The chapter summarizes the most important issues of the research topic, with a special focus on the goals of sanctioning competition law infringements. Without efficient sanctions, there is a serious risk that competition rules would not be taken seriously, which would in turn undermine the performance of our market economy. Sanctions, deterrence and respect for law are inseparable friends. Although there seems to be a global consensus that the ultimate goal is optimal deterrence, this goal exists more on the policy level than in the calculation of the amount of fines and other sanctions in actual cases. The chapter discusses various options for measuring the efficiency of fines, concluding that this discussion can be pursued only at an academic level. A mix of sanctions can bring about optimal deterrence, including personal administrative sanctions. Two hypothetical cartel cases with likely fines imposed in various jurisdictions are presented to show that even similarly structured sanctioning regimes may result in a diverging level of sanctions being imposed due to diverging national approaches.

Turkish competition law provides a dual enforcement structure that consists of public and private enforcement. Although the legislator has attached considerable weight to private enforcement by enabling the claimants to sue for threefold damages, it is fair to say that the Act on the Protection of Competition mainly relies on public enforcement. The Act empowers the Turkish Competition Authority to enforce the law and sets out various sanctions, including structural remedies, which equip the Authority with broad powers in combating anticompetitive behavior. The prime sanction is administrative monetary fines which are based on the turnover of the infringing undertaking and can be set at a maximum level of 10 percent of the turnover of the infringing undertaking. The Act also authorizes the Authority to implement monetary fines to managers and employees in cases where they have considerable influence in the formation of infringement. Anticompetitive behavior is a misdemeanor; however, in bid-rigging, it can also give rise to a crime and trigger harsh criminal sanctions. It is generally accepted that the Act provides severe penalties for infringements; however, in practice, the sanctions have been applied somewhat inconsistently, basically due to the fact that enforcement policy lacks coherent policy goals.

The chapter describes how the mix of competition law sanctions and enforcement instruments in Germany has been significantly expanded in recent years. A special feature of the German competition law procedure is that there are two different types of proceedings. Administrative proceedings allow for less serious consequences, such as prohibitions, behavioural and structural remedies, and disgorgements. More severe measures, such as regulatory fines, can only be adopted in regulatory offence proceedings. Criminal law does not play a major role in the enforcement of competition law in Germany. There is only one real criminal offence, bid-rigging. Recent reforms have concerned the liability of parent companies and legal and economic successors, the codification of the leniency programme and the calculation of fines. A highly controversial issue is the liability of managers and employees. New enforcement approaches currently being discussed or already being tested include exclusion from public tenders, reputational sanctions, whistle-blowing and increased use of negotiated settlements. Private enforcement seems to be making particularly great progress as a result of the EU Antitrust Damages Directive. Overall, the current system in Germany seeks to combine incentives for voluntary compliance with tough sanctions and strict enforcement for those who nevertheless break the law.

In legal procedures, sanction is understood as a means to put a law into effect, by which the legal subject is compelled to comply with the law by providing incentives for compliance or penalties for infringement. To be effective, sanction needs to have a deterrent effect on the wrongdoer. Competition law sanction varies in different jurisdictions and may include rules of an administrative, private, and criminal law nature. In Indonesia, the competition authority can impose administrative sanctions. However, the law also provides for criminal sanction for the infringement, for which it requires a court decision. The law itself does not mention private sanctions. In practice, it is debatable whether it would be possible to claim damages from a competition law infringer via court. The study is divided into two parts. First, it focuses on sanctioning in competition law in Indonesia: while sanctions usually require a deterrent effect, two issues need further clarification. Secondly, it addresses the challenges needing to be overcome to establish an ASEAN competition law and ASEAN competition law enforcement body, and the attempts to harmonize competition laws of member countries.