This chapter examines transnational efforts to uphold the rule of law by regional courts and organizations.  While not originally the primary focus of regional trade regimes and human rights systems in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, these institutions have now taken on a thicker set of obligations toward protecting the rule of law (along with democracy and other related concepts).  The result is that supranational and international organizations have become important actors confronting real-world threats to the rule of law. The chapter compares developments in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

The burgeoning literature in comparative constitutional has not devoted sufficient attention to the constitutional functions of political parties, nor has it systematically explored the constitutional law of electoral design. This volume examines the constitutional treatment of parties and elections both as a matter of constitutional theory and from the perspective of historical and contemporary practice. To this end, it draws together a series of contributions from a diverse range of scholars working in distinct disciplines. Political scientists tend to treat political parties as their key object of study, while comparative constitutional lawyers have largely ignored them, preferring to focus on other institutional question. What follows brings each perspective into conversation with the other.

Recent decades have seen a sharp rise in constitutional provisions regulating core aspects of democracy, including the rules about parties, voting, and elections. The trend is apparent in both democracies and nondemocracies, although democracies tend to constitutionalize slightly more matters. Constitutionalization can help democracy by tying the hands of politicians. Looking at cross-national data, we find that constitutionalizing democracy is correlated with higher levels of democracy. Constitutionalization of democracy carries advantages as well as risks. We illustrate the dynamics with short case studies of Kenya and Thailand.

In Constitutional Identity, Gary Jacobsohn highlights the tension both within constitutional systems and between constitutions and societal norms (culture). In this essay, we explore the first tension and glance at the second. One objective of the essay is to enumerate a set of “disharmonies” that appear with some frequency within constitutions and, employing historical data, identify the constitutional systems that contain them. Appealing to formal logic, we develop a taxonomy that helps us understand the kinds of disharmonies on display; a taxonomy that points to their sources. The essay thus generalizes Jacobsohn’s notion of disharmony and extends his insights from a small set of cases that begin with the letter “I” to a larger set.

This chapter examines the institutional context of the Court. It focuses first on the Court’s function as a court, i.e. as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It then considers the Court’s relations with States, as an international court. Finally, he considers the Court’s institutional grounding as an organ of the United Nations, and examines its relationship with the United Nations. Professor Ginsburg argues that there is a gap between the Court’s formal institutional structures and its actual operation in practice, and emphasises in particular the way in which the Court has taken a central role in the development of international law.

This chapter surveys constitutional design for territorially divided societies, with special application to the Middle East. Federalism, which is a standard part of the toolkit in other parts of the world, has rarely been attempted or sustained in the region. Decentralization holds more promise, and although many of the attempts so far have been ineffective, it would help a good deal. Special autonomy, in which one or more regions of a country enjoy authority over certain subjects, could work for certain areas as well. Another set of tools, categorized as rights, redistribution, and representation, operates at the level of the central government. Whatever arrangements are chosen, there is a need for institutional guarantors of the constitutional bargain over territory: courts and international actors can play this role. The chapter concludes that mechanisms providing voice are superior to those facilitating exit, and that a combination of representation and decentralization may be sufficient in many cases.