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This chapter examines the political economy of British theatre – that is, how the state governs and manages the economics of theatre – and British theatre’s often fraught relationship to these arrangements. It considers the place where state funding of theatre has been most necessary but most reluctant: theatre buildings. The chapter first traces the history of capital investment in British theatre since 1945. It shows how the state has taken up its fiscal responsibilities to finance theatre building fitfully, and sometimes inequitably. Against this historical backdrop, the chapter then examines the reconstructed Battersea Arts Centre in south London, which fully re-opened in 2018 after a serious fire. The refurbished BAC, the chapter argues, makes a distinctive and persuasive case for public investment in theatre. Economically, it realises a Keynesian aim articulated at the foundation of the theatrical mixed economy after World War Two: for public investment to increase theatre’s productive capacity. It also puts the value of that investment on show, suggesting an alternative case for public funding, one in which theatre is not simply a ‘good cause’ but a highly credible investment, economically and aesthetically.
Late medieval Europeans extended exploitation of fish stocks to marine frontiers previously little affected by intense human predation. Driven by demand since the twelfth century and supported by waves of innovative capture and preservation methods, herring fisheries in the North Sea and Baltic fed millions of northern Europeans with the largest medieval catches known. Stockfish (naturally freeze-dried cod) from arctic Norway went from a regional subsistence product c.1100 to an export trade profiting fishers and merchants alike. Elsewhere entrepreneurs caught, preserved, and exported pike and other fish from the eastern Baltic, hake and conger from the Channel approaches and Bay of Biscay, and migratory bluefin tuna off Sicily and the Gulf of Cadiz, all for consumption a thousand and more kilometers away. Transforming local abundances for distant tables at unprecedented scale drove new capitalized forms of organization and market behaviour. Consumers, merchants, and fishers saw fish as economic objects disconnected from any familiar nature and free for competitive exploitation. Yet besides prospects of infinite abundance the new frontier fisheries posed risks, and not simply those of hazardous access or human conflict. Heavily fished local stocks of herring successively crashed to commercial insignificance when further stressed by environmental changes in the pulsating arrival of the Little Ice Age. But the almost accidental discovery of virgin cod stocks off Newfoundland in the 1490s confirmed the mythic belief that abundance always lay over the next horizon. Thoughts of limits vanished at the eve of modernity.
The independent India that came into existence on 15 August 1947 was a large, diverse and poor country that inherited many economic problems from its colonial past. The most decisive break with the past that was achieved in economic matters by independent India was in the role of government policy and state agencies in the running and directing of the economy. The most important set of controls that were devised in the late 1940s concerned the development of industry through the rationing of capital issues and planning of future economic development. Since the level of savings and capital investment in agriculture was so low during the 1950s it is not surprising that the growth in agricultural output which took place was largely the result of enhanced labour utilisation on an expanding area of unirrigated land. Between 1939 and 1971 a particular type of economy emerged in India in which official planning and government economic management played a crucial part.
Between 1860 and 1970 the Indian economy was in an underdeveloped state, but the characteristics of this underdevelopment need to be specified with some care. The striking contrast in India between 1860 and 1970 remained the absence of productivity increases, leading to significant underemployment of labour at subsistence wages with low levels of investment in technology and in human capital formation, and depressed demand for basic wage-goods. The more successful application of new technology and increased investment in agriculture led to foodgrain self-sufficiency, and to a fall in the real price of wheat and rice that has benefitted the rural poor. The administrative procedures, ideology and competence of the state have all played a part in reinforcing underdevelopment, with the biggest failing of all being in human capital development and appropriate technical research. After almost two centuries of colonial rule, India was an underdeveloped economy by 1947, and had underdeveloped institutions to match.
The rural sector, comprising agriculture, and ancillary activities such as animal husbandry, forestry and fishing, was the foundation of the colonial economy. In most parts of the country, the peasant mode of production never fully resolved itself into a class structure based on labour and capital. Rich peasants rarely became rentiers; poor peasants did not often suffer full proletarianisation by losing access to land entirely. The creation of a land market in India in the first half of the nineteenth century was identified by nationalist historians as one of the most drastic effects of colonial rule that acted, especially in north India and Bengal, as a mechanism for transferring control of land out of traditional proprietors into the hands of merchants and moneylenders. For the rural poor the disruption of the rural labour market was probably the most severe direct consequence of the depression in agriculture.
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