Institutions are the system of legal rules and social norms that enhance individual economic property rights. Individuals take them as exogenous, but they are endogenous to the entire system. Institutions are complicated distributions of economic property rights and are therefore the result of attempts to maximize wealth net of the transaction costs involved. This chapter defines institutions, relates them to property rights, reviews the literature, and provides numerous examples of institutions and their evolution.

There are many notions of property rights. The critical concept in this book is an Economic Property Right, which is defined as an individuals ability in expected terms to exercise a choice with respect to a commondity. Such rights depend on the individuals legal and moral rights to that commodity. Such rights are complicated because they might be spread out across different subsets of a commoditys attributes, and different people might hold different types of rights to the commodity. Furthermore, the strength of any given property right can vary and is under the choice of various people.

An inquiry into the rationale for the protection of animals in wartime confronts a key challenge: tThe progressive philosophical reflection on the improvement of the position of animals in (human) societies is at odds with the human-centred nature of international humanitarian law. Against this background, the chapter critically engages with possible reasons for animal protection in wartime: anthropocentric approaches, speciesism, anthropomorphism and a rights-based approach. It analyses to what extent these paradigms are reflected both in lex lata and in claims de lege ferenda. The chapter also examines to what extent these approaches can be brought in line with the overall objectives of international humanitarian law and reflects upon the challenges that arise from such an alignment. It favours a straightforward reform approach which aims at a specific convention for the protection of animal rights in wartimes.

Chapter 4 considers the human rights relevant to research using linked data without consent; how these rights come into tension with each other and other relevant interests; and how these tensions should be considered and resolved. It notes the emphasis placed in the West on civil and political rights, such as the right to privacy, and the lack of attention to economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to health, and how this has resulted in an unbalanced approach to the regulation of research.

Chapter 4 considers the human rights relevant to research using linked data without consent; how these rights come into tension with each other and other relevant interests; and how these tensions should be considered and resolved. It notes the emphasis placed in the West on civil and political rights, such as the right to privacy, and the lack of attention to economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to health, and how this has resulted in an unbalanced approach to the regulation of research.

Despite the long-established fact that Thai women in old Siam were among those few enjoying the privilege of living in a matrilineal and matrilocal society, Thai laws rarely reflected such characteristics in their texts. Indeed, from the earliest record of Thai history, there were hardly any formal legal rules recognizing the rights of women. Thus, students of Thai family law learn how women gradually strengthened their place among men until today, from having no place to being equal to their male compatriots. All of this exists against the backdrop of a country with a relatively satisfactory track record of women’s rights. This book chapter questions whether the original strong status of women in the past has anything to do with contemporary family law in Thailand by exploring the old family laws and pointing out certain features in the laws which might explain the discrepancies between the legal text and women’s societal status. Moreover, historical analysis may also explain why there is still some unequal treatment of men and women in the contemporary family law system, even when the Constitution directly protects gender equality.

Modern understanding of the institution of slavery and the experience of slave themselves has been largely defined and dominated by a template drawn from the modern plantation slavery of the Americas. Images of slave agency and of abolitionism have been derived from the same template in which slave agency is equated with unambiguous resistance to slavery as such, and abolitionism attributed to a moral response originating within the slave-owning society and possessing a strong redemptive dimension. The weakness of an elite abolitionism regarding ‘Islamic’ slavery in the states of the eastern Mediterranean has often been noted and contrasted with the moral force and redemptive power of Western abolitionism. This chapter argues, firstly, that the ascription of a uniquely Islamic character to Middle Eastern and North African slavery, which in fact shares its key characteristics with practices and notions common to medieval and early modern southern Europe, is a survival of nineteenth century Orientalism. It argues, secondly, that the relative weakness of an abolitionist sentiment can best be explained not by the power of an Islamic discourse but by the structures of slavery in the region and especially the forms of agency to which those structures gave rise.

In this Chapter, I consider what lessons can be learned and pathways forward. The reproductive battleground was once in the courts, where incremental advancements through landmark decisions were achieved. Skinner v. Oklahoma (overturning a compulsory sterilization law that treated similar crimes differently), Griswold v. Connecticut (overturning a Connecticut law that barred married couples from accessing contraceptives), Eisenstadt v. Baird (striking down a Massachusetts law that restricted non-married persons from accessing contraceptives), and Roe v. Wade (decriminalizing doctors’ performing abortions) formed the foundation for the reproductive rights discourse, advancing concepts such as privacy and autonomy in the reproductive health space. However, recent retreats from the primacy of those holdings by the Supreme Court suggest that, at least for the present time, the Court may gerrymander reproductive rights and weaponize the First Amendment to advance the personal views of five conservative male Justices of the Court. Drawing on brilliant contributions of scholars, civil society, activists, a bold new cohort of female legislators at the state and federal levels, and intuitions of judges committed to the equality of women, this Chapter concludes that a Reproductive Justice Bill of Rights is needed and that new pathways in litigation must involve an equal protection analysis.

Chapter 4 replies to the argument that international courts who decide important policy decisions take them off the public agenda and therefore stifle public debate. The chapter explains that an international judgment is often just the entry point into a public discussion and a dialogue with the relevant authorities. In fact, the ensuing public deliberation may be superior to what would happen absent international courts' intervention. International courts shift the discussion from interests and naked power to rights, and they change the social settings in a way that processes and disseminates information well to wider segments of the public. International courts create friction with the executive, guide the legislator, and can help the national judiciary, all leading to a more vibrant debate. Finally, international courts provide numerous lawyers with vital training that they can use to better the public discourse.

In this final chapter, I trace out the implications of the deliberative partnership thesis for our understanding of judicial behavior, judicial power, and the development of legal rights. I speculate on a model of constitutional development that recognizes the appropriate role of political parties in legal development. I also offer a defense of partisan influence on constitutional interpretation as a more accurate safeguard of a community's self-governing, egalitarian commitments.