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This chapter reviews the regulation of disinformation from an African human rights’ law perspective, focusing on the right to freedom of expression and the right to vote. It provides an overview of the African regional law framework, specifically the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of 1981 (the African Charter) and corresponding jurisprudence. The chapter also analyses the way in which freedom of expression and disinformation laws have been applied in African countries, the aim being to contextualize and illustrate how African regional law plays out at the domestic level, but with an emphasis on the position in South Africa.
Despite Kenya’s transformative and progressive 2010 Constitution, it is still grappling with a hybrid democracy, displaying both authoritarian and democratic traits. Scholars attribute this status to several factors, with a prominent one being the domination of the political order and wielding of political power by a few individuals and families with historical ties to patronage networks and informal power structures. The persisting issues of electoral fraud, widespread corruption, media harassment, weak rule of law and governance challenges further contribute to the hybrid democracy status. While the 2010 Constitution aims to restructure the state and enhance democratic institutions, the transition process is considered incomplete, especially since the judiciary’s role of judicial review is mostly faced with the difficult task of countering democratic regression. Moreover, critical institutions such as the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) have faced criticism due to corruption scandals and perceptions of partisanship, eroding public trust in their ability to oversee fair elections effectively.
In the digital age, the landscape of information dissemination has undergone a profound transformation. The traditional boundaries between information and news have become increasingly blurred as technology allows anyone to create and share content online. The once-excusive realm of authoritative media outlets and professional journalists has given way to a decentralized public square, where individuals can voice their opinions and reach vast audiences regardless of mainstream coverage. The evolution of the digital age has dismantled the conventional notions of journalism and reshaped how news is obtained and interpreted. This shift has paved the way for the proliferation of fake news and online disinformation. The ease with which false information can be fabricated, packaged convincingly and rapidly disseminated to a wide audience has contributed to the rise of fake news. This phenomenon gained global attention during the 2016 US presidential election, prompting nations worldwide to seek strategies for tackling this issue.
The issue of mass disinformation on the Internet is a long-standing concern for policymakers, legislators, academics and the wider public. Disinformation is believed to have had a significant impact on the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election. Concern about the threat of foreign – mainly Russian – interference in the democratic process is also growing. The COVID-19 pandemic, which reached global proportions in 2020, gave new impetus to the spread of disinformation, which even put lives at risk. The problem is real and serious enough to force all parties concerned to reassess the previous European understanding of the proper regulation of freedom of expression.
Chile’s regulation of fake news dates back nearly a century. The initial instance occurred in 1925 during a constitutional crisis that resulted in the drafting of a new constitution. At that time, a de facto government issued a decree making it illegal to publish and distribute fake news. The second regulatory milestone occurred during the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet with the inclusion of provisions related to defamation in the 1980 constitution. Defamation involved spreading false information through mass media to unjustly tarnish someone’s reputation. Upon the restoration of democracy in Chile in 1990, these stipulations were permanently abolished from the legal system. Since 2001, the judicial pursuit of disinformation in Chile has been limited to exceptional means such as the State Security Law or, indirectly, through the right to rectification.
This chapter explores the erosion of trust in public facts and the crisis within commonsense conceptions of reality. It traces the evolution of scientific practices, emphasizing the role of early experimental scientists like Robert Boyle in grounding them. Ezrahi argues that the contemporary breakdown of epistemological norms, which previously upheld facts as sociopolitical currency, inevitably undermines the foundations of contemporary democracy. The citizens' diminished confidence in understanding why political actors behave in specific ways, coupled with the disparities between motives and visible effects, fosters the proliferation of conspiracy theories. The current breakdown of epistemological norms manifests itself in the “post truth” era and the ascent of “alternative facts.” Ezrahi scrutinizes the challenges of discerning facts from opinions in journalism and underscores the perils of exposure to fake news. The chapter investigates the erosion of a shared commonsense perception of reality through the lens of the Brexit campaign and the Trump presidency. Ezrahi highlights that the blurring of the cosmological dichotomy between Nature and humans has made it increasingly challenging for the public to differentiate between facts and fiction. Finally, he advocates for an awareness of the public’s role in defining political causes and facts.
In today's digital age, the spread of dis- and misinformation across traditional and social media poses a significant threat to democracy. Yet repressing political speech in the name of truth can also undermine democratic values. This volume brings together prominent legal scholars from democracies worldwide to explore and evaluate different regulatory approaches for addressing this complex problem – all taking into account that the cure must not be worse than the disease. Using a comparative lens, the book offers important and novel insights into methods ranging from national regulation of politicians' speech to empowering civil-society groups that are well-positioned to blunt the effects of disinformation and misinformation. The book also provides solutions-oriented recommendations for policymakers, judges, legal practitioners, and scholars seeking to promote democratic values by encouraging free political speech while combatting disinformation and misinformation. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter introduces the reader to the topic studied in the book, factual misinformation and its appeal in war. It poses the main research question of who believes in wartime misinformation and how people know what is happening in war. It then outlines the book’s central argument about the role of proximity and exposure to the fighting in constraining public misperceptions in conflict, and the methods and types of evidence used to test it. After clarifying some key concepts used in the book, it finally closes with a sketch of the manuscript’s main implications and an outline of its structure and contents.
The online sphere is a relatively new space and as such is much less regulated and policed than the offline world. This also means that rights are less protected online than they are in the physical world. Online harassment, hate speech, and misinformation via echo chambers, filter bubbles, conspiracy theories, and fake news have received increasing attention. Free internet access requires that users are reasonably protected by public authorities from such rights violations. The chapter looks at this problem from the perspective of three necessary elements required for the enjoyment of all rights: (1) rights enforcement, (2) an environment conducive to rights, and (3) education and skills training. In terms of enforcement, public authorities face the problem of having to identify often anonymous individual offenders without undermining general internet user anonymity. With respect to a safe environment, the chapter focuses on political polarisation and to what extent online misinformation is responsible for it. Finally, the chapter sets out certain skills that states ought to teach their citizens so they are able to defend themselves against attacks by other internet users.
Factual misinformation is spread in conflict zones around the world, often with dire consequences. But when is this misinformation actually believed, and when is it not? Seeing is Disbelieving examines the appeal and limits of dangerous misinformation in war, and is the go-to text for understanding false beliefs and their impact in modern armed conflict. Daniel Silverman extends the burgeoning study of factual misinformation, conspiracy theories, and fake news in social and political life into a crucial new domain, while providing a powerful new argument about the limits of misinformation in high-stakes situations. Rich evidence from the US drone campaign in Pakistan, the counterinsurgency against ISIL in Iraq, and the Syrian civil war provide the backdrop for practical lessons in promoting peace, fighting wars, managing conflict, and countering misinformation more effectively.
Fake news can affect people in negative ways. A recent line of research has demonstrated that when people are exposed to fake news they can form false memories for the events depicted in the news stories. We conducted a meta-analysis to obtain an estimate of the average rate of false memories elicited by fake news. Thirteen articles were included in the final analysis, revealing that nearly 40% and 60% of the participants reported at least one false memory and belief (respectively) after fake news exposure, while each participant remembered or believed 22% of the total number of fake news presented. Individual differences may affect the rate of false memory formation following exposure to false memories. We therefore examined moderating effects of individual difference variables assessed in the included studies. Participants with better analytical reasoning skills and a high level of interest in the news topic were least likely to report false memories for fake news, with level of interest being also a facilitating factor in remembering true news. No effect was detected for cognitive ability and objective knowledge. Our results provide insightful and practical information in the context of world-wide misinformation dissemination and its impact on people's beliefs and memories.
This Element takes on two related questions: How do the media cover the issue of misinformation, and how does exposure to this coverage affect public perceptions, including trust? A content analysis shows that most media coverage explicitly blames social media for the problem, and two experiments find that while exposure to news coverage of misinformation makes people less trusting of news on social media, it increases trust in print news. This counterintuitive effect occurs because exposure to news about misinformation increases the perceived value of traditional journalistic norms. Finally, exposure to misinformation coverage has no measurable effect on political trust or internal efficacy, and political interest is a strong predictor of interest in news coverage of misinformation across partisan lines. These results suggest that many Americans see legacy media as a bulwark against changes that threaten to distort the information environment.
Most people who regularly use the Internet will be familiar with words like “misinformation,” “fake news,” “disinformation,” and maybe even “malinformation.” It can appear as though these terms are used interchangeably, and they often are. However, they don’t always refer to the same types of content, and just because a news story or social media post is false doesn’t always mean it’s problematic. To add to the confusion, not all misinformation researchers agree on the definition of the problem, or employ a unified terminology. This chapter discusses the terminology around misinformation, guided by illustrative examples of problematic news content. It also looks at what misinformation isn’t: what makes a piece of information “real” or “true”? Finally, we explore how researchers have defined misinformation and how these definitions can be categorized, before presenting the working definition that is used throughout this book.
King Charles III is Dracula's distant cousin. Governments are hiding information about UFOs. COVID-19 came from outer space. These sound like absurd statements, but some are true, and others are misinformation. But what exactly is misinformation? Who believes and spreads things that aren't true, and why? What solutions do we have available, and how well do they work? This book answers all these questions and more. Tackling the science of misinformation from its evolutionary origins to its role in the internet era, this book translates rigorous research on misleading information into a comprehensive and jargon-free explanation. Whether you are a student, researcher, policymaker, or changemaker, you will discover an easy-to-read analysis on human belief in today's world and expert advice on how to prevent deception.
If elections are to perform their legitimizing role, they should not only be objectively free, fair and non-fraudulent, but should also be perceived by the public as such. This paper investigates who perceives elections to be fair and why by contrasting two main logics: one based on the idea that perceptions of election integrity arise from external cues voters get from their environment and a second logic claiming that perceptions are internally created based on attitudes and beliefs. We use original survey data collected in ten countries around the European Elections 2019. We find that perceptions of election fairness are unrelated to country levels of integrity but mainly relate to voters’ status as winners/losers of the elections, attachment to the institutions they elect and populist attitudes. We also find beliefs on fake news influence to weakly mediate the relation between populist attitudes and perceptions of election fairness.
Deceiving citizens is typically considered the main political motive behind the spread of fake news. Accordingly, strategies to debunk fake news, such as fact-checking, have been suggested to combat it. However, the spread of fake news persists despite these debunking strategies. We propose an alternative but underexplored motive behind the spread of fake news: Fake news aims not only to deceive citizens but also to induce media skepticism. To support our claim, we present a stylized formal model of media skepticism and demonstrate that the incentive to spread fake news persists even if citizens are not deceived by disinformation coming from fake news. Our model highlights the dilemma embedded in fact-checking.
This chapter looks closely at the influence of online news, especially social media, echo chambers, fake news, populism, political polarisation and foreign propaganda. There is lack of information but what there is does not fit well with current worries and concerns about the political content and effects of the new media and suggests a different set of conclusions.
Human minds are particularly biased when processing information in digital environments. Behavioral economics has highlighted many cognitive biases that afflict our economic decision making. We may choose people like ourselves for important jobs or we may focus on irrelevant characteristics. We may also focus on recent, available information because our brains interpret that as more relevant for the current situation, whereas, optimally, we might benefit from a deeper dive into collecting more representative or comprehensive data and analyzing it appropriately. Even the way information is presented influences whether we believe it. Designers of digital content and experiences need to be aware of and account for such biases when engaging users.
This chaptercomments on the relationship between moderation and civility and argues that the latter can work as an effective antidote to a festering climate of fear, rage, and intimidation.