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This chapter analyzes voluntary compliance in tax contexts, focusing on the importance of procedural justice and tax morale. It also explores conditions under which governments can achieve optimal revenue levels.
This chapter discusses the perils of voluntary compliance, including variation between individuals in the likelihood of voluntary compliance, costs and risks of changing intrinsic motivation by states, and potential risks to the cooperating public. The chapter examines a crucial paradox: When governments shift from monitoring to seeking public collaboration, they may inadvertently create more problematic regulatory approaches. While appearing gentler on the surface, these strategies could prove more manipulative from a democratic standpoint and more intrusive from a liberal perspective.
This chapter explores the role of culture (e.g., trust, solidarity, rule of law) in predicting the success of voluntary compliance and its malleability toward trust-based rather than coercion-based regulation.
This chapter compares the impact of different regulatory tools (command and control, mandates, and incentives relative to reasoning, honesty oath, and nudge) on the crowding out of different types of intrinsic compliance motivations.
This chapter concludes the book with normative messages on contexts where states can trust public cooperation without coercion, addressing jurisprudential and normative aspects of governments gaining public cooperation.
This chapter examines the likelihood of voluntary compliance in public health contexts, with emphasis on lessons learned during COVID-19 regarding trust in mask wearing, social distancing, and vaccine uptake.
This chapter assesses the potential of technological tools to ensure voluntary compliance without coercion and improve the predictability of trustworthiness, focusing on the ethical challenges such differentiation might create.
Chapter 1 introduces the challenges of trusting public cooperation without monitoring and coercion, considers current research on the relationship between concepts such as cooperation and honesty, and examines the effectiveness of voluntary compliance.
This chapter investigates factors influencing voluntary compliance with environmental regulations, exploring the role of environmental motivation in shaping behavior and analyzing various types of pro-environmental actions.
This chapter investigates moderating factors such as trust-related mechanisms, norms, and institutions, and their ability to explain the relationship between intrinsic motivation and compliance, which is free of regulatory coercion.
This chapter analyses compliance motivations and their alignment with existing taxonomies: extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivations, cooperation vs. coercion, and trust-based vs. monitoring-based approaches. It then explores the advantages of voluntary compliance over coerced compliance, both in the short term and in the long term.
When do citizens voluntarily comply with regulations rather than act out of fear of sanctions? Can the Public be Trusted? challenges prevailing regulatory paradigms by examining when democratic states can rely on voluntary compliance. Drawing on behavioral science, law, and public policy research, Yuval Feldman explores why voluntary compliance, despite often yielding superior and more sustainable outcomes, remains underutilized by policymakers. Through empirical analysis of policy implementation in COVID-19 response, tax compliance, and environmental regulation, Feldman examines trust-based governance's potential and limitations. The book presents a comprehensive framework for understanding how cultural diversity, technological change, and institutional trust shape voluntary cooperation. By offering evidence-based insights, Feldman provides practical recommendations for balancing trust, accountability, and enforcement in regulatory design. This book is essential reading for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners seeking to optimize regulatory outcomes through enhanced voluntary compliance. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.