the Hetmanshchyna, the Ukrainian Cossack state of the second half of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the scanty and superficial treatment which it has been given in Longworth’s book.

Two important and interrelated problems need to be additionally considered within the narrow limits available in this place. Longworth finds it difficult to understand what I meant by designating the Cossacks the “representative class” of the seventeenth-century Ukraine, and he denies a “national character” to Ukrainian Cossackdom.

The answer to the first question is simple. In the corporately organized world of seventeenth-century Europe, each country was, as a rule, represented by one