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Edited by
Matthew Craven, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,Sundhya Pahuja, University of Melbourne,Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics and Political Science
Edited by
Matthew Craven, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,Sundhya Pahuja, University of Melbourne,Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics and Political Science
In 1963, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities published a study that found that more people were ‘effectively confined behind their national boundaries today than in previous periods of history’.The study, written by Filipino Judge José D. Inglés in his capacity as Special Rapporteur, represented the first attempt within UN institutions to examine the emerging right under international law of individuals to leave any country including their own, and to systematically document how various states were recognising – or failing to recognise – this right in their domestic laws and regulations.
examines the decade following the building of the Berlin Wall, from 1961-1971. After partition, which resulted both in increased jazz activities in the East and the clandestine transfer of jazz materials across the border, party leadership authored a pivotal “jazz resolution” that sought to steer the course of jazz in the socialist state. Examining this landmark policy in detail, this chapter shows how socialist leaders claimed jazz as a genuine folk tradition once more and called for its recognition as an art form that protested racial oppression. The chapter also details the pivotal 1965 tour by Louis Armstrong of the eastern bloc, which the GDR used to demonstrate its solidarity with the civil rights movement in America, and which permanently changed the trajectory of jazz in the GDR. In this light, the East German cultural establishment aimed to recruit one of the world’s most famous jazz musicians not just as a critic of American racial policies but furthermore as an ideal socialist-realist artist. Armstrong’s tour had many impacts, including the founding of the Dixieland Festival in Dresden, which continues to the present day.
Concerns over Berlin and Cuba led American forces to confront Soviet forces in situations in which a misstep, a rash action by an aggressive or nervous officer, might have led to war. Nikita Khrushchev provoked each of these crises. The Berlin crisis he created in 1958 provides a useful example of how he functioned. The revival of German power in the late 1950s, and evidence of growing German influence within the Western alliance, worried Soviet analysts. By the spring of 1960, the American government knew unequivocally, from intelligence gathered by U-2 over-flights of the Soviet Union, that Khrushchev's claims of missile superiority were unwarranted. The Cuban Communist party was legalized and its members began to play a role, although relatively minor, in the implementation of Fidel Castro's programs. Air raids by CIA-operated bombers had failed to eliminate the tiny Cuban air force but had prompted a Cuban military alert and protest to the United Nations.
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