This brief chapter, closing Part I, concludes that the individual is procedurally involved in such contexts to a minor extent and offers reflections on the reasons for this. It discusses the culture of state-centrism at the Court, its passive approach to procedural mechanisms, and certain fears it likely has. The reasons are challenged in this chapter, which ends with a brief word on how transparency practices can also contribute to the further integration of individuals in the procedural law of the World Court.

This chapter argues that the implications of territorial disputes for individuals are seldom considered in the Court’s legal reasoning and proposes ways to do so. It first observes that the Court traditionally resolves territorial disputes with reference to a firm hierarchy of titles, few of which allow for the consideration of individuals. It then considers how the title of effectivités could potentially allow for the consideration of individuals and acknowledges that their rights and needs have been mentioned by the Court as an afterthought in certain judgments. It analyses the reasons for the Court’s approach and argues that the principle of equity could play a stronger role in allowing for the consideration of individuals in territorial disputes.

This chapter argues that while great strides have been made to humanise the law of diplomatic protection, its practice in the courtroom is not in alignment with this as the protected individual does not participate in proceedings. It first dismantles the famous Mavrommatis fiction and argues that other conditions for diplomatic protection (such as nationality and the exhaustion of local remedies) and its features (such as state discretion and state responsibility) have been increasingly humanised to place emphasis on the individual. Second, it analyses the case law to show how the individual does not participate in proceedings at the Peace Palace. Finally, it provides suggestions to advocate for stronger procedural participation for the injured individual in cases of diplomatic protection at the ICJ.

This chapter concludes that the individual is considered in the legal reasoning of the Court in the identified contexts to a minor extent and offers reflections on the reasons for this. It recapitulates reflections on formalism and stability that are key in maritime and territorial boundary disputes. It notes that the Court is correctly limited to the request of the parties and cannot innovate beyond their submissions. However, across all chapters it was observed that state litigants often raise concerns about individuals in their custody. It therefore challenges the Court’s judicial caution when faced with potentially developing international law in addressing state’s concerns. It argues that while the Court does not have a formal law-making function, it develops international law nonetheless through its interpretations and clarifications and should not hesitate to do so when clarification is sought by state litigants on matters relating to the affected individuals in such disputes.

The introduction explains the book’s argument that individuals impacted by the repercussions of interstate disputes dealt with by the Court should and can be further integrated into its procedure and considered in its legal reasoning. Through the lens of social idealism, it explains how the Court’s effectiveness and legitimacy may be compromised due to its reluctant approach towards individuals. It also clarifies the method, methodology, scope, and structure of the book.

This chapter argues that such judicialisation before the ICJ has not developed international environmental law in a way favourable to victims of environmental degradation. It first observes that certain promising human rights-focused environmental disputes were discontinued, indicating that other forms of peaceful dispute settlement remain significant in the environmental context. It then argues that raising arguments in certain incidental proceedings in environmental disputes, such as counterclaims, have limited the potential for certain decisions to develop peoples’ rights in environmental disputes. Finally, it argues that the Court’s perceived judicial caution has limited its ability to clarify the role of local populations in environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and develop certain environmental principles in light of populations, such as the precautionary principle or the principle of intergenerational equity.

This chapter argues that advisory proceedings have the procedural flexibility to enable individuals’ participation, despite the Court’s reluctance to bring such participation to fruition. It first dispels the myth that witnesses are limited to the confines of contentious proceedings. It then discusses the Court’s sparse engagement with amici curiae. Finally, it explores the potential of the analogous extension of Article 66(2) of the Court’s Statute, authorising the furnishing of information by entities beyond states and international organisations.

This chapter observes instances in which the World Court has recognised that certain sources of international law may confer rights for individuals. It first identifies cases where the Court has interpreted relevant provisions of other international treaties, beyond the international human rights framework, as conferring rights on individual. In so doing, it analyses where the Court has applied ‘textualist’ and ‘intentionalist’ approaches to reach its conclusions. The chapter then notes where the Court has identified customary international law, the existence of which would confer rights to private persons in specific contexts. It notes that while there are ambiguities in the Court’s methods, this is characteristic of its approach to sources more broadly

This chapter addresses a former practice where international civil servants of certain UN organisations, who were not satisfied with the decisions rendered by the administrative tribunal dealing with their employment matters, were able to have these decisions re-examined by the Court. These proceedings drew much attention to the access and procedural inclusion of individuals before the World Court. It argues that the Court was indeed the incorrect forum for wronged UN staff members seeking redress due to its own Statute barring access to individuals and therefore entailing a permanent inequality of the parties. However, it argues that while the Court was handling such disputes, there were ways to adjust its procedural mechanisms to further bridge the inequality between the parties.

This chapter concludes the monograph, summarizing the main reflections offered throughout and reflecting on the future of the relationship between the individual and the International Court of Justice.

This chapter identifies the distinct contexts in maritime disputes where concerns for local populations are raised in states’ arguments but dismissed by the Court. It observes that the overarching reason underpinning this approach is the Court’s adherence to legal formalism. This approach is appropriate when determining the pre-existence of a maritime boundary before delimiting one. However, when adjusting a provisional line in maritime boundary delimitation, it argues that the principle of equity can play a greater role in promoting a fuller consideration of the needs of local populations. Beyond the delimitation process, when attributing sovereignty to a maritime zone, the dismissing concerns for local populations has taken the form of rejecting states’ arguments regarding historic fishing rights. In this context, this chapter argues that reframing the understanding of stability can allow for historic fishing rights to be upheld and, therefore, for the needs of local populations to be considered.

The Court’s personal jurisdiction is governed by Article 34(1) of its Statute, limiting standing to states. Through an examination of the travaux preparatoires of this provision, it is revealed that while drafters considered granting individuals standing before the World Court, this was ultimately rejected due to reasons anchored in the traditional positivist doctrine. While scholars have long criticised Article 34(1) for being at odds with the role of the individual in the contemporary international legal order and called for its amendment, this chapter argues against this proposal due to the practical infeasibility with respect to Statute amendments, workload, jurisdiction, and legal interest. It argues instead that the Court may adjust its procedural mechanisms in a variety of contexts to circumvent its Article 34(1) and allow for the integration of concerned individuals in its proceedings to the best of its ability, where necessary or desirable.