We discuss opportunities in applying the resource-rationality framework toward answering questions in emotion and mental health research. These opportunities rely on characterization of individual differences in cognitive strategies; an endeavor that may be at odds with the normative approach outlined in the target article. We consider ways individual differences might enter the framework and the translational opportunities offered by each.

We show that the benchmark Bayesian framework that Rahnev & Denison (R&D) used to assess optimality is actually suboptimal under realistic assumptions about how noise corrupts decision making in biological brains. This model is therefore invalid qua normative standard. We advise against generally forsaking optimality and argue that a biologically constrained definition of optimality could serve as an important driver for scientific progress.

This commentary focuses on two related, open questions in Hulleman & Olivers' (H&O's) proposal: (1) the nature of the parallel attentive process that determines target presence within, and thus presumably the size of, the functional visual field, and (2) how the pre-attentive guidance mechanism must be conceived to also account for search performance in tasks that afford no reliable target-based guidance.

We show that our item-based model, competitive guided search, accounts for the empirical patterns that Hulleman & Olivers (H&O) invoke against item-based models, and we highlight recently reported diagnostic data that challenge their approach. We advise against “forsaking the item” unless and until a full fixation-based model is shown to be superior to extant item-based models.