Robert Simpson and Toby Handfield recently argued in this journal that my epistemic environmentalism is too radical. It implausibly collapses the distinction between rational response to evidence and group epistemic success and – on the mistaken assumption that this best conduces to epistemic success – requires uncritical deference to apparent experts. In this response, I argue that Simpson and Handfield badly mischaracterize my view. I neither collapse the distinction between ecological and epistemic rationality, nor do I countenance uncritical deference. I argue that environmentalism has the resources to give the right answers in the cases that Simpson and Handfield urge against my view.

Working memory encompasses the limited incoming information that can be held in mind for cognitive processing. To date, we have little information on the effects of bilingualism on working memory because, absent evidence, working memory tasks cannot be assumed to measure the same constructs across language groups. To garner evidence regarding the measurement equivalence in Spanish and English, we examined second-grade children with typical development, including 80 bilingual Spanish–English speakers and 167 monolingual English speakers in the United States, using a test battery for which structural equation models have been tested – the Comprehensive Assessment Battery for Children – Working Memory (CABC-WM). Results established measurement invariance across groups up to the level of scalar invariance.

OBJECTIVES/GOALS: The time between lower extremity amputations and prosthetic acquisition profoundly influences patient rehabilitation and mortality outcomes. Our primary outcome was time to prosthetic acquisition following major limb amputation. We hypothesize that women face an increased time lag between amputation and prosthetic acquisition compared to men. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: We used the 2015-2021 Truven Marketscan Medicare and Commercial Claims Administrative dataset to identify individuals with lower extremity amputations based on CPT codes. We excluded patients < 18 years old, those with prior/concurrent major extremity amputations, and those with <= 31 days discontinuity in enrollment. To estimate time to prosthetic acquisition after initial amputation, Weibull Accelerated Failure Time multivariable regression models were used to estimate unadjusted and adjusted time ratios and 95% confidence intervals comparing men to women. We adjusted models for age, Medicare supplement/commercial payer, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), amputation type, social deprivation index, and Elixhauser comorbidities. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We identified 4,054 patients with major lower extremity amputations (75% below knee and 25% at or above knee). Patients were predominantly male (72%). For patients who received prosthetics, 39.06% of men and 31.28% of women received prosthetics within the first three months of amputation (p<0.001). Time ratios > 1 indicated longer time to prosthetic acquisition between comparison groups. The adjusted time ratio for women compared to men for the time to acquisition of prosthetics was increased; this was statistically significant (TR 1.3281, 95% CI 1.1667, 1.5118). This time ratio suggests that if a man received a prosthetic in 100 days, a women would receive her prosthetic in 133 days. DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE: We found a significant difference in the time to prosthetic acquisition following major limb amputation and acquisition rate in the first three months of amputation among men and women. Successful rehabilitation, quality of life, and healthcare costs are influenced by the timeliness of prosthetic acquisition.

There's heated debate around whether people who did terrible things in the past, at a time when there was widespread acceptance of such actions, are appropriately blamed by us, on the grounds they weren't really morally ignorant, or their ignorance was itself culpable. I point to puzzles that arise if we blame them. We need to explain how they could act so badly if they weren't fully ignorant. I argue that plausible answers to that question entail that they're not blameworthy, or that we lack standing to blame them.

Framing effects are held to be irrational because preferences should remain stable across different descriptions of the same state of affairs. Bermúdez offers one reason why this may be false. I argue for another: If framing provides implicit testimony, then rational agents will alter their preferences accordingly. I show there is evidence that framing should be understood as testimonial.

In a recent paper in this journal, Joshua Blanchard has identified a novel problem: the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. We find ourselves in unwelcome epistemic company when we hold a belief that is also held mainly or most prominently by those we regard as morally or epistemically bad. Blanchard argues that some, but not all, unwelcome epistemic company provides higher-order evidence against our belief. But he doesn't provide a test for when company is unwelcome or a diagnosis of why it is unwelcome. I provide both. On my disjunctive test, unwelcome epistemic company provides us with a defeater when either there is a match between the content of the belief and the properties that make our company unwelcome, or there is reason to suspect that the belief arose via a shared, unreliable, causal process.

Cushman argues that the function of rationalization is to attribute mental representations to ourselves, thereby making these representations available for future planning. I argue that such attribution is often not necessary and sometimes maladaptive. I suggest a different explanation of rationalization: making representations available to other agents, to facilitate cooperation, transmission, and the ratchet effect that underlies cumulative cultural evolution.

Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the Standard accounts of autonomy can satisfactorily explain the way in which it undermines fully autonomous agency. In order to understand to what extent and in what ways the addicted are autonomy-impaired, we need to understand autonomy as consisting, essentially, in the exercise of the capacity for extended agency. It is because addiction undermines extended agency, so that addicts are not able to integrate their lives and pursue a Single conception of the good, that it impairs autonomy.

No-platforming—the refusal to allow those who espouse views seen as inflammatory the opportunity to speak in certain forums—is very controversial. Proponents typically cite the possibility of harms to disadvantaged groups and, sometimes, epistemically paternalistic considerations. Opponents invoke the value of free speech and respect for intellectual autonomy in favor of more open speech, arguing that the harms that might arise from bad speech are best addressed by rebuttal, not silencing. In this article, I argue that there is a powerful consideration in favor of no-platforming some speakers: allowing them a platform generates genuine higher-order evidence in favor of their claims. When that higher-order evidence would be misleading, we may reasonably believe it should not be generated.

John Doris argues that, when behaviors are caused by processes that we would not endorse, our agency is defeated. I argue that this test for defeaters is inappropriate. What matters is not what we would but what we should endorse. The subpersonal mechanisms he identifies as defeaters enable us to track and respond to reasons. They realize agency, rather than defeating it.

In his paper published in this issue, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that the challenge to compatibilism from luck is not novel. Rather, the challenge is identical to that from manipulation cases, and compatibilists already have responses to that challenge. In response, I distinguish two different luck problems for compatibilism. One challenge is seen in manipulation cases, but the challenge he identifies is different from the challenge from manipulation. The luck problem is therefore novel, and the existing solutions to the challenge from manipulation fail to address it.

Carbon nanotubes (CNTs) have unique thermal/electrical/mechanical properties and high aspect ratios. Growth of CNTs directly onto reactive material substrates (such as metals and carbon based foam structures, etc.) to create a micro-carbon composite layer on the surface has many advantages: possible elimination of processing steps and resistive junctions, provision of a thermally conductive transition layer between materials of varying thermal expansion coefficients, etc. Compared to growing CNTs on conventional inert substrates such as SiO2, direct growth of CNTs onto reactive substrates is significantly more challenging. Namely, control of CNT growth, structure, and morphology has proven difficult due to the diffusion of metallic catalysts into the substrate during CNT synthesis conditions. In this study, using a chemical vapor deposition method, uniform CNT layers were successfully grown on copper foil and carbon foam substrates that were pre-coated with an appropriate buffer layer such as Al2O3 or Al. SEM images indicated that growth conditions and, most notably, substrate surface pre-treatment all influence CNT growth and layer structure/morphology. The SEM images and pull-off testing results revealed that relatively strong bonding existed between the CNT layer and substrate material, and that normal interfacial adhesion (0.2‒0.5 MPa) was affected by the buffer layer thickness. Additionally, the thermal properties of the CNT/substrate structure were evaluated using a laser flash technique, which showed that the CNT layer can reduce thermal resistance when used as a thermal interface material between bonded layers.

The typical explanation of an event or process which attracts the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is an explanation that conflicts with the account advanced by the relevant epistemic authorities. I argue that both for the layperson and for the intellectual, it is almost never rational to accept such a conspiracy theory. Knowledge is not merely shallowly social, in the manner recognized by social epistemology, it is also constitutively social: many kinds of knowledge only become accessible thanks to the agent's embedding in an environment that includes other epistemic agents. Moreover, advances in knowledge typically require ongoing immersion in this social environment. But the intellectual who embraces a conspiracy theory risks cutting herself off from this environment, and therefore epistemically disabling herself. Embracing a conspiracy theory therefore places at risk the ability to engage in genuine enquiry, including the enquiry needed properly to evaluate the conspiracy theory.

If Knobe is right that ordinary judgments are normatively suffused, how do scientists free themselves from these influences? I suggest that because science is distributed and externalized, its claims can be manipulated in ways that allow normative influences to be hived off. This allows scientists to deploy concepts which are not normatively suffused. I suggest that there are good reasons to identify these normatively neutral concepts with the folk concepts.