Coombs and Trestman provide an integrative, embodied framework for the evolution of complex cognition. However, they overlook the critical role of ecological and environmental contexts in such evolution. Our commentary highlights its anthropocentric biases and emphasizes the need for species-specific approaches that account for diverse sensory modalities, ecologies, and social environments while prioritizing organism-specific challenges and ecological niches.

While we applaud Bruineberg et al.'s analysis of the differences between Markov blankets and Friston blankets, we think it is not carried out to its ultimate consequences. There are reasons to think that, once Friston blankets are accepted as a theoretical construct, they do not do the work proponents of free energy principle (FEP) attribute to them. The emperor is indeed naked.

We agree with Heyes that an explanation of human uniqueness must appeal to cultural evolution, and not just genes. Her account, though, focuses narrowly on internal cognitive mechanisms. This causes her to mischaracterize human behavior and to overlook the role of material culture. A more powerful account would view cognitive gadgets as spanning organisms and their (shared) environments.