The epilogue comes out of a process of self-reflection on the author’s own role as staff in an IDFI. It reflects on the author’s limitation and inability to influence organizational culture and the discourse on reform. It also focuses on lessons learned regarding how individuals may need to prepare themselves to better influence these powerful and potentially impactful entities as well as governments on the road toward educational reform that progresses learning in developing countries.

This chapter introduces donor financing of education reform in developing countries and the global compacts in the sector. There is an assumption that learning was not part of these compacts and if only it were part of the discourse and learning was consistently measured, this crisis would not be upon us. However, the first global event in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990 included a significant and urgent obligation of the donor community to address learning. This concerted focus disappeared in following global events. Nonetheless, donors influenced by the shared passion for learning at Jomtein were consistently involved with measuring learning, helping to keep an eye on the unfolding learning deficit. Three examples are offered to illustrate this commitment – in a project (the Indian District Primary Education), across regions and during the primary early grades. These examples shine a spotlight on the tried and tested assessments of learning. In spite of donor focus on this important aspect of education, there is a learning crisis across developing countries.

The second chapter moves from the learning crisis to IDFI programming in education. Based on the three main donors involved with primary education (World Bank, DFID, and USAID), it examines the process of designing projects in developing countries and the interventions that were financed. Early emphasis was on developing school infrastructure. Initial research, especially the school effectiveness studies, informed donor decisions on the content of their financing of education reform. There is an evolution in IDFI approach with a singular focus on developing infrastructure to a collective construction of a basket of investments for quality education based on best practice. There are commonalities across agencies in the interventions that are financed. Each of the areas contained in this basket are discussed in detail in light of the learning crisis – instructional materials, teacher training, and community mobilization. The chapter concludes by identifying the gaps in programming that have led to the learning crisis. In the final evaluation, the interorganizational reflection and systems learning that would have helped to comprehend and attend to the learning crisis did not happen.

The chapter begins by describing the content of the micro and meso levels that make up the ecosystem necessary to promote learning. In the past decades, knowledge generated on quality education has led to “discrete and disruptive” interventions with manageable and disaggregated components that fit into the worldview of the mostly distant donor (a “hawk’s eye” approach). An organically integrated approach is constructively worked out, which provides a framework for analyzing micro and meso levels (a “turtle’s feet” approach). The conceptual framework that structures this knowledge generation includes three areas that define micro and meso institutions: composite history, tangled milieus, and embedded mindsets. This research framework allows for the design and implementation of interventions that fit the ecosystem in a country that drives how things work on the ground. The chapter argues that such a shift in knowledge generation will help to design interventions that enable meso institutions to intervene for consistent and effective teaching and learning to take place in schools in developing countries.

This chapter explores the evidence base that informed the work of donors. It examines the analytical work undertaken in developing countries, mostly financed by multilateral and bilateral agencies. Three trajectories in this body of education research can be identified: (i) large-scale surveys showing broad trends and patterns; (ii) randomized controlled trials claiming to show “what works” in education; and (iii) political economy research. I highlight the strengths and limitations of each of these research tracks, examining to what extent studies were able to inform project design or steer mid-course correction to improve learning. The discussion shows how the predominance of one approach blinds practitioners to the specificities and complexities of the two levels (micro and meso) critical for learning. This also displaces much-needed resources for knowledge generation in the areas that impact learning. In sum, the educational ecosystem in a country, which includes numerous institutions at the micro and meso levels interacting and working together to make a school system function, is a black box.

Most children in developed countries who finish primary schooling can read, write, and do basic mathematics. This is in stark contrasts with children in many developing countries. Despite billions of dollars spent each year for decades by donors, a large proportion of students in these countries are not learning. In sub-Saharan Africa, 84 percent and 88 percent of students did not achieve minimum proficiency in mathematics and reading, respectively, while in Central and Southern Asia, this figure was 76 percent and 81 percent in the same subjects. Contrast this with mathematics and reading in Europe and North America where only 14 percent did not attain minimum proficiency in both subjects.