This chapter by the philosopher Johanna Thoma focuses on the ‘moral proxy problem’, which arises when an autonomous artificial agent makes a decision as a proxy for a human agent, without it being clear for whom specifically it does so. Thoma recognises that, in general, there are broadly two categories of agents an artificial agent can be a proxy for: low-level agents (individual users or the kinds of human agents artificial agents are usually replacing) and high-level agents (designers, distributors, or regulators). She argues that we do not get the same recommendations under different agential frames: whilst the former suggests the agents be programmed without risk neutrality, which is common in choices made by humans, the latter suggests the contrary, since the choices are considered part of an aggregate of many similar choices. The author argues that the largely unquestioned implementation of risk neutrality in the design of artificial agents deserves critical scrutiny. Such scrutiny should reveal that the treatment of risk is intimately connected with our answer to the questions about agential perspective and responsibility.