The article demonstrates that the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip are highly problematic from a legal perspective. There are strong indications that the ICJ acted outside the scope of its authority by adopting a very vague but progressive interpretation of the Genocide Convention combined with a novel application of Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, which allowed the ICJ to adopt specific interim measures in the first, second and third orders. Finally, an overall analysis indicates that the ICJ has begun to act as the ultimate genocide prevention body in attempting to enforce a general duty to minimise human suffering in Gaza. While this might be seen as a laudable exercise to protect civilians, it seems to be beyond the scope of the Genocide Convention and the judicial authority of the ICJ.

The notion of constitutional identity is a recent and enigmatic notion in constitutional law and theory. This Article demonstrates that constitutional identity—understood as a certain constitution-related self-identity of a nation or people—can be constructed from the text of a constitution, its interpretation and its application. However, constitutional identity is nothing more and nothing less than a constructed reality that can be regarded as a constitutional state's restless soul. It exists only as a constructed, simplified, imagined reality that will most likely also be contested and subject to change. Constitutional identity and the reliance on it in particular by national courts should therefore not be regarded as something sacred and absolute that can be compared to an imagined stable heart. Instead, constitutional identity should be treated with caution.