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The introduction will give a brief overview of the military history of the Victorian period and situate the significance of these conflicts in the larger context of British domestic history and British foreign policy/grand strategy. There will also be a discussion of the layout of the book and the individual chapters.
This chapter discusses the types of war fought by the Roman army in the late Republic and Principate. It examines the context in which these conflicts occurred, their frequency, duration, decisiveness and results. Much of the chapter deals with strategy, or the practical factors such as intelligence, communications and logistics which impose limits upon it. It is convenient to divide the foreign wars fought by the army in this period into four broad groups: wars of conquest, wars to suppress rebellion, punitive expeditions, and wars fought in response to invasions or raids. Beyond the desire of the emperor to prevent the movement of troops for one operation causing problems in other areas, it is hard to see how any form of grand strategy could have coped with so many local, ever-changing problems. The strategy in civil wars was always simple and wars ended with the death of one of the rival leaders. Compromises were inevitably temporary.
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