We begin this chapter by outlining what constitutes a humiliating foreign policy. We then linger on a key feature in the phenomenology of political humiliation, namely the sense of being replaced. This sense manifests in a perception of being removed from importance and consequence – usually by someone not viewed as a worthy competitor. After describing the phenomenology of replacement, we point out that it is particularly important to understand this sentiment because it straddles personal and political psychology, and because a focus on the sense of replacement helps us distinguish normative and descriptive aspects of political humiliation. After discussing the phenomenology of replacement, we highlight the difference between democratic and autocratic rulers in their susceptibility to humiliation. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the dual role of humiliation as both driver and method of war.

This chapter explains how failure at Gallipoli in spring 1915 focused attention on fighting the Ottoman Empire. The secret 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, understood by historians as emblematic of broader British and French imperial ambitions, also provided a blueprint for the prosecution of the war. In this multifront war, what happened on one battlefront had consequences on others and for Allied military and domestic agendas back in Europe.

This chapter deals with two key documents concerning Palestine adopted during the First World War. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement was an agreement between Britain and France to divide the Middle East into respective areas of influence. The agreement was conditional on Britain and France defeating the Ottoman Empire. The Agreement ignored national interests of both Arabs and Jews. It was, however, a binding agreement between two sovereign States. The fact that it was a secret agreement and ignored rights of self-determination did not affect its legality at the time. An exchange of correspondence between British High Commissioner McMahon and Hussein Sherif of Mecca promised Arab independence. It is doubtful that the correspondence was regarded as a treaty at the time; nevertheless, it can be considered a binding international commitment by Britain. The fact that it was secret and conditional on Britain defeating the Ottomans does not detract from its legal validity. Britain apparently intended to exclude Palestine from the area promised to Hussein but, for political reasons, used ambiguous language that did not make an explicit reference to excluding Palestine.