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Animals, like humans, suffer and die from natural causes. This is particularly true of animals living in the wild, given their high exposure to, and low capacity to cope with, harmful natural processes. Most wild animals likely have short lives, full of suffering, usually ending in terrible deaths. This book argues that on the assumption that we have reasons to assist others in need, we should intervene in nature to prevent or reduce the harms wild animals suffer, provided that it is feasible and that the expected result is positive overall. It is of the utmost importance that academics from different disciplines as well as animal advocates begin to confront this issue. The more people are concerned with wild animal suffering, the more probable it is that safe and effective solutions to the plight of wild animals will be implemented in the future.
This chapter examines relationality objections to intervention in nature. It starts by reconstructing Clare Palmer’s contextual approach, according to which we are not usually required to assist wild animals due to the lack of prior morally relevant entanglements with them. It rejects these grounds for determining positive obligations, arguing that it implausibly implies there is no requirement to help distant human beings in need due to natural causes or to benefit others at no cost. Next, it offers a case for construing Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s account in Zoopolis of our political duties toward wild animals in a way that much more pervasive interventions in nature may be required. If we have a duty to ensure that the environment meets wild animals’ needs, facts suggest that the satisfaction of wild animals’ needs does not depend on the preservation of their natural environments. Instead, we should favor some form of environmental enhancement, that is, any modification of environmental conditions with a net positive effect on nonhuman well-being.
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