This chapter has two parts. The first part investigates how the Party controls courts. It finds that the Party maximizes its political control over judicial affairs by normalizing its political prerogative in judicial decision-making. The normalization process takes two steps. First, all judges within a court are embedded in a chain of command—from Party leaders to court leaders, divisional heads, and frontline judges—tasked with processing and translating political directives into partial judicial outcomes that serve Party-state interests when needed. The legality of these demands or their immunity from legal scrutiny is derived from the Party’s political prerogative. This practice is then replicated across all courts and among all judges nationwide. The second part of this chapter analyzes reported cases of judicial corruption to identify what has caused the spread of judicial corruption. It concludes that the root cause is the very normalization of the Party’s political prerogative. Because this prerogative is inherently arbitrary and vulnerable to abuse, its institutionalization creates systemic opportunities for corruption across the political-legal apparatus. As a result, what begins as political control ultimately facilitates the pervasive spread of judicial corruption.

This concluding chapter outlines the contours of the Party-state and develops a conceptual framework to explain its distinctive mode of governance. At its core is a dual normative system: a legal system grounded in popular sovereignty is overseen and constrained by a power-based normative system designed to uphold the absolute authority of the Party Center—an organizing principle essential to maintaining the structural integrity of the Party-state. The chapter argues that the governance logic of the Party-state is best captured by the theory of Normalized Political Prerogative (NPP). According to this theory, governance unfolds through a three-step process: operationalization, normalization, and regulation. Together, these constitute the formal institutional foundation of Party-state rule. The NPP framework elucidates the systemic proliferation of corruption as an inherent byproduct of this mode of governance, the role of the Party’s disciplinary apparatus as a self-correcting mechanism to mitigate its adverse effects, and the evolving dynamics between institutions and leadership that shape politicking and power struggles within the Politburo.

In this chapter, I analyze the methodology of the Party’s anticorruption program under Xi Jinping. This program has two goals. The first is to shock and awe. This goal has been achieved successfully through the anti-corruption campaign in 2012-2017, which is attributable to two main factors: leadership qualities of both Xi himself and the campaign’s chief director Wang Qishan and the institutional infrastructure provided by the Party’s disciplinary system that had been built by Xi’s predecessors. The campaign’s success also shows that the institutional performance of the Party is susceptible to leadership influence, under which the same tools, devices, and mechanisms can be employed and exploited to different effects. The second goal of Xi’s anti-corruption program is to provide long-term solutions to some of the perpetuating problems of the Party’s disciplinary system. This reform marks a significant transformation in the Party-state relationship: instead of undermining the state for its own preservation, the Party now strengthens its political governance by empowering the state and drawing legitimacy from it. Lastly, I also discuss two recent developments: the gradual decline of Wang Qishan’s influence and the retraction of power from the CCDI.

This chapter seeks to explain the recurrence of judicial corruption despite waves of reforms. To that end, I track major reforms launched by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) over past decades and find a pattern: Most of them revolved on redistribution of judicial decision-making power. Instead of confronting the issue of institutionalized judicial partiality caused by normalized political prerogative, these reforms were designed to divide, centralize, decentralize, and recentralize judicial decision-making power. Since these measures are not geared to eliminate judicial partiality, they work best in redistributing rather than uprooting corruption. Recent reforms made efforts to set boundaries for the exercise of political prerogatives by banning “improper” interference while retaining “proper” interference. The reform may lift the costs of corruption, thereby reducing but not eliminating it, because the power that is most prone to corruption is the one that is entitled to “proper” interference. In the last section, I use a recent SPC scandal to expose the limits of the current judicial reforms and to illustrate the reach and the entrenchment of the prerogative-based judicial interference power.

Unlike anticorruption institutions elsewhere, China’s anticorruption practices follow a self-regulatory model: it is regulated by the very institution that is targeted by anticorruption. Compared with its role in judicial affairs, the Party’s involvement in anticorruption investigation is much more forefront, direct, and prominent. In this chapter, I track the origin and institutional evolution of the Party’s disciplinary system during 1927-2012. I point out that the Party’s institutional design is founded on the cardinal principle to preserve the unified (absolute) command of the Party Center. Thereby, how to reconcile between the imperative to uphold this principle and the need to provide a measure of autonomy for disciplinary institutions to avoid capture has been the main theme of the disciplinary institution-building process. The introduction of a tiered interlocking disciplinary decision-making structure, the segmented investigation process, and the “dual-leadership” model are the direct outcomes of the Party’s efforts to balance the conflicting needs mentioned above. These arrangements had fueled the rise of the CCDI but also brought several problems and challenges, including legal deficiency, jurisdictional frictions, resource shortage, incentive issues, and abuse, which had set the stage for Xi Jinping’s unprecedented anti-corruption campaign and disciplinary reform upon his taking power in 2012.