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This chapter examines several cases of interaction between the ICRC and Bern, emphasizing ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga’s concern to buttress ICRC independence circa 1993, an orientation continued by his successor, ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger. This is contrasted with different policies during the era of ICRC President Peter Maurer. The relationship between Bern and Geneva will always be unique, since Bern has a special status in international humanitarian law, and because Bern is a significant donor to the ICRC’s budget. But the chapter argues for more attention to the differences between ICRC humanitarian neutrality and Swiss political neutrality, whether at the United Nations or in Ukraine.
The increased but perhaps temporary tight linkage between the ICRC and the World Economic Forum, whose paying members are corporations, is examined in great detail – especially from 2014. A costs–benefits analysis, fairly constructed, shows that the issue is of relatively minor significance in the long run as facts have played out, although that could have been otherwise. The world overwhelmingly has adopted some form of capitalism, which recognizes the importance of private business actors, including in places such as “communist” China and Vietnam. But President Peter Maurer’s presence on the WEF board of trustees was indeed a mistake. The ICRC, existing for strictly humanitarian reasons, should not be endorsing or advancing any economic system, or allowing itself to be seen as part of an unelected economic elite that informally helps govern a world manifesting many negatives. The problem 2014–2022 was mainly one of optics: namely, that one could question ICRC priorities and motivations in certain situations, while the organization ran the risk of endangering ICRC staff in the field. The latter did not materialize in any major way, but it logically could have done.
The author concludes, first, that the ICRC is not in fatal decline, especially given its continued sizable budgets (even if reduced) and relatively new financial supporters, such as the World Bank. ICRC leaders and many staff continue to have good high-level contacts with important policymakers around the world, these latter often approaching the president and other officials for discussion of pressing topics. The ICRC is often consulted within the United Nations, including in the Security Council. However, there is much to discuss about the precise nature of ICRC diplomacy. Does it stay in its humanitarian lane as strictly humanitarian and Dunantist? Or, as some critics maintain, does it wander too far afield when it should be more focused on traditional issues?
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