Apart from depleting global marine resources, illegal fishing affects the economies and societies of many developing coastal states. They are often not in a position to police the maritime zones that are under their jurisdiction, such as their exclusive economic zone, and to enforce their fisheries regulations adequately. The persons who organise these illegal fishing operations, such as the operators and owners of vessels, often use flags of convenience and take advantage of the weak legal systems of flag States and coastal States. In this chapter it is argued that, in addition to coastal, port and flag States, the States of which such owners and operators are nationals also have a role to fulfil in the fight against illegal fishing.

This chapter will examine rules governing marine spaces beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, namely, the high seas and the Area. The high seas are essentially characterised by the principle of freedom of the seas, and order in the high seas is ensured primarily by the flag State. Thus, the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State and its exceptions are key issues underlying international law governing the high seas. However, the Area is governed by the principle of the common heritage of mankind. This principle is innovative because it may bring new viewpoints beyond the State-to-State perspective in the law of the sea. Against that background, this chapter will discuss in particular the following issues: (1) the principle of freedom of the high seas, (2) the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the high seas, (3) the problems associated with flags of convenience, (4) the peacetime exceptions to the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State on the high seas, (5) the raison dtre of the principle of the common heritage of mankind, and (6) the 1994 Implementation Agreement

During the second half of the twentieth century, the collapse of European Empires increased the number of sovereign states. At the same time, higher taxation and more aggressive regulations by governments of wealthy countries left companies and wealthy individuals seeking offshore homes for capital. In 1948, the Liberian government passed legislation to bring it into this market for offshore services, creating a new channel by which to monetize its sovereignty. The three laws passed in that year established the Liberian shipping registry and created loose corporation and tax laws intending to attract foreign investment.This chapter examines the success of the Liberian shipping registry, which by the 1960s was the largest in the world in terms of tonnage and remained one of the largest in the world even through the collapse of the Liberian state during the civil wars. It contrasts this with the failure of Liberia’s efforts to become a tax haven. This contrast allows for a broader exploration of the "market" for sovereignty and its limits since the middle of the twentieth century. It shows that while, in theory, any state with formal recognition might try to attract capital by committing to lower levels of regulation, this commitment alone is not enough to generate investment and economic development.