Debates over citizenship, immigration, colonial memory, the reform of the state, the historiography of modern France, terrorism and security, and the complicated relationship between state and church have been exploited by politicians and galvanized society. Many of these debates are around the political concepts of republicanism, neutrality, and the spirit of laïcité which structure the vocabulary of French political actors and of ordinary citizens. In France, majority rule infringes on the rights of minorities. This chapter probes the debates concerning cultural policies in France in the face of what its government perceives as a challenge to its national raison d’être, including those revolving around the burqa, the niqab and the burkini. Freedom of religion is restricted to the private sphere while secularism is celebrated in the public sphere. It is argued that the burqa and niqab ban is neither just nor reasonable in the eyes of these women and girls, their families and community, and that paternalism that holds that the ban is for the women’s own good is a poor, coercive excuse. Claims for paternalistic coercion to protect adult women from their own culture when they do not ask for protection are not sufficiently reasonable to receive vindication.

This chapter deals with the relationship of the particular to the general in the practice of law in three stages. It begins by examining the conception of the rule and its general and abstract character in the doctrine and theory of law. It then “re-specifies” the question from a praxeological viewpoint; that is to say it deals with it from the point of view of practitioners and users of law. Finally, it addresses the issue of Islam in French public and legal life, through the so-called “burkini affaire” and the resulting judgment of the Council of State (Conseil d’État), which gives us the opportunity to examine how the question of the general and particular dimensions of the legal rule applies in context, contingently, at three levels: that of “public opinion,” which is polarized around the question of the degree of particularism admissible in public life; that of the regulatory authority, which establishes a rule starting from a particular case; and that of the judging authority, which decides a particular case on the basis of general rules.