This chapter articulates the central argument (why a new legal form for social enterprises in India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore is needed and what it should entail); explains why the four Asian jurisdictions are selected as case studies; and examines the purposes of social enterprises and their two main business models. The chapter then provides an overview of social enterprises in the four Asian jurisdictions including: their operating domains, the drivers of the development of social enterprises, the challenges faced by them, the three main conflicts of interests afflicting them, and the legal forms used by social enterprises. Importantly, the chapter shows that the legal forms available to or used by social enterprises in the four Asian jurisdictions are unable to properly address the conflicts of interests, and thus, a new legal form is required.

The central argument in this chapter is that the duties to which directors owe the company, specifically the duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company and the duty to exercise powers for proper purposes, should be aligned with the purpose of social enterprises. In other words, the meaning of company’s interests in the best interest duty and that of proper purpose in the proper purpose rule ought to be equated with the proposed corporate purpose advanced in Chapter 1. To make this argument, I show that the laws governing these two directors’ duties in the four common law Asian jurisdictions and those of UK CICs and US PBCs and SPCs are not aligned with the purpose of social enterprises and I demonstrate why it is important to have this alignment. I also explain how the proper purpose rule can be aligned with my proposed purpose of social enterprise.

This chapter argues that the existing corporate laws of the four Asian jurisdictions and the laws regulating social enterprises in the US and UK that deal with purpose are generally ineffective in preventing the subordination of social benefit to profit; the laws are inadequate to ensure that social benefit is prioritized. Thus, I argue that in my proposed legal form, under the first criterion, there should be a requirement to the following effect that “on the whole, the pursuit and delivery of social benefit is prioritised over profit-making except where doing so will have a material and adverse effect on the financial viability of the social enterprise.” To make this argument, I first distinguish between corporate interest, corporate object, and corporate interest. I then examine the company laws of the four common law Asian jurisdictions, followed by the US benefit corporation and social purpose corporation as well as the UK community interest company. Subsequently, I propose a corporate purpose to which social enterprises should adhere and I show how this purpose can be privately and publicly enforced.

The business corporation is just one of many types of corporations, each of which typically has its own statute. Since 2010, 35 states have adopted statutes creating a new form of corporation: the public benefit corporation (PBC). Although the details vary somewhat from state to state, in general PBC statutes are intended to provide a limited liability entity through which for-profit businesses could lawfully pursue stakeholder capitalism and ESG without running afoul of the shareholder value maximization rule. The availability of PBCs as an alternative to the traditional business corporation could alleviate the growing pressure on the latter to pursue ESG, since they provide an alternative by which social justice activists can pursue their ESG goals while still making a profit. In any case, the widespread adoption of PBC statutes confirms that Dodge is corporate law’s general rule. After all, if Dodge were not the law, PBCs would be unnecessary. Boards of business corporations would be free to pursue public benefits without violating their fiduciary duties. The perceived need for PBC statutes suggests that boards are not free to do so absent the statute.

The goal of the business corporation traditionally has been understood to be the maximization of shareholder wealth. A growing demand for social enterprise has led to the creation of various new forms of business organization, including the benefit corporation, that have the goal of creating both shareholder wealth and other public benefits. Although benefit corporations were developed to overcome the shareholder wealth maximization norm, it is not fair to say that they also overcome shareholder primacy. Properly understood, benefit corporations are shareholder-centric: they exist to allow shareholders to pursue altruistic goals rather than to require them to do so. This essay demonstrates this from the history and structure of the Model Benefit Corporation Act and argues that benefit corporation legislation ought to remain essentially enabling rather than mandatory in nature.

This chapter summarizes the fundamentals of U.S. corporate law, including limited liability, corporate objectives, fiduciary duty, and shareholder information, voting, litigation, and exit rights. It also canvasses legal innovations (e.g., benefit corporations and sustainability disclosures) and explains their relevance to incorporating sustainability as part of broader corporate practice. This review reveals few legal barriers to U.S. corporations pursuing sustainability, although important practical factors can frustrate attempts to engage in such efforts. In the shareholder-oriented American corporate and business environment, the drive for pursuing such changes will need to come from asset owners and markets themselves.

The international emergence of alternative corporate forms and certifications has given credence to a new strain of law developing within the corporate sustainability movement, known as social enterprise law. What are some of the trade-offs that accompany such laws? Upon canvassing the development of social enterprise lawmaking initiatives worldwide, two preliminary observations arise. First, the majority of social enterprise laws, particularly in Europe and Asia, are designed to address the targeted needs of special and/or marginalized populations. The miniscule number of these businesses formed to date suggests that concerns over the shrinking of public goods and services remain largely theoretical. Second, U.S. benefit corporation laws may only strengthen erroneous beliefs on existing corporate law and governance – thus creating impediments to broad-scale sustainability change. The aggressive pursuit of a global market by private U.S. entrepreneurs behind the B Corporation certification and benefit corporation laws contrasts starkly with state-led initiatives.