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ABSTRACTS

THE DIFFICULT TRANSITION FROM CLIENTELISM TO CITIZENSHIP

LESSONS FROM MEXICO

By JONATHAN FOX

The consolidation of democratic regimes requires the extension of political rights to the entire citizenry, but this process does not necessarily follow from electoral competition. The transition from authoritarian clientelism to respect for associational autonomy is an important dimension of democratization, unfolding unevenly through iterative cycles of conflict among authoritarian rulers, reformist elites, and autonomous social movements. This process is illustrated by a study of changing bargaining relations between rural development agencies and grassroots indigenous movements in Mexico. The results suggest that the transition from clientelism to citizenship involves three distinct patterns of state-society relations within the same nation-state: redoubts of persistent authoritarianism can coexist with both new enclaves of pluralist tolerance and large gray areas of "semiclientelism."

THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIVATIZATION

A TYPOLOGY

By HARVEY B. FEIGENBAUM and JEFFREY R. HENIG

In shifting responsibilities from government to market, privatization has the potential to alter the institutional framework through which citizens normally conceive and pursue their individual and shared interests. But the literature has presented it as a relatively apolitical adaptation to changing conditions. Rather than a choice among means to achieve broadly shared goals, privatization often takes the form of a strategy to realign institutions so as to privilege the goals of some groups over the competing aspirations of other groups. Drawing primarily on the experience of Western, industrialized nations, a political typology is developed that distinguishes between privatizations undertaken for different reasons—whether pragmatic, tactical, or systemic.

"LESS FILLING, TASTES GREAT"

THE REALIST-NEOLIBERAL DEBATE

By EMERSON M. S. NIOU and PETER C. ORDESHOOK

This essay examines and reformulates the realist-neoliberal debate. It focuses initially on the issue of the attribution of instrumental goals to states—the goals they pursue as a function of the environment they confront—and argues not only that such goals are epiphenomena of other things but also that their specification constitutes a mere redescription of the alternative equilibria that states can achieve in anarchic systems. The world orders that realists and neoliberals envision are but alternative equilibria to a more general game. In that game cooperation, regardless of its form, must be endogenously enforced, and a debate over instrumental goals (whether it is best to model states as relative or absolute resource maximizers) is not central to the development of a theory that explains and predicts world orders.

Instead, the realist-neoliberal debate should be recast. The central research agenda should be to develop models that illuminate the following: how the equilibrium to a game in which states structure international affairs influences the types of issue-specific subgames states play; how countries coordinate to equilibria of different types; how the coordination problems associated with different equilibria can be characterized; how institutions emerge endogenously to sustain different equilibria; how states can enhance the attractiveness of an equilibrium; and how states can signal commitments to the strategies that are part of that equilibrium.

THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY**PROBLEMS AND PROSPECT**

By BIN YU

This article examines the state of the field in the Western study of Chinese foreign policy. After briefly surveying the earlier generations of scholarship, it critiques the current narrow focus and apolitical tendency in studying Chinese foreign policy-making institutions and perceptions of foreign policy makers and specialists. The author argues for a more balanced and more comprehensive approach that combines analytical vigor and empirical validity.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND ITS ADVERSARIES IN THE ARAB WORLD

By JILL CRYSTAL

While scholars outside the Arab world often link authoritarianism there to some dark cultural template involving religious doctrine or family structure, scholars of the region ground their explanations in political economy, in the historical evolution of the state, in patterns of state-society interactions, and in ideological appeals. To understand authoritarian outcomes, they draw attention to economic transformations, to social actors and the importance of organized social groups, to the role of state efforts to contain them in shaping political outcomes, to the repressive institutions that sometimes arise from this process, and to weaknesses of state ideologies that arise to justify authoritarian outcomes. Their work allows us to unpack the phenomenon of authoritarianism by reorganizing it into three different sets of forces: those that precipitate authoritarianism, those that sustain it, and those that resist it. The result is a clearer and more nuanced understanding of the range of factors that affect the likelihood of any state resorting to violence.