

THE INTER - AMERICAN SYSTEM: Searching for a New Framework

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SOUTH AMERICA INTO THE 1990s: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN A NEW ERA. Edited by G. Pope Atkins. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990. Pp. 211. \$36.50 paper.)

ALTERNATIVE TO INTERVENTION: A NEW U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. Edited by Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990. Pp. 157. \$26.50 cloth.)

IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS. By Thomas Carothers. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991. Pp. 309. \$29.95 cloth.)

LEADERS, LEADERSHIP, AND U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA. By Michael J. Kryzaneck. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992. Pp. 249. \$45.00 cloth.)

LATIN AMERICA: U.S. POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR. By Douglas W. Payne, Mark Falcoff, and Susan Kaufman Purcell. (New York: Americas Society, 1991. Pp. 91. \$9.95 paper.)

With the end of the cold war, both the organizing framework of the inter-American system and the dominant paradigm of U.S. policy in Latin America have largely disintegrated. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Pact, which were developed primarily as security guarantees against external threats to the hemisphere, may now be irrelevant to the issues facing the region over the next several decades. Containing the communist threat and eliminating Marxist movements from Latin America are no longer appropriate guides for future U.S. foreign policy.

The obvious question thus becomes, what is to replace those definitions? Is there another framework that can provide the webbing to bind the nations of the Western Hemisphere together, however loosely? Will a consistent guiding principle emerge to determine Washington's approach to the region, or have we reached the point where there is no unifying concept, no consensus on which to build a single new framework?

To envision the geographic region of the Western Hemisphere as something less than a functioning international system, perhaps as a series of subsystems with fragmented interests and competing policies, may require a shift in the prevailing conceptual maps. Viewing these

countries as part of a single “inter-American system” has always been part fiction, of course, but the idea embodied in the OAS of a regional community has been a convenient political arrangement despite vast disparities in power. In any case, consensus seldom existed about the purposes of the system. For the United States, the OAS and its agencies were primarily security arrangements, but for many Latin American states, its proper role extended beyond security to economic development. Certainly, the regular violation by the United States of the bedrock pledge not to intervene in another country’s affairs undermined confidence in the system’s ability to serve the interests of all members fairly.

The search for a new consensus or a new paradigm requires first an understanding of how the recent past has been defined, especially because such understanding may shape the future behavior of the United States. Second, discussion is needed about U.S. options after the cold war. Third, policymakers need to consider alternatives to the present inter-American system. All five of the books under review here address these issues to some extent and with varying degrees of success.

Defining the Past

The themes prevailing in U.S.–Latin American relations during most of the twentieth century have been neglect, intervention, anti-communism, and a preoccupation with security, interspersed with erratic economic aid programs and sporadic campaigns for democracy and human rights. During the cold war years, the United States dealt with Latin America in the broad strategic context of the battle with the Soviet Union while generally ignoring other dimensions of the hemispheric relationship. Two critical events shaped that policy: the Castro revolution in Cuba and the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. Future policy will no doubt be influenced by the way in which analysts understand the cold war period.

For example, has U.S. intervention been a positive force in the region? Are there lessons from the recent past that could guide future behavior? In *Leaders, Leadership, and U.S. Policy in Latin America*, Michael Kryzanek offers a critique of U.S. policy as well as suggestions about what lies ahead by focusing on the relationship between Washington and Latin American political leaders. He reminds readers of the U.S. tendency to emphasize relations with individual leaders rather than understanding and trying to influence the broader political process. As a result, Washington too often has adopted unrealistic expectations about the convergence of U.S. interests with those of selected dictators, while failing to support regimes pursuing social reforms.

Despite the murky and mixed results of U.S. interventions, Kryzanek perceives encouraging signs for the United States growing out of the contributions of the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George

Bush to the recent rise of democratic leaders in the region. He cites gains in places like El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama. Programs from the 1980s that contributed to this success include the National Endowment for Democracy, which gave funds to support opposition parties and the local press, and the Inter-American Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion, which provided training in the electoral process and assistance in holding elections. Kryzanek also points to positive outcomes from legislative exchanges in the Caribbean Basin and labor reforms sponsored by the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). In addition, he argues, the United States has made some strides toward depoliticizing the military in a number of countries. He remains cautious nonetheless about democracy's chances of prevailing throughout the hemisphere.

In *Leaders, Leadership, and U.S. Policy in Latin America*, Kryzanek strongly endorses what he calls "electoral intervention" by the United States as a way to promote the democratic process and "to assure that those who assume national office are friends of this country." Although he considers a fair electoral process important, "it is the end result of this process that interests us most." The key, he argues, is to elect "a pro-U.S. leader" (p. 115). One notes here Kryzanek's regular use of personal pronouns—we, us, our—to refer to the United States.

Despite the decline of communist states, Kryzanek views revolutionary leaders as an ongoing problem for the United States. He cautions the reader to "remember that one of the key strengths of leftist guerrillas is resiliency" (p. 141). Attempts to grapple with revolutions have bedeviled Washington throughout the twentieth century, and if they are to be dealt with appropriately in the future, it is important that previous ones be understood accurately. Kryzanek nevertheless portrays the Sandinista revolution as primarily the work of the Ortega brothers and the subsequent regime as that of Daniel Ortega, whom he views as a revolutionary leader on a par with Fidel Castro. Such oversimplification raises questions about Kryzanek's appreciation of what actually happened in Nicaragua.

In *Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.–Latin American Security Relationship*, edited by Richard Bloomfield and Gregory Treverton, Robert Pastor contributes a reasoned analysis of recent U.S. policy and points out that Washington did not oppose the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua simply because they were revolutions or involved nonaligned countries "but because they were aligned" with the Soviet Union (p. 65). He argues that in fact, the United States has been supportive of social change and democracy in the region and does not view such movements as incompatible with U.S. interests as long as they remain independent of foreign influence.

A realistic appraisal of U.S. actions on behalf of democracy can be found in *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the*

Reagan Years by Thomas Carothers, a scholar and former official in the U.S. State Department. Carothers begins by declaring that the United States cannot take credit for the recent wave of democracy sweeping Latin America. He goes on to criticize the simplistic notions and ahistorical views held by many U.S. officials about Latin America and democracy in the region. Carothers is particularly dubious about the policies of the Reagan administration. In El Salvador, it attempted to secure a quick democracy "in a country dominated by deeply anti-democratic structures of power, without significantly altering those structures." He finds "nothing in the policy to make the right give up power" (p. 45). And in Guatemala, the Reagan approach was fundamentally "flawed" in believing in a political center that did not exist.

Carothers points instead to the genuine interest of many career diplomats in establishing the democratic process in Latin America and credits them, not Reagan rhetoric, with some of the modest successes achieved by Washington in promoting democracy in various parts of Latin America, such as in Bolivia and Chile. Notably useful was Reagan's "Project Democracy," a global program exploited by the bureaucracy for "a patchwork of initiatives" that promoted democratic participation.

Carothers notes nonetheless the stronger tendency of U.S. administrations to use the theme of democracy to placate the congress when U.S. policy was actually concerned with fighting communism. The recurring dilemma in the 1980s, as in the 1960s, was how to promote democracy while aiding the military in various Latin American countries. But to cite only one example, all the U.S. aid and training expended did not turn the Panamanian army into a professional nonpolitical force committed to democracy.

U.S. policymakers, Carothers suggests, exhibit a naive faith in their ability to change people's behavior, assuming that democracy will prevail if "the people" are given a two-week course on the electoral process and the opportunity to vote. These projects are likely to fail, he argues, "because the magnitude of the task and of the solution are vastly out of proportion with one another" (p. 218). In the end, Carothers concludes, the United States has little influence over political evolution in most of Latin America. Recognizing that the main obstacles to democracy are not communism but domestic structures will contribute to constructing more prudent U.S. policies than those prevailing in the past few years.

Options for the United States

Depending on Democracy / Can the United States build its future policy on promoting democracy and human rights? The standard argument has been that democratic states adopt foreign and domestic policies compatible with U.S. interests and receive more sympathy from the U.S. Congress. To believe that such an approach can work, one must also believe in

Washington's ability to influence the course of domestic politics in the region and that democracy has a reasonable chance of surviving.

As Carothers convincingly demonstrates in *In the Name of Democracy*, previous levels of U.S. interest in Latin American democracy have correlated with the intensity of the U.S. fight against communism. With communism gone, what can justify the investment in promoting democracy in Latin America? Bureaucratic goodwill, makeshift training programs, and inspiring rhetoric from Washington are not likely to guarantee the region a democratic future. In any case, following such a path would be a flimsy basis on which to build policy. An alternative democratic path not fully discussed by any of the authors under review in this essay derives from the experience of the John Kennedy and Jimmy Carter administrations. Their policies imposed sanctions on governments unwilling to play by democratic rules. In neither case, however, did these "liberal" efforts succeed at permanently securing human rights and democracy or assuring the rise to power of friendly governments.

Compounding the problem of relying on democracy as the foreign policy touchstone is the persistent U.S. assumption, so aptly explained by Carothers, that democracy will prevail once the dictator is thrown out of power. According to this view, getting rid of Fidel Castro or Manuel Noriega or the Sandinistas will, with U.S. guidance, usher in a golden age of democracy—notwithstanding national history, social structure, economic chaos, and political culture.

Howard Wiarda, whose early work cogently addressed the structural importance of political culture in Latin America, is not very sanguine about the survivability of democracy. In his contribution on trends in South America in Pope Atkins's *South America into the 1990s: Evolving International Relationships in a New Era*, Wiarda reminds his readers that no deeply held commitment exists in Latin America to cling to democracy for its own sake if the political system fails to function effectively. The United States, he cautions, should not put all of its policy eggs in the democratic basket (p. 43).

Moreover, the pursuit of democracy, whether following the Carter or the Reagan approach, is tinged with interventionist implications. Interfering with the domestic affairs of a country becomes unavoidable once it has been decided that the U.S. mission in Latin America is to promote democracy and human rights. Although several of the authors reviewed here cite the 1987 Esquipulas accord as an alternative to U.S. intervention, that document too intruded into domestic politics and thus may not be emulated as widely as predicted.

The Economic Path / President Bush's 1990 announcement of an "Enterprise for the Americas" suggested that U.S. interests in Latin America could best be protected by focusing on the economic dimensions of the

relationship. In a proposal characterized as laying the foundation for regional stability and progress, Bush called for joint efforts to reduce foreign debt, increase the level of private investment, and establish a hemispheric free-trade zone. A study dedicated to reviewing that proposal is *Latin America: U.S. Policy after the Cold War* by Douglas Payne, Mark Falcoff, and Susan Kaufman Purcell. They view Bush's ideas as "visionary": "Economic cooperation based on trade will, one hopes, replace the cold war framework for inter-American relations in the coming decades" (p. ix).

This faith in economics to rescue Latin America and provide the basis for U.S. relations with the region is not a new belief. It resembles the conviction expressed in 1962 that the Alliance for Progress would provide the pathway for economic development to sustain new democratic governments and thus eliminate the economic and social conditions that lead to revolution. To a large degree, the search for an economic solution to political and security problems stems from the conventional wisdom of U.S. aid programs holding that the Marshall Plan's success in Europe can be reproduced elsewhere. The remarkable accomplishments of economic integration in Europe also provided an incentive for trying to replicate common markets and free-trade areas in Latin America.

These economic approaches exhibit a simplicity that is appealing, especially to U.S. policymakers. Previous attempts at economic development via government assistance have had mixed results and now offer little hope for dealing with the large-scale fundamental problems found in Latin America. Relying instead on free trade and private investment not only gets government off the hook and out of the frustrating economic development effort, it enables policymakers to avoid the messy world of politics. If all that is required for stability and democracy is economic growth based on a free market, the need for Washington to be concerned about Latin America is significantly diminished, thereby justifying "benign neglect."

Such beliefs are not uncommon in Latin America as well, where frequent calls have been issued for the various inter-American organizations to pay more attention to economic development and less to cold war security issues. This kind of emphasis would not only contribute to economic growth and regime survival but would also minimize the need for U.S. intervention. For an example of this argument, see Heraldo Muñoz's essay in Bloomfield and Treverton's *Alternative to Intervention* (p. 29).

In endorsing the economic option, Falcoff suggests in *Latin America: U.S. Policy after the Cold War* that the old "statist populist development strategies" in Latin America are giving way to new "macroeconomic performance" approaches that offer more promise of resolving long-standing political conflicts in Latin America (p. 27). At the same time, Falcoff notes that Latin America's leverage with the United States and its ability to win

economic concessions have declined dramatically with the end of the cold war. Thus while free trade and economic integration have great potential, their successful implementation requires the kind of cooperation from the United States that Washington may have no particular economic or political incentive to provide.

Falcoff outlines a number of interesting economic options that compel readers to look beyond the typical models for free-trade areas. First, he plays down the prospects of arrangements directly involving the United States, believing that they would turn into agreements to obtain government aid. Instead, he builds on ideas circulating in Latin America for subregional free-trade blocs, expressing most optimism about splitting the hemisphere into two broad groups: those countries resembling the First World and those likely to remain locked into the Third World. Such an arrangement might not be fair, he implies, but it holds promise for countries having extensive global ties and willing to sign cooperative agreements. This trend is illustrated by the creation of MERCOSUR, the Southern Cone Common Market accord reached in 1991 between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

The case for basing future U.S. ties with Latin America on economic cooperation is clearly outlined in *Latin America: U.S. Policy after the Cold War*, but this and other recipes are often presented in a political vacuum. The mood in Washington is not conducive to expanding the new North American Free Trade Agreement beyond Mexico nor to increasing trade concessions or foreign assistance. Moreover, high expectations that economic formulas can resolve deep-seated political and security problems may be based more on wishful thinking than on realistic appraisals of what is possible.

The Security Problem / If the paramount rhetorical refrain of Latin American governments during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s has been directed at the need for economic growth, the U.S. refrain has stressed the security of the hemisphere against external threats. Clearly, the security argument has taken on a number of guises over the years. The original concept of the 1947 Rio Pact was to defend the region against aggression from outside. The only unambiguous example of such a threat was the Cuban missile crisis, although Argentina's case against Britain in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict might also qualify. While the notion of an imminent external threat against the hemisphere was seldom supported by evidence, the concept of a regional defensive alliance served as an acceptable international arrangement.

The definition of "security" that has proved most fractious to the inter-American system was that insisted on by the United States and incorporated into the OAS security accords when it met in Caracas in 1954. At this meeting, it was agreed that threats to the security of the

hemisphere would include communist ideology and associated instruments of subversion. Thus the security of member states could be threatened from within, by revolutionary forces aligned with non-American ideologies and sponsors. This vague definition of threat (often labeled the “national security doctrine”) led to the pattern of U.S. intervention exemplified by direct intrusions (as into the Dominican Republic) and indirect ones (as against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and Salvador Allende in Chile).

Security from a Latin American perspective has most often been related to regime survival: resistance to revolution, internal disorder, and U.S. intervention. For instance, military assistance coming from the United States to repel external invasion or communist insurgency was used effectively by recipient regimes to guarantee their ability to suppress dissent and remain in power. Scholars like Falcoff and Kryzanek agree that security from leftist revolutionaries is an ongoing concern for the region, particularly for the United States. Pastor also contends in *Alternative to Intervention* that revolutionary regimes “do pose a potential national security concern for the United States” (p. 57). U.S. persistence in mindless knee-jerk opposition to revolution, however, is unlikely to be effective or even tolerated, particularly because of its interventionist overtones, in either the U.S. Congress or Latin America.

According to Pastor, the threat to the United States—and to the hemisphere—derives primarily from instability and its exploitation by leftist groups. To counter this possibility, he finds it necessary to deal more effectively with incumbent regimes and manage better the various “succession crises” that occur. If a Marxist regime should come to power, the United States should seek collective action to turn it out. Pastor thus takes as givens Washington’s refusal to accept leftist solutions and the inevitability of intervention, whether multilateral or unilateral.

Do alternatives exist for Washington? James Kurth, another contributor to *Alternative to Intervention*, recommends that the United States help construct an improved inter-American consultative process to deal with security problems, and he suggests using the Contadora model of collective diplomacy. But for such a process to work, he notes, the United States would have to accept the reality of divergent interpretations of security. Throughout the contributions to Bloomfield and Treverton’s *Alternative to Intervention* and Atkins’s *South America in the 1990s*, the common theme calls for the United States to look to a new collective security arrangement for the hemisphere and to abandon unilateral intervention. Bloomfield asserts nonetheless that U.S. intervention has been the major obstacle thus far to constructing an effective collective security system.

Bloomfield also points out much more clearly than the other contributors the degree of U.S. involvement in the daily life of Latin Ameri-

cans, from its extensive economic relationships to the inescapable security concerns and recurring advocacy of human rights. Moreover, Bloomfield finds only slight encouragement for collective action based on the U.S. experience with Noriega in Panama. While the OAS was for the first time willing to try to negotiate a government out of power, the organization could not bring itself to justify direct intervention on behalf of democracy. Whether a different commitment would prevail in the face of a security threat remains to be seen.

Jorge Domínguez is skeptical about the capacity of the inter-American system to work on behalf of U.S. policy interests. His contribution to *Alternative to Intervention* notes that Washington, citing joint actions against Cuba and in the Dominican Republic, has frequently presented the system as something that has actually functioned, when there is no real history of genuine consultation or mediation. The success at Esquipulas might lay the foundation for future mediation by Latin American governments, Domínguez asserts, but only if the United States allows the process to work, as the Bush administration did in Central America.

Missing from many of these analyses of U.S. options in Latin America is systematic consideration of the criteria for intervention. If it is true that intervention has been the most persistent characteristic of U.S. policy in Latin America, then is it reasonable to expect Washington to abandon the option merely because communist threats are withering away? The interventionist impulse preceded the cold war and therefore seems likely to remain afterward.

For example, if expanded free-trade arrangements increase economic interdependence, will Washington be more or less prone to interfere in the kinds of "succession crises" to which Pastor refers? Will domestic U.S. politics push the White House to intervene, as was ostensibly the case in Nicaragua and Panama, on behalf of democracy and human rights? Will the hegemonic power's preoccupation with stability allow its threshold of tolerance for disorder to rise, or when faced with potential revolution, will it opt for familiar policies of firm support for the short-term authoritarian solution, regardless of the impact on democracy? The latter choice appears to describe Washington's current response to the collapse of democracy in Peru.

Clearly, the option preferred in this sampling of scholarship is for the United States to build on the nascent attempts at inter-American collaboration that emerged during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. The United States is essentially being asked to rely more on the Latin Americans to help mediate and work out regional security problems along the lines established by the Contadora process and the Esquipulas accord. This option's success would require a dramatic shift in U.S. habits and an unlikely willingness on the part of Latin Americans to intervene in conflicts in a manner acceptable to the United States. In any

case, the end of the cold war provides an opportunity for revising the inter-American security process. Little consensus can be found for maintaining the OAS as the critical organization for this task because the OAS is generally considered by these authors to be an irrelevant instrument discredited in the eyes of all parties in the hemisphere.

Revising the Inter-American System

Assuming that the existing system is broken, what are the possibilities for redesigning the inter-American system so that it can deal better with economic and security issues—and with the interests of the United States? According to Muñoz's contribution to *Alternative to Intervention*, the inter-American system since its inception has been based on false assumptions about equality and common interests. It "provided security for the United States, but produced insecurity for Latin America" (p. 27). The coup de grace came with the failure to act on behalf of Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas case. To replace the OAS, Muñoz calls for the creation of subregional groups, such as the Contadora countries, to deal with local problems. Those who have the greatest stake in local security would play the key roles, although such an arrangement would require a willingness to take collective action against aggression and subversion. Muñoz does not propose intervention on behalf of domestic issues like human rights.

Writing about the Contadora initiative in *Alternative to Intervention*, Carlos Rico is optimistic about the potential of that experience for convincing Central American governments to focus on common interests and rise above narrow national interests. But Rico points astutely to the need for incentives. Here, collaboration serves as a means for smaller states to maintain local stability, promote democracy, and (perhaps most important) limit the opportunities for U.S. intervention. Rico observes that "U.S. actions [in Central America] galvanized the whole process" of Contadora (p. 111).

The essays by Muñoz and Rico illuminate the conundrum facing Latin American governments. On the one hand, subregional collaboration is an appealing alternative to U.S. interference. On the other hand, it is questionable whether that collaboration can confront nondemocratic governments, which many perceive as the root of tension and conflict. Constructing a limited collective security arrangement to deal with aggression may be possible, but expecting it to follow the interventionist implications of Contadora and Esquipulas may be unrealistic.

The essays compiled by Pope Atkins in *South America into the 1990s* serve as a reminder that options applicable to Central America may not be appropriate for South America. The propensity for U.S. intervention in the Caribbean and Central America places that area in a different realm

for U.S. policy. Characterized by small states, vulnerable economies, continuing national disputes and uncertain political stability, Central America may require more systematic attention to security guarantees than the South American states.

Policymakers and scholars too often overlook the distinctive qualities of South America. Atkins views the continent as a separate international subsystem made up of relatively large states with increasingly independent and diversified economies, one that is not particularly dependent on the United States. According to Atkins, since 1965 South America has been recapturing its separate identity and moving away from close ties with the United States. Thus the South American states may be on the verge of establishing their own "system" for dealing with economic and security problems.

Atkins and contributor Howard Wiarda point out, however, that the emerging climate of cooperation may not last. As noted, Wiarda is particularly concerned about the fragility of democratic governments in the Southern Cone and the lack of preparation in Washington for what might happen if they are overthrown. Democracy and human rights, he explains, may not be high priorities for South American governments—nor in the foreign policy interests of the United States.

Jack Child resurrects the influence of European geopolitical thinking on South American military leaders, particularly those in Argentina. Yet he pays only glancing attention to the Argentine military's enthusiasm for pursuing revolutionaries as far away as Nicaragua between 1979 and 1982. In fact, the Argentine policy of that period demonstrated the strength of the geopolitical imperative of protecting national security far beyond the nation's borders.

If Argentina retains aspirations to regional leadership, despite recent democratic accomplishments, Brazil appears to have accepted a less assertive role as "an essentially moderate and non-threatened status quo power on political issues," according to fellow contributor Wayne Selcher (p. 95). Now committed to avoiding entanglements, Brazil cannot be expected to take the lead in building a subregional collective security system. Even Brazil's military strength is not perceived as a threat to its neighbors—at least as long as it remains non-nuclear.

Throughout the valuable collection of essays in *South America into the 1990s*, it is clear that the major powers in the Southern Cone as well as Venezuela and Peru prefer bilateral relations and independent arrangements within and outside the hemisphere. Missing from the collection is a focused study of what the histories of the Andean Pact and the Latin American Free Trade Area reveal about the prospects for regional economic integration. For example, will the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) provide the necessary stepping stones for moving toward the functional integration so often deemed necessary to achieve

political and security cooperation? ALADI is mentioned only in the context of Brazil's relations with its neighbors, not as part of a general assessment of multilateral subregional agreements.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, three major points emerge from these five books. First, the existing inter-American system is ill-equipped to deal with the crucial issues facing the Western Hemisphere in the post-cold war era: democratization, economic growth, and regional security. No single framework is likely to replace the OAS, although scholars are plainly encouraged by the experience developed through the Contadora and Esquipulas accords.

Second, redefinition of U.S. interests is still in flux. Promotion of free trade and democracy continue as rhetorical pillars of policy at least, but reservations remain about whether those concerns can form a basis for protecting U.S. security interests. Thus scholars evince no confidence that prevailing conditions in Latin America will eliminate the U.S. propensity to intervene. Moreover, democratic governments are not all likely to remain in power, new collective security arrangements are dubious propositions at best, and improved trade alone cannot resolve serious political problems. Finally, promising developments in South America relating to the real possibility of southern arrangements on trade and security suggest that the future of the entire hemisphere may lie in the direction of problem-specific subregional collaboration.