Chapter 3 explores the ways in which states subvert international legal institutions and norms in pursuit of their own security and political interests. This chapter argues that the use of self-referrals to the ICC stems from political calculations that allow political leaders to advance their own domestic and international agendas at the expense of furthering the goals of the international justice regime. Chapter 3 is a story of political calculations, political power, and security interests, and the agency of (African) states in creating and shaping the delivery of international justice. The Ugandan case is studied in depth to hightlight the ways in which self-referrals to the ICC stem from strategic calculations that allow states to use the Court to defeat rebel leaders, warlords, and/or political opponents.

The ICC becomes a transposed arena where domestic politics are meted out and enmeshed with the rule of law and legal procedures. Chapter 6 describes Côte d’Ivoire as a prime example of the ICC becoming involved in a highly politically charged crisis that was set off by contested electoral results in December 2010. The Ouattara administration outsourced justice to the ICC for the purpose of handling political adversaries. In doing so, it followed the lead of other states who had previously used the self-referral mechanism.