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This chapter focuses on state coordination brought about by the relationship between central and local governments, using local tax collection as a practical example. The dominant fact discussed in this chapter is the vacillation of the Tanzanian government between deconcentration, with centrally appointed civil servants in charge of local affairs, and full devolution to local governments. An ambitious local government reform was voted through in 1998, but never fully implemented. Responsibility for the collection of the property tax has changed three times in the last decade. As capacity is clearly missing at a local level, tax collection should optimally be under the central government for the time being. It is suggested that oscillating responsibilities in the recent past reflect hidden rent-seeking competition between local politicians, central government tax collectors, and ruling party members. In effect, corruption has been observed with both central and local tax collection. An important conclusion that comes out of the chapter and the discussion by Jan Willem Gunning is the role of capacity in the design of institutional structures in developing countries.
This chapter takes up the first of the four development “problems” highlighted in Part III. Whether in the name of civilization, modernity, or modernization, interventions to transform the composite materials, structural designs, and locations of African homes represented the development agenda to reform African domesticity and labor. Discourses on improvement masked the political and economic agendas at work and ignored the indigenous logic of African residential construction and organization. From the nineteenth century development efforts urged Africans to build square or rectangular houses in place of round huts. The scientific work of early twentieth-century urban planners set the stage for what “modern” urban spaces would look like in African cities. In the postcolonial era urbanization has far outpaced the ability of states and private enterprise to provide affordable, modern housing for citizens. Urban Africans have begun to fight back against the assumptions made about informal settlements by development specialists and city planners from the global north. These activists are challenging their governments to see urban residential areas as social spaces that belong to all citizens, not just wealthy ones. In their challenge, informal settlement dwellers are forcing the international development community to Africanize the development episteme.
This chapter describes significant economic developments before 1800 and explains why they occurred. According to Chinese historians, embryonic capitalism appeared several centuries later in China than in Europe, but they were weak, and had atrophied by the 1800s. The chapter elucidates how state and private economic organizations, operating under new institutions or rules, reduced the economy's transformation and transaction costs. Recognizing that excessively taxing China's depressed and fragmented economy, the Ch'ing government tried to coordinate tax collection under central government control and disburse funds to lower administrations without imposing higher taxes. The Ch'ing government was committed to building an ideal Confucian society based on the rural way of life, in which peace, social harmony, and minimal prosperity would reign. The Chinese people responded to the Ch'ing reforms and the incentives and positive externalities that followed by organizing their households, lineages, and communities in ways that promoted growth.
In the early Heian period state power declined, except in the capitals (kokufu) of the sixty-five (or sixty-six) provinces. While the central government declined, these provincial offices (kokuga) retained, and even increased, their power over local land and people as local elites took over their functions: the collection of taxes, the administration of land, and the promotion of agriculture. This chapter focuses on these changes that took place during the ninth and tenth centuries. The provincial governments turned out to be unique bargaining grounds for the division of resources between capital and countryside, and that function, combined with the functions of the governments as repositories and redistributors of wealth, ensured their survival well beyond the Heian period. In 731, a new system of policing provincial officers was put into operation, which the custodial aspects of office, forcing incoming governors to seek out and take charge of all government assets that were supposed to be on hand, particularly tax-grain.
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