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States usually intervene in failed states for broader strategic or humanitarian motives. However, chapter 6 uses Somalia, the Democratic Repblic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan to show that most African interveners lent their support to one side or the other in these lawless lands in the pursuit of their own interests. In the DRC, external interveners were primarily interested in looting rather than in Congo’s stability. In Somalia, Ethiopia switched from hostile to supportive military interventions in an attempt to dampen Islamist influence while also creating a weak transitional government it could easily manipulate. Kenya and Eritrea, in contrast, intervened in order to establish a strong Somali state capable of counterbalancing Ethiopia’s hegemonic aspirations in the horn of Africa. Unlike the first two cases, South Sudan did not experience multiple military interventions despite encountering similar conditions. This negative case is the result of Ethiopia’s restraint from taking any military action to support its kin, the Nuer, because it feared upsetting the ethnic balance in its eastern region. Results from qualitative comparative analysis show that most African interveners are motivated to dispatch their militaries to failed states by the presence of prominent roles, rebel sanctuaries, lootable resources, and domestic pressures.
Malaysia has been on a long and rocky road for women to be appointed to the bench with progress only starting in the last decade. Not that long ago, a NGO Shadow Report commenting on Malaysia’s Report on CEDAW in 2005 described the number of female judge as ‘dismal’ in the civil and Syariah legal system. Women had to overcome significant challenges of being on the bench in the Syariah court system as a national fatwa prohibited women from being appointed as judges. It took over two decades for the National Fatwa Committee to overrule its previous decision allowing women to be appointed as Syariah court judges provided that they met the qualification requirements. In order for the fatwa to take effect in the individual states, it had to be passed by the respective states with some states declaring they would not pass it and other states remaining silent on this issue. Progress was initially very slow and by early 2016, only the five out of thirteen states allowed Muslim women to become Syariah court judges. By mid-2016 history was made when more states came around and women were also appointed to higher Syariah courts.
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