This chapter explores the role accorded to the principle of equality of Member States in the case law of the Court of Justice and national courts reviewing measures of financial assistance. At the same time, it investigates the extent to which the common interest, as the expression of the principle of solidarity, features as a consideration before those courts. The chapter opens with a brief description of financial assistance measures to gain a sense of how their versatile nature influenced judicial review. It then analyses judicial review of the European Stability Mechanism and the resulting Memoranda of Understanding at the national level in respect of access, remedies, and the interpretation of the principles of solidarity and equality. An analogous exercise is then conducted in respect of the EU courts. The chapter lastly reflects upon judicial interactions taking place between the EU and the national level and comments on the overall status of legal accountability in the EU judicial space.

Affected by the financial crisis and in order to receive financial assistance, several EU member states had to adopt structural adjustment programmes aiming at the reduction of public expenditures. Despite their differences, common feature of all financial assistance schemes was the combination of supranational and international legal instruments and institutions. Newly created financial assistance mechanisms, such as the EFSF and ESM, were created under international law and all financial assistance packages included the participation of the IMF. This hybrid nature of European financial assistance raises the question of whether the actors involved in the award of the assistance are bound by EU human rights. Against this background, this chapter first exposes the doubtful legitimacy of European financial assistance. Second, it analyses the CJEU case law on financial assistance conditionality from a human rights perspective, aiming to respond to the question of whether European actors were and could be bound by human rights when preparing financial assistance conditions. Third, it investigates the possibility of conceiving a legitimate role for courts in applying the procedural and substantive dimension of human rights accountability in times of crisis.

The sovereign debt crisis shook the foundations of the euro area economic framework and ECB. It marked a clear change from the past. The chapter describes the events, starting with the Greek situation, and continuing to the problems related to Italy and Spain. For the ECB and European Macroeconomic Constitution, the main issues related to measures that were increasingly directed at easing economic and financial market stress concerning individual Member States’ public finances. Hence the constitutional concerns over the ECB’s legal mandate became more pronounced and contested. The chapter analyses the ECB’s verbal interventions, drafting and involvement in rescue plans, but also the role of the longer-term financing for banks in creating the vicious link between banks and sovereigns is discussed. The main constitutional conclusions relate to the ECB’s activities outside the sphere of monetary policy. They could be deemed alarming for the independence of the ECB, but they also could have distorted the institutional balance within the EU. Furthermore, the role of LTROs in encouraging banks to purchase government bonds underlines the problem with extending the reach of monetary policy measures.

This chapter shows how many of the events and much of the work of the second interim government in Tunisia, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and Troika, were directly linked to or produced by the behaviors, traits, and decisions of the TPA. The chapter begins by explaining how – in line with the previous chapter – the TPA was not operating in wide open territory; rather, it faced many constraints by nature of its role as a first interim government. These included pressure to swiftly hand power to an elected government, thus forcing it to work quickly; the need for care as it tried not to overstep its mandate, thus constraining its decision-making ability; and a host of constraints created by the legacies of the outgoing autocracy and inexperience with democratic government, including its own lack of preparation. The chapter then describes the series of events and actions under the TPA's successor, each with its own echoes of what had come before.

Chapter 6 examines severe and protracted economic contractions following the Great Recession of 2008–09 in two countries on the European periphery: Latvia and Greece. It documents the evolution of main macroeconomic aggregates and social indicators in these two countries before, during, and after the 2008–09 crisis. The chapter also critically examines the role played by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other European institutions in the design and implementation of austerity in these economies, and draws lessons for other nations from these two experiences. The chapter also discusses the futility of democratic consultation (referendums) in Greece for the amelioration of conditionality and austerity.