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How does context influence individuals’ misinformation about socially marginalized groups? Scholarship has long found that one’s geographical and social environment are important determinants for one’s political attitudes. But how these contexts shape individuals’ levels of misinformation about stigmatized groups remains an open and pressing question, especially given the swift rise of misinformation in recent years. Using three original surveys, we find that individuals who report more contact with a diverse group of individuals were significantly less likely to be misinformed. These findings are particularly pronounced among white Americans. Moreover, contrary to the popular belief that where one lives is a strong determinant of racial attitudes, we also find that partisan and racial context did not meaningfully shape misinformation. These findings shed light on the factors that helps us to understand the misinformation that exists about this sizable share of U.S. society.
This Element examines just how much the public knows about some of America's most stigmatized social groups, who comprise 40.3% of the population, and evaluates whether misinformation matters for shaping policy attitudes and candidate support. The authors design and field an original survey containing large national samples of Black, Latino, Asian, Muslim, and White Americans, and include measures of misinformation designed to assess the amount of factual information that individuals possess about these groups. They find that Republicans, Whites, the most racially resentful, and consumers of conservative news outlets are the most likely to be misinformed about socially marginalized groups. Their analysis also indicates that misinformation predicts hostile policy support on racialized issues; it is also positively correlated with support for Trump. They then conducted three studies aimed at correcting misinformation. Their research speaks to the prospects of a well-functioning democracy, and its ramifications on the most marginalized.
Does treatment mode matter in studies of the effects of candidate race or ethnicity on voting decisions? The assumption implicit in most such work is that such treatment mode differences are either small and/or theoretically well understood, so that the choice of how to signal the race of a candidate is largely one of convenience. But this assumption remains untested. Using a nationally representative sample of white voting-age citizens and a modified conjoint design, we evaluate whether signaling candidate ethnicity with ethnic labels and names results in different effects than signaling candidate ethnicity with ethnically identifiable photos and names. Our results provide strong evidence that treatment-mode effects are substantively large and statistically significant. Further, these treatment-mode effects are not consistent with extant theoretical accounts. These results highlight the need for additional theoretical and empirical work on race/ethnicity treatment-mode effects.
Laboratory studies frequently find that framing changes individual issue positions. But few real-world studies have demonstrated framing induced shifts in aggregate political opinions, let alone political identities. One explanation for these divergent findings is that the competitive nature of most real-world political debates presents multiple frames that cancel each other out. We assess this proposition and the extent of real-world framing by focusing on the issue of immigration, which has been framed in largely negative terms by the media. Specifically, we assess the connection between New York Times coverage of immigration and aggregate white partisanship over the last three decades. We find that negative framing on immigration is associated with shifts toward the Republican Party—the Party linked with anti-immigrant positions. This suggests that under the right circumstances, framing can alter core political predispositions and shape the partisan balance of power.
By
Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University,
Marisa A. Abrajano, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego,
Jeronimo Cortina, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Houston
Edited by
Jane Junn, University of Southern California,Kerry L. Haynie, Duke University, North Carolina
Until recently, Latinos were nearly invisible on the national political scene, garnering little attention from political parties, candidates, and scholars alike. Much has changed in the last several decades, and Latinos are now the largest minority group in the country, making up more than 12 percent of the U.S. population. With a steady stream of immigrants from Mexico and Latin America, the proportion of Latinos is expected to more than double by mid-century to a quarter of the population. Once small and geographically concentrated in states in the American west and southwest, new patterns of settlement among immigrants to nontraditional gateway metropolitan areas in the United States has resulted in a highly diverse Latino population that is increasingly dispersed across states in the United States. Nevertheless, substantial populations of Latinos reside in five of the most electorally rich states in the United States – California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois – and the dynamics of elections in those states and across the nation simply cannot be understood without accounting for Latino voters (Leighley 2001; Shaw et al. 2000).
Despite the momentous demographic changes and the resulting imperative to understand Latino electoral behavior, surprisingly little is known about how Latino voters are mobilized, and what impact that mobilization has on their voting behavior. In general, political scientists have focused their attention on developing models to explain voting among Anglos and African Americans.
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