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Elections in Central Asia unfold against a backdrop of digital repression, characterized by network throttling, online content blocking to suppress dissent and targeted online harassment of political opposition and journalists. State-imposed limits on online information availability are compounded by cyber foreign interference, including espionage, information campaigns, and disruptive incidents that have increasingly played a geopolitical role. These multifaceted cyber threats underscore the urgent need for a rapid, concerted policy response aimed at bolstering the integrity of electoral systems and procedures, reducing censorship and enhancing cybersecurity culture and resilience. This chapter explores trends in influencing elections and threatening electoral integrity through cyber means, focusing on both the informational and technical domains, and proposes action-oriented recommendations for cross-sectoral cooperation toward securing elections and the broader digital ecosystem in the region.
In 2015, Russia’s state media regulator Roskomnadzor criminalized sharing information that criticizes and ridicules public figures. The crudity of some of the memes notwithstanding, the state’s swift and heavy-handed response was remarkable the Russian government was afraid of public laughter. In the following years, the state’s stance on internet jocularity only worsened, culminating in the infamous 2019 disrespect of authorities, laws, and a string of criminal cases against those who created or reposted playful memes that made fun of the church and other authorities. Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government has grown even more intolerant, choking every voice of dissent. Nevertheless, many Russians continue to resist the official Kremlin narratives despite the threat of severe punishment; and humor remains one of their “weapons” of choice. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of humor in building resilience to authoritarianism and disinformation, especially among the younger generation of Russians. As public jocularity continues to be a powerful resource in both the ongoing struggle for democracy in Russia and in the crackdown on it, we examine humor in the context of the 2022 Russian invasion in Ukraine and argue that social media plays a role in amplifying humor and contributing to political change.
Evaluating attitudes toward democracy within an authoritarian political system is a complex endeavor. Numerous surveys indicate that a significant majority of Chinese citizens express satisfaction with the current level of democracy in China. To elucidate this intellectual puzzle, this chapter examines how differing understandings of democracy influence perceptions of satisfaction with the state of democratic governance. The findings reveal that Chinese citizens who regard elections and political rights as fundamental to democracy tend to be dissatisfied with the existing democratic framework. Similarly, individuals who espouse liberal democratic values also express dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy.
Redistricting plays a critical role in structuring the competitive terrain of American elections and shaping the quality of democratic representation. While often viewed as a routine administrative task, the redrawing of electoral boundaries is a deeply political process that can significantly influence who runs for office, who wins, and how voters are represented. This article examines the relationship between redistricting and electoral competition, with a particular focus on how partisan gerrymandering, legal rulings, and institutional reforms have influenced the fairness and integrity of the redistricting process. Tracing its historical roots and evolution, the analysis explores how legislatures, courts, and independent commissions construct district maps and the downstream effects these configurations have on incumbent entrenchment, voter behavior, and partisan polarization. By investigating the trade-offs between fair representation and competitive elections, this article illuminates how institutional design choices shape electoral outcomes and democratic legitimacy. In doing so, it underscores the enduring significance of redistricting as a source of political contestation and reform in the ongoing struggle to strengthen American democracy.
Scholars debate whether the presence of multiple parties in the legislature stabilizes dictatorships or promotes their demise. We show that authoritarian regimes face a dilemma: allowing for multipartism reduces the risk of bottom-up revolt, but facilitates protracted top-down democratization. Concessions to the opposition diminish the long-term benefits of authoritarian rule and empower regime soft-liners. We test our theory in Latin America—a region with a broad range of autocracies —using survival models, instrumental variables, random forests, and two case studies. Our theory explains why rational autocrats accept multipartism, even though this concession may ultimately undermine the regime. It also accounts for democratic transitions that occur when the opposition is fragmented and without a stunning authoritarian defeat.
A liberal reformist core dominated antiwar activities through the end of 1966. That year the movement maintained a predominantly decentralized orientation, both lacking and resisting true national coordination. Primarily through grassroots activity, the movement incorporated new constituencies and provided alternative sources of information that challenged the government’s credibility. Antiwar activists pursued change largely through the established political system, but also in coalition building for mass demonstrations and draft resistance. Dissent within the government became more visible, which gave wartime dissent a degree of respectability. Protesting napalm production signified an early economic challenge, and the case of the Fort Hood Three exemplified cooperation between active-duty military and civilian antiwar activists. Despite continued growth and some impressive achievements, the movement also faced more significant government and right-wing opposition, and the war’s continued escalation left many activists feeling frustrated and alienated.
Political polarization is a group phenomenon in which opposing factions, often of unequal size, exhibit asymmetrical influence and behavioral patterns. Within these groups, elites and masses operate under different motivations and levels of influence, challenging simplistic views of polarization. Yet, existing methods for measuring polarization in social networks typically reduce it to a single value, assuming homogeneity in polarization across the entire system. While such approaches confirm the rise of political polarization in many social contexts, they overlook structural complexities that could explain its underlying mechanisms. We propose a method that decomposes existing polarization and alignment measures into distinct components. These components separately capture polarization processes involving elites and masses from opposing groups. Applying this method to Twitter discussions surrounding the 2019 and 2023 Finnish parliamentary elections, we find that (1) opposing groups rarely have a balanced contribution to observed polarization, and (2) while elites strongly contribute to structural polarization and consistently display greater alignment across various topics, the masses, too, have recently experienced a surge in alignment. Our method provides an improved analytical lens through which to view polarization, explicitly recognizing the complexity of and need to account for elite-mass dynamics in polarized environments.
In this chapter we apply the theoretical model we introduced earlier to the behaviour of leaders to find out what alarms them, and under what conditions they are able and willing to order repression. We do not argue that we can accurately predict and explain every act of violence and repression. But we show how it helps us understand empirical patterns of repression. This model can inform our assessment of when we are most likely to observe human rights violations. To explain how context shapes human rights violations, we concentrate on why political regimes influence leaders’ threat perceptions and why democracies have the best human rights records, and why they do not always guarantee the protection of everyone’s basic rights. We outline the influence of mass dissent and of socio-economic factors. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of how context shaped respect for human rights in six countries.
This chapter covers the period between the Democrat Party’s 1955 political crisis and its greatest financial crisis (a devaluation and bailout in 1958). During this period, Prime Minister Menderes and his allies sought to sustain their economic policies while also retaining political power. Achieving these goals required illiberal tactics while seeking aid from the United States and other allies with increasing desperation. Democrat Party leaders marginalized intraparty critics and silenced the media, academics, and opposition. Unlike in previous chapters, however, we see Democrat Party leaders’ gambits either failing outright or achieving less than satisfactory results. In this period, US and European creditors took a harder line with the government; radical political movements gained popularity in neighboring states such as Syria and Iraq; and turnout in the 1957 elections fell such that the Democrat Party won with only a plurality of the vote. By the summer of 1958, a currency devaluation and bailout were no longer avoidable. Only the uncertainty caused by a revolution in Iraq enabled the Democrat-led government to secure comparatively favorable terms in negations.
Prior to the Enlightenment, citizens viewed themselves as subjects of their governments, obligated to obey the mandates of the ruling class. Enlightenment thinkers argued that governments should serve their citizens, rather than citizens being servants of their governments. This had a constraining effect on the abuse of authority, but also led to a romantic notion of democratic governments being accountable to their citizens and acting in their interests, legitimizing the exercise of authority by the ruling class. This chapter discusses the historical evolution of democratic institutions to show how they emerged as a result of negotiations in a political marketplace. One advantage of democratic institutions is that the exercise of authority tends to rest with the positions people hold rather than with those people themselves. This mechanism for peacefully replacing those in authority constrains their ability to abuse their power.
Chapter 3 examines the evolution of caste and democracy.In doing so, it focuses on three aspects – the relationship between caste and electoral politics, the trajectory of caste-based reservations (affirmative action), and the link between development indicators and caste in the contemporary period. Though caste mobilization has indeed pluralized representative politics in India, substantial economic and social gains by the lower castes have been limited.
Democracy is one of India’s great achievements. However, it is undeniable that Indian democracy has been under considerable strain in recent years. Chapter 1 analyzes these trends linked to Indian democracy and their underlying determinants. In particular, the chapter emphasizes the link between growing economic inequality and India’s recent democratic decline through two mechanisms – the decline of the Congress and the rise of the BJP under Modi.
Amid declining public standing, many political parties seek to regain disaffected voters through various institutional strategies. One key approach is democratizing legislative candidate selection to grant party members or voters greater influence and signal improved responsiveness, transparency, and legitimacy. Yet does this strategy pay off electorally? The growing literature on this topic provides conflicting answers and limited evidence. We argue that more inclusive candidate selection does not have meaningful effects at the polls despite its merits. Whereas voters favor such procedures in principle, as some suggest, they underprioritize them in favor of other considerations when electing parties. We support this argument with observational and experimental data, including a matching difference-in-differences estimation of party performance across thirty-four democracies and a survey democracies and a survey experiment in three countries. This article contributes to our understanding of the relationship between party institutions and voter behavior in an age of eroding public trust and rising anti-establishment sentiment.
It is widely believed that high inflation reduces the popularity of incumbents, and contributed to poor incumbent performance in recent elections in the United States and elsewhere. Existing research shows that voters’ inflation perceptions are associated with their evaluations of incumbent parties, but these observational studies cannot eliminate the possibility that the causal relationship runs the other way, where opposition to incumbent governments causes individuals to report higher price increases. To help overcome this inferential challenge, this study draws on a pre-registered experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey fielded just days before the 2024 US Presidential election. We find that priming Americans to think about inflation reduced support for the incumbent party. This effect is most pronounced among Independents and Democrats. These findings suggest that inflation likely contributed to the Democrats’ 2024 electoral defeat, and provide novel evidence that inflation has a causal effect on support for incumbent parties.
This research note introduces a new publicly available dataset identifying which federal candidates are out as LGBTQ2S+. The dataset comprises 4,201 candidates who ran in 2015, 2019 and 2021 for the five parties that won seats in the House of Commons. In this research note, we describe the replicable procedure we followed to identify out LGBTQ2S+ candidates, which involved systematic individual candidate searches. This procedure identified 176 LGBTQ2S+ candidates in total, which is more than in previous datasets. We illustrate how the data can be used by documenting how LGBTQ2S+ candidates changed over time relative to straight cisgender candidates. This dataset will allow researchers to examine a range of questions about LGBTQ2S+ representation as well as conduct intersectional analyses.
The American and allied military presence in Afghanistan peaked between late 2010 and mid 2011. For the next ten years, the major debate in Washington was how many troops to withdraw, how quickly. The announced unilateral American withdrawal was the defining fact of the war for its final decade. Policymakers treated the debate over troop numbers as a proxy for a debate over larger goals. But there are other aspects of strategy, like reconstruction and diplomacy, that simply cannot be subsumed within a debate about troop numbers, aspects that went unaddressed during the US’s gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan. Withdrawing troops without achieving the other objectives is how the United States gradually abandoned the rest of its war aims as slowly and expensively as possible.
Indonesia’s population skews young, so political analysts are increasingly concerned with what the “youth vote” looks like, and what generational change will bring to Indonesia’s democracy. On the one hand, analysts have historically focused on the liberal political activism of more educated cohorts of young people, and especially those in urban areas. On the other, and most recently, young Indonesians overwhelmingly voted for Prabowo Subianto in the 2024 presidential elections, suggesting this cohort to be either unaware of, or unperturbed by, his authoritarian history. This paper examines how young Indonesians perceive their country’s democratic trajectory. We analyze two decades of nationally representative survey data, and examine the democratic preferences of Indonesian voters whose political socialization took place entirely in the post-authoritarian era (1998–). The results suggest both life-cycle and intriguing cohort effects: on average, Indonesians become more positive towards their democracy as they age; but we also find that Indonesia’s Gen Zs are more satisfied with democracy than other generational cohorts—despite a precipitous decline in the quality of Indonesian democracy over the past decade. We argue, therefore, that while all Indonesians show high levels of satisfaction with their weakening democracy, young Indonesians, more than other generations, can be understood as ‘complacent democrats.’
Redistricting is often a hotly contested affair within states as the party in power attempts to maximize its chances for electoral success through injecting partisanship into the process. Previous works have evaluated how different redistricting practices can influence elections, but little is known about how redistricting can impact citizen attitudes toward government. Using an original survey with a unique experiment, we evaluate the relationship between how redistricting is performed and how satisfied citizens are with the state of democracy in the United States. We find that the mere perception of redistricting being done in a partisan manner leads to decreased levels of system support. Furthermore, our models show that independent redistricting commissions tend to reduce the perceived prevalence of gerrymandering and boost citizens’ evaluations of the democratic process.
Congruence between the policies implemented by elected representatives and voters’ policy preferences is fundamental to representation and democratic accountability. Can we anticipate a closer alignment between voters’ policy preferences and the policies explicitly adopted by elected representatives on the more electorally significant issues? We address this question using a simple game theoretic model, where we demonstrate that greater salience of a particular issue in elections leads to less congruence between the policies implemented by elected representatives compared to voters’ policy preferences on that very issue. This finding carries significant implications for the connection between electoral salience and representation on valence issues, and has particular relevance for understanding the democratic foundations of security and counterterrorism policies.
Despite a long tradition of research on dominant party systems (DPS), comparative analysis remains limited by conceptual ambiguities, regional and historical biases, and the absence of accessible data. This research note introduces the Global Dominant Party Systems (GDPS) Dataset, which includes 187 cases of executive dominance across 106 independent countries from 1900 to 2024, addressing the regional and historical biases that have traditionally plagued the literature. Drawing on foundational theories and refined concepts, the dataset differentiates between dominant parties and DPS and develops the minimal definition of DPS that focuses on executive arena and at least minimally contested elections. The dataset identifies cases with mechanical properties typical of DPS, that is those in which one party (or coalition) consistently monopolizes executive power and electoral competition fails to produce changes in government leadership. Despite setting permissive minimal criteria, the dataset also offers a broad range of variables on democracy, corruption and institutional features which can be used to set different criteria for case selection and conduct robustness checks. The dataset also includes variables on ethnic and opposition fragmentation, voter turnout, economy and population size, enabling researchers to investigate the institutional and socio-economic foundations of dominance across regime types and world regions. Finally, the proposed model of DPS evolution and change can serve as a useful guide for qualitative research on unpacking causal mechanisms. While limited to positive cases of dominance, the dataset offers new potential for cross-regional hypothesis testing and theory development on executive power, party system change, and democratic resilience.