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This chapter discusses Portuguese policies and Indian reactions concerning the horse trade, general trade control, and technology. The Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean meant that for perhaps fifty years the trade through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and so to Venice suffered greatly, though not consistently. Even in the first decade of the sixteenth century over half of Portugal's state revenue came from West African gold and Asian pepper and other spices. A problem as important as mismanagement in Lisbon was the revival of the Levant trade, for this eroded Portugal's early sixteenth-century quasi-monopoly position. Apparently later in the century some of the Christians were persuaded to bring the pepper themselves, but at least for the first part of the century the Portuguese were usually dependent for their pepper supplies on their supposed inveterate enemies, the Muslims.
This chapter investigates the strengths and weakness of the Portuguese military and governmental system. It shows how international interests dictated that Hurmuz be left open, at least a little, by the Portuguese. Much more important was the failure to take Aden to control the entrance to the Red Sea. One basic problem was that all officials traded on their own behalf, as well as in many cases being responsible for controlling trade in their particular port. The fuzzy distinction between public and private property can be illustrated by many instances in the sixteenth century, for instance the abuses in Diu. The chapter discusses the official Portuguese system, the one in which they tried to be different and have an impact, by an analysis of three general points to do with the nature of their activities and empire, one of which was their brutality, usually directed against Muslims.
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