Environmental policies and enforcement pose fundamental corruption issues relating to the tensions between economic self-interest and the public good. By directing our attention to the challenges of collective action, they also highlight the importance of state-level institutional and political characteristics – notably, the political clout of industrial and environmental lobby groups. High levels of corruption and low levels of trust both weaken the stringency and enforcement of environmental policies and affect levels of emissions, although as levels of trust in a state increase, the effects of corruption weaken or vanish. Our environmental findings closely parallel those in other chapters having to do with COVID policies – not surprising, as they raise similar questions of policy and compliance – and support our argument that thinking solely in terms of specific acts of rule- or law-breaking is an incomplete understanding of corruption, its causes, and its consequences.

The United States, despite its generally favorable rankings on international indices, has significant corruption problems. Those issues cannot be ignored, but neither should they be exaggerated or oversimplified. American corruption is not any one single problem: contrasts are apparent among the states, across regions, and at different levels of the federal system. Some are illegal, but other types are legal – or not clearly against the law. While corruption is a significant issue in the context of law enforcement, race relations, environmental policy, and public health, its sources, consequences, and context differ from one sector to the next. Inequalities along racial and class lines add further complexities and significantly affect the prospects of reform. Checking corruption and dealing with its consequences will be a matter not only of enacting and enforcing sound laws but of how well we govern ourselves within a large, complicated, multi-level, but fundamentally democratic constitutional framework.

Arguments that corruption is “grease for the wheels,” benefiting economic growth, are difficult to sustain. State-level findings show that extensive corruption tends to leave a state poorer, and more economically unequal, than states where the problem is less significant. Citizens’ ability to respond to those difficulties by political means is in turn influenced by corruption itself, general levels of political participation, the strength or weakness of trust in officials and fellow citizens, the amount and quality of political news coverage in the mass media, and a state’s social composition. Problems of low trust could conceivably be addressed via effective universally applied public policies, but those in turn can challenge, and be challenged by, key aspects of America’s long-term bargain between government and citizens and by citizens’ expectations of each other. Corruption often undermines trust, and trust can underwrite effective reforms, but the relationships are complex and contingent upon levels of trust that are neither too low nor too high.

Health care comprises a major segment of the US economy and is a critical influence upon citizens’ quality of life. The quality of health care and access to it are negatively affected by corruption. So too is citizen compliance with public health policies, a fact that became apparent during the COVID-19 pandemic. Stay-at-home orders, for example, were significantly less effective in states with more extensive corruption. Low levels of trust in government contributed to those disparities. Such effects are more pronounced in poorer areas and Black communities. Racial contrasts in vaccine equity – access to vaccinations and related services – were pronounced and, again, reflected levels of corruption. Particularly intractable problems of collective action posed by structural corruption and structural racism must be addressed if disparities in the quality of health care are to be reduced.

As judged by our three proxy measures of corruption, the fifty states vary greatly in terms of the pervasiveness and types they experience. We analyze those contrasts employing a range of empirical measures and find the political, economic, and institutional factors matter greatly. Particularly intriguing are the ways contrasts in corruption relate to Daniel Elazar’s three major political subcultures – Moralistic, Individualistic, and Traditionalistic – and to the ways they differ and mingle state by state. Contrasts in our corruption measures are linked to a range of explanatory variables in ways consistent with theory. Such links to fundamental influences not only point to the systemic nature of corruption, its causes, and consequences, but also help explain its tenacity and the difficulties we face when we attempt to implement reforms.

Can citizens check corruption through political participation policies? What the latter might mean can be a hotly contested question: smaller government, decentralization, deregulation, and term limits for elected officials are all significant reform ideas, but none qualifies as a silver bullet and all have their potential negative consequences. Factors such as representation of women in public office, news media coverage, and levels of education can have more influence on states’ levels of corruption. Political competition and lobbying regulations are also significant influences. Controlling campaign financing is a widely supported idea, but contributions, like lobbying, enjoy First Amendment protection, and the full consequences of various contribution limits, matching funds, and candidate-subsidy schemes are difficult to anticipate. Good politics might conceivably make for better government, but what those ideas might mean in practice and how to get there are controversial issues.

The question of how corrupt the United States is has no single answer. After all, we lack an accepted definition of corruption and cannot directly measure what is usually a clandestine or contested kind of activity. Some corruption is clearly illegal, but other activities widely seen as corrupt, or corrupting, are legal – in some cases, constitutionally protected. There are different categories of corruption – at a minimum, it is important to distinguish between illegal and legal corruption – and the country is comprised of fifty different states, each (as Daniel Elazar has argued) a civil society in its own right, and each with multiple institutions where corruption might take root. Finally, the causes and consequences of corruption can differ significantly from one policy area or economic sector to the next. In this chapter, we lay out our agenda for analyzing American corruption, with an emphasis on the diversity of the federal system and the importance of looking carefully at different aspects of policy and politics.

Police killings of Black Americans are influenced not only by specific law enforcement situations but also by corruption – where corruption in a state is more extensive, police killings are more frequent. State-level factors may seem remote from local policing, but in fact the constitutional and political connections are strong and deep-rooted. Police killings of Black Americans also reflect contrasts in the states’ political cultures and aspects of communities’ racial composition. Median income levels and the economic gaps between Black and White populations also influence the patterns of police killings. Lobbying activities, political party competition, and police unionism contribute to overall levels of accountability. These diverse and often deep-rooted influences, many of them linked to the expectations communities have of their police and the attitudes of police toward their work and the surrounding communities, show that dealing with the problem of police killings of Black Americans will require fundamental changes of many sorts.

While we cannot measure corruption directly, it is possible to employ a number of proxy variables. We describe three useful approaches, all contributing to our understanding of corruption in practice. The Corruption Convictions Index (CCI) employs US Department of Justice data on corruption convictions aggregated by state. The news-based Corruption Reflections Index (CRI) compares the states in terms of the number of stories mentioning corruption. While both the CCI and CRI are proxy measures of illegal corruption, our Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), derived from surveys of statehouse news reporters, compares the states in terms of both legal and illegal corruption broken down by branch of government. While each index has its limitations, the three collectively yield suggestive rankings of the fifty states, not only by indirectly estimating the overall scale of the problem in each state but also, with the CPI, contrasting illegal and legal varieties and perceived corruption by branches of government.