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This chapter discusses the transformation of the Bank for International Settlements from a predominantly European organisation into a truly global one. This transformation coincided with, and was the result of, the rapid rise in prominence of the emerging-market economies, particularly from the 1990s. Until the mid-1990s the BIS, although serving the global central banking community, was in terms of governance and organisation strongly dominated by the Group of Ten advanced industrial countries. Because of history and statutory constraints – but also because the G10 very much valued their close cooperation – this changed only gradually. The chapter outlines in detail how and why the BIS first expanded its shareholding membership and only then its internal governance structure to become truly representative of the global economy. The great financial crisis of 2007–8 further accelerated this process, which was basically concluded by the end of the 2010s, with all major central banks being represented on the BIS Board of Directors.
This chapter is a reflection or insider’s view provided by a former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and long-standing member of the BIS Board of Directors, William Dudley. Based on his first-hand experience, and in reference to the crucial decade following the global financial crisis of 2007–9, his contribution reflects on the usefulness of the BIS as the global cooperative organisation of central banks. The BIS continues to play a crucial role as a forum for information exchange and discussions among central bankers and for informal networking. In addition, through its research, meetings and policy work it enables international consensus-building with a view to promoting global financial stability. The contribution also identifies some areas in which the BIS can and should further improve, in particular in terms of its transparency, diversity and inclusiveness. The efficient coordination of work and the ongoing cooperation between the BIS and the other key stakeholders in the international financial system, in particular the IMF and the World Bank, also figures high on the agenda.
This chapter discusses the contribution of BIS research to the shift in the way financial stability issues have been looked at before and after the great financial crisis of 2007–9. It also considers the policy implications for the post-crisis reforms. The 1997–8 Asian crisis was an important turning point, focusing BIS research on the endogenous causes of financial instability and thus on the resilience and the risks of the financial system as a whole. From the late 1990s, the BIS started advocating a macroprudential approach to financial stability, including the adoption of countercyclical macroprudential policies. These ideas, while being shared by some academics and central banks, were largely ignored in policy circles, including in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The chapter argues that the great financial crisis of 2007–9 catapulted these same ideas to the top of the reform agenda. Work done previously by the BIS and others, i.a. on the issue of countercyclical capital buffers, could be leveraged and find its way on the reform agenda pushed by the Financial Stability Board and the G20. The ‘measured contrarianism‘ of the BIS in this area thus added real value.
This chapter summarizes the main episodes of output contraction and crises across subsequent decades and relevant sub-periods in the long twentieth century. It interprets the main findings of the book and draws lessons for the design and implementation of policies that can be effective to anticipate and cope with macrocrises and main recessions.
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