

Professor Cushman replies:

All ad hominem attacks on my views aside, Robert Hayden raises important issues about the ethical implications of scholarship on the former Yugoslavia. In my review, I do not advocate the intrusion of ethical or moral considerations into the process of doing scholarship. That would violate the basic canons of scientific inquiry. Rather, I raise questions about the ethical and moral implications of Hayden's work. His supposedly nonpartisan work reproduces some basic tenets of Serbian nationalist accounts of the breakup of Yugoslavia. In his book and in other work published in *Slavic Review*, Hayden denies that genocide took place in Bosnia. The facts demonstrate that it did, and I believe that genocide denial by scholars is a serious ethical matter. His account equalizes victims and perpetrators in assigning responsibility for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent war. This is ethically problematic, since it violates the memory of the victims who cannot speak for themselves and exculpates the perpetrators of heinous crimes. Scientific findings can and should be adjudicated in terms of their ethical and moral implications. For instance, an account of the Holocaust that left out any discussion of Nazi aggression and planning and, instead, focused on the actions of the Jews as the cause of the genocide would have serious ethical shortcomings that should be discussed. Hayden wants a social science that is outside of ethics. He is welcome to it, but others have every right to expose his work for what it is. I suspect that Socrates would approve.

It is ironic that Paul Shoup, in defending Robert Hayden's book (which he mistakenly refers to as a "collection of essays"), sees my review as an attempt to "ethnicize" the conflict, since one of my major purposes was to point out how supposedly objective and nonpartisan researchers produce accounts that support interpretations of events advanced by the various ethnic nationalists who caused the destruction of Yugoslavia. There is very little in Hayden's book that a Serbian nationalist would find objectionable and much that a Bosnian or Croatian victim of Serbian aggression would. Shoup is right to say that "not only the Serbs . . . are fair game when examining the course of events leading to the dismantling of Yugoslavia and its aftereffects." Yet he misses the point that a more balanced account can be produced without rewriting the basic history of the war, without masking the most important facts of the case, and without engaging in overt political polemics as Hayden does in his last chapter, which is not a scholarly analysis but a screed against the war conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What is most telling is that neither Hayden nor Shoup address any of the specific critiques that I make about the book. This is usually an indication that the reviewer has hit the mark, but I will leave that for readers to decide.

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To the Editor:

I am puzzled by Craig Brandist's review of my book *Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin's Theology of Discourse* (*Slavic Review* 59, no. 3). Brandist faults me for not treating Bakhtin's interest in neo-Kantianism in a book not devoted to the subject and argues for the uncompromising centrality of the critic's indebtedness to German philosophy. I do in fact discuss Bakhtin's engagement in more traditional applications of Kant, which were germane to the subject of my book in a way that his use of neo-Kantian paradigms was not. More seriously, Brandist takes me to task for my close attention to Bakhtin's Russian text, an approach that he labels "philological overcompensation," a stratagem "serv[ing] to suggest that only a reader with a knowledge of Church Slavonic can appreciate the thinker." Nowhere in my book do I suggest anything of the kind, either implicitly or explicitly. Brandist sees no contradiction in his imputation of a "one-sided approach" to others while he himself argues in a highly deterministic and even colonialist vein, having us believe that Bakhtin is interesting only to the extent that he is indebted to western philosophical models and terms. Like the Russian nationalist critics whom he presumably cannot abide, Brandist relies on a series of false oppositions about culture in his critique of those who do not share his purist view of Bakhtin. But the diverse and open work of Bakhtin deserves better than such monologic approaches.

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