

the radical transformation which the Old Testament concept of wrath has undergone in the light of the New Testament revelation of God's love, . . . do not seem able to attain the height of St John's thought, which sees him (Christ) as both the Redeemer and Judge. Not one after the other but one because of the other.' (p. 177.)

Occasionally perhaps a little lacking in imaginative insight, this is primarily a specialist's book, a most detailed and precise investigation, and a fine example of clear, patient, and accurate scholarship.

JOSEPH BOURKE, O.P.

TRIDENTINE SEMINARY LEGISLATION, ITS SOURCES AND ITS FORMATION.

By James A. O'Donohue, A.B., J.C.D.

This monograph has for its object a presentation of the origins and development of the Tridentine seminary legislation. The account of clerical education and formation from the days of the Carolingian Empire up to the middle of the twelfth century, and then on until the fourteenth century, is slight, despite the high intellectual and spiritual achievements then by the clergy outside the quadrangles of cathedrals. The rise of scholasticism was of profound importance, and the coming of the Friars Preachers merits more than a short footnote on page 107. Within a hundred years of its foundation the Order of Preachers had established 647 priories which were centres of learning and formation frequented by the neighbouring clergy.

There were two extra-conciliar events which exercised a notable influence on the final seminary legislation of the Council of Trent. The first was the founding by Cardinal Morone of the German College, entrusted to the care of the recently formed Society of Jesus and opened in Rome in the autumn of 1552. The Dominican Cardinal John Álvarez of Toledo was one of the three administrators of the new college. The second event was the legislation of the Legatine Synod, November 1555 to February 1556, under Reginald Cardinal Pole. Here the word seminary, 'seed bed', seems to have been used for the first time, to designate a school exclusively dedicated to the formation and training of future clerics.

A more accurate picture could have been drawn had closer attention been paid to the actual membership of the Council. There it will be seen that the Jesuit representation was negligible, whereas of all the representatives of religious orders the Dominicans were in the majority. Eighty-four were present during the various sessions from 1545 to 1563, of whom thirty-two were Fathers of the Council, i.e. thirty Archbishops and Bishops, with two Masters General. The remaining fifty-two attended as theologians. Among the leading personalities from the Order of Preachers, and given a place in the special preparatory

commissions for drafting the seminary legislation, were: Julius Pavese, Archbishop of Sorrento; Bartholomew of the Martyrs, Archbishop of Braga, Primate of all Spain and Portugal; Giles Foscarari (not Foscarini as on p. 130, n. 46.) Bishop of Modena who counselled the Pope to approve of the Society of Jesus; Peter Bertano, Bishop of Fano; John Jerome Trevisano, Patriarch of Venice; and of the seven theologians sent by the Pope there were four Dominicans.

The Twenty-third Session of the Council of Trent remains, indeed, the fundamental law of the Church for clerical training, though it has since been revised in various respects by the Code of Canon Law and other enactments of the Holy See. The thesis would have been of greater value if the continuity had been shown, and a comparative study made between the old legislation and the new.

AMBROSE FARRELL, O.P.

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. By Michael Polanyi. (Routledge and Kegan Paul; 42s.)

Professor Polanyi has argued in various publications, and now in this immense book, based on his Gifford lectures for 1951-2, that the standard of detached objectivity which obtains in science is both false and, by reason of the prestige of science, a danger to all other forms of knowledge. He insists instead that the personal qualities of the knower, his passionate engagement in the task of knowing, must be taken into account when the meaning of our knowledge is assessed. This personal factor is of the essence of knowledge, not an accidental accompaniment.

To the scientist this is bound to seem paradoxical. His very bread and butter depends on his having eliminated all that was personal to him before he submitted his results to the appropriate learned journal. Again, those who support the idea of personal knowledge in other fields usually seek to establish it by *contrast* with science, which is the realm of 'technique' and 'primary reflection' for Marcel, the 'it' as opposed to 'thou' for Buber. Polanyi's originality lies in his attempt to overcome this contrast by raising scientific values rather than reducing others.

Perhaps no other philosopher of science would entirely agree with Polanyi, but they are coming nearer to him as the tide of positivism recedes. He is insisting that in scientific discovery a new pattern is there to be apprehended, at first dimly, until at the end of the research it is clear. The rationality of nature is there waiting to reveal itself, to be expressed by our explanations. Now the positivist would have none of this. Scientific theory was a machine to predict new facts, or a convenient summary of existing facts. Such ideas are natural,